SUBSCRIBER:


past masters commons

Annotation Guide:

cover
The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
cover
Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 43 - 49.
Book Four. Distinctions 43 - 49
Forty Ninth Distinction. First Part. About the Natural Quality of Beatitude
Question Three. Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Several Operations Together
I. To the Question
A. Opinions of Others
1. Opinion of Richard of Middleton

1. Opinion of Richard of Middleton

147. Here is said [by Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.49 princ.1 q.6] that “beatitude consists in the act of intellect and will together.”

148. The reason for this is that “beatitude consists in the perfect union of the beatifiable person with God; now this includes union according to every power according to which the nature is able to be immediately one with God. Of this sort [of power] are both intellect and will, because just as God (under the idea of supreme truth) is the immediate object of the intellect, so is he (under the idea of supreme good) the immediate object of the will.”

149. Again, “the virtue through which anything is moved to its term is the same virtue by which it rests in its term; but intellectual nature is moved to God through both intellect and will; therefore it rests in him through both powers. But beatitude is perfect resting of intellectual nature in God.”

150. I add a third reason: when several things are required for the perfection of something in first act, several things, proportionable to those first ones, will also be required for the perfection of the same thing in second act; but intellect and will are required for the perfection of intellectual nature in first act, because intellectual nature would be perfect in first act when it lacks neither; therefore second acts corresponding to the first ones are required for the perfection of it in second act; beatitude, therefore, which is completive perfection of intellectual nature in second act, will include these two second acts.

151. The proof of the major is that nature cannot be perfectly at rest unless whatever belongs per se to its natural perfection be at rest; for grant that some such not be at rest, then nature, according to something or other intrinsic to it, is not at rest; therefore it is not perfectly at rest; therefore the resting perfection of the whole nature includes per se the resting of any first act belonging per se to that nature.