C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Richard

164. To the arguments for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.148]: the minor is not true save of one immediacy without the other, and from this does not follow save that beatitude is only in one or other of them, to the extent beatitude includes each immediacy. Likewise, beatitude of nature only consists in that by which nature most immediately attains the object; but that is single, though some power of it may, through another operation, attain it most immediately with the immediacy possible for that power.

165. To the second argument [n.149] it can be said that ‘to tend to the end’ only belongs to appetite properly, and this as the ‘to tend’ is compared to motion; because although the intellect tend to an object present, here however, when taking the ‘to tend’ equivocally, it yet never tends to anything as to acquiring, namely through motion, a term of motion.

166. In another way, having conceded that there is a tending to the beatific object through both powers, namely by a certain imperfect operation that can be had about something absent, the point can be conceded: one tendency is that whereby nature tends to it principally, and thus does a single resting follow it, which is the resting of nature principally; but the other tendency is a less principal tendency of it, and in this way does the resting follow. Also, when comparing the powers with each other, these tendencies are not to the object with a double immediacy most immediately, but only one is, and so that one will be the immediate resting which follows. The beatitude then is the beatitude of nature, to the extent that beatitude includes a double immediacy of operation to object.

167. To the third [n.150] I say that the total resting of nature, speaking of extensive totality, requires that whatever is restable in nature be at rest; and in this way the beatitude of man is not without resumption of, and reunion of the soul with, the body, because some appetite is in the soul for the body as for its proper perfectible object, or at least because conversely there is some appetite in matter (as in what is properly perfectible) for form, namely for the soul. But among these restings there is one resting of the nature simply, which namely is the resting of what is simply noblest in that nature, insofar as it is restable.

168. I say therefore that, just as there are some many things pertaining to the first act of something, so there can be many restings of those many, and one total resting, with extensive totality, of the whole, which includes those many restings. But there is of them all a single resting, which is the ultimate rest in the object, which also is alone the simply total resting of nature, speaking of intensive resting.