II. To the Initial Arguments for Each Part

170. To the first main argument [n.139] I say that the ‘whatever’ is not taken there for all desirable things separately, but for one desirable thing in which all are unitedly contained; and thus, in having the beatific object, by whatever act it be said to be had, ‘he has whatever he wants’, because he has it eminently in that act on account of which alone it is rightly to be wanted; and in this act he has every act rightly to be wanted. When, therefore, you take under the minor that this and that operation are rightly to be wanted in themselves, it is plain that it is not rightly taken under the major.

171. To the next [n.140] I say, as will be said in the following question [nn.271, 304], that ‘to have’ is taken there for an act of willing, not for any act of willing whatever, but for the perfect act of willing, which follows bare vision; and he who by such act has whatever he wants, that is, has the one thing that is eminently everything wantable, is blessed. But it does not follow that ‘therefore whoever wants whatever he wants is blessed’, because a definition or description proper to something can be given through a lower level predicate but not through a higher level one, because a higher level one belongs to more things; hence in the form [sc. of the argument] a consequent is drawn from a lower to a higher level along with distribution [sc. at that higher level -which is fallacious].

172. As to the third [n.141], I deny the major, because many aspects in something can be distinctive of it from something [else], nor yet is each of them of the essence of that something insofar as it is distinct, but only that which first and essentially distinguishes it - and if you take this to be the understanding from the fact that ‘per se’ is stated in the major, namely essentially and per se in the first mode [cf. footnote to n.117], I concede the major; and then the minor is false, because by act of will alone is the blessed distinguished in this per se mode from the non-blessed - about which more in the following question, ‘On Enjoyment’ [nn.297-299].

173. As to the argument for the opposite [nn.142-146], it can be conceded when one understands it about beatitude simply of the nature, and about any operation simply beatific, namely in each way of immediacy in immediately attaining the object. And this appears probable since, when people posit beatitude to be in each operation or in both, they say that one of them is per se ordered to the other [nn.155-163]; and consequently, neither are each nor both one ultimate perfection simply of the nature, since even a single one of them is simply the ultimate perfection of the power.