2. Argumentation from the Second Middle Term, namely from the Habit, and the Weighing of it

225. Argument is made, second, from habit, because an act is nobler that a nobler habit disposes to. Some habit of the intellect is nobler than any habit of the will because, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 1.2.983a4-7, wisdom is the noblest habit and the same is expressly said in Ethics 6.7.1141a16-20 and 10.7.1177a22-25. But no habit [of the will] is nobler, in the Philosopher, than justice or at any rate than friendship, about which it is plain that they are, according to him, far below wisdom.

226. To the contrary, I Corinthians 13.13, “But the greater of these is love;” and Augustine On the Trinity 15.18 n.37, “Among the gifts of God no gift is greater than charity, nor equal to it” (plainly speaking about a gift of a different idea).

227. The response [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.49 q.1 a.1] made to the Apostle and Augustine is that their understanding holds for the state of this life, but for the state of the fatherland the light of glory is nobler. The proof is that that to which, because of its perfection, belonging to something imperfect is repugnant is more perfect than that to which this is not repugnant; the light of glory, because of its perfection, is repugnant to being present in a wayfarer but not to being present in charity.

A confirmation: what distinguishes the perfect from the imperfect is more perfect than what is common to both; the light of glory distinguishes the comprehender [in heaven] from the wayfarer; charity is common.

228. Argument against this response:

First from the authority of Hugh [of St. Victor] On the Celestial Hierarchy 6.7 [supra n.21], about the “acute, super-fervent, hot,” says “love is supreme over knowledge;” hence the supreme order [of angels] is denominated from its ardor, the next to it from its knowledge.

229. Again, by reason:

The most perfect habit of will on the way [for the wayfarer] perfects the will according to the capacity that it has at that time; therefore, if it is nobler than any habit of intellect [as the response to the Apostle and Augustine conceded, nn.226-227], the capacity of the will on the way is greater (or for something greater) than the capacity of the intellect; therefore it is greater in the fatherland too, because either there is the same capacity here as there (speaking of remote capacity, which is according to the rank of the nature with the capacity), or the capacity there will correspond proportionally to the capacity here (speaking of proximate capacity); for the first capacity [capacity on the way] can only be totally satisfied by something proportionally perfecting it, so only by something more noble than it; but it is for something more noble [sc. than the intellect is for, as was conceded, nn.226-227].

230. This middle term [n.225] seems rather to conclude in favor of the will, especially when speaking of infused habits, which dispose to the true beatitude that the theologians speak of.

231. As to the authority of the Philosopher [n.225], it could be said that, although wisdom were a nobler acquired habit, it does not follow that it dispose to a nobler act, speaking of supernatural act, of which sort is beatitude.

232. But to the contrary [sc. to the concession, n.231, that wisdom is a nobler acquired habit]: the will is a power able to be habituated by an acquired habit just as the intellect is; therefore, the supreme acquired habit of the will can exceed wisdom just as its supreme infused habit exceeds the supreme habit infused in the intellect.

233. It could also be said that the Philosopher commonly did not distinguish intellect from will in idea of operative principle, or operative in extrinsic operation; hence he holds this principle, as it is distinct from nature, to be the same, now art or intellect, now intention [Ord. I d.2 n.351]. Likewise, neither does he distinguish the principle in its intrinsic operation in regard to the end; hence too he does not distinguish wisdom’s speculation from love, but rather its speculation includes love - or at any rate he does not assert that intellection suffices without volition, because, as intellection is distinguished from this other act (which act [of volition] is less manifest), he neither affirms nor denies it.