I. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

a. About the Opinion Itself and the Manner of Positing it

20. As to this second question the assertion is made [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 13 q.12] that beatitude perfects the essence more principally than the power.

21. The way of stating it is as follows: “Beatitude consists more principally in the object, which is uncreated beatitude, insofar as this is the good of the created will. Now the soul or the angelic nature is transformed by means of the will, so that, to the extent possible for it, it is converted into the object, and this by force of love, according to what Dionysius [Divine Names ch.4] says, that ‘love is a virtue that transforms and converts the lover into the beloved’; and Hugh of St. Victor says about ‘acute and super-fervent heat’ [Commentary on Celestial Hierarchy 6 ch.7] that ‘love wants to make you one with it’, namely the beloved; and later, ‘love inserts itself so that, if it could be done, the lover would be what the beloved is’, namely the one he loves, ‘and thus in a certain marvelous way it begins, by the force of love, to be expelled and go outside itself’.”

22. From this as follows: “That the nature which loves should go out of itself and begin to be what it loves can only come about by circumincession, a circumincession not of the soul and of a created nature that in-flows into deity, but rather the converse, so that in such created nature nothing should appear save divine dispositions, indeed, so that it should not appear to be anything other than God - just as iron glowing in fire shines and burns the way fire does, as if it not be, and not appear to be, other than fire.”

b. Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

23. From this way of understanding things an argument is made for the conclusion:

Since beatitude is by the in-flowing or circumincession of the beatific object in respect of the beatifiable subject, and since this in-flowing or circumincession is more in the essence than in the powers (for from the in-flowing into the essence there is a redounding or derivation into the powers, and not conversely, because derivation or redounding is from the prior to the posterior, not conversely, whether the order is one of being or of reason; for that is principally such by which something else is such, and not conversely) -     therefore etc     . The proposed conclusion thus follows.

24. Again, and it is as it were the same point: God, who is beatitude in its essence, is more principally possessed in his essence than in his powers; for he perfects essence in some way through essence, namely by in-flowing in the manner stated; but he only perfects the powers through operations terminating in the essence under the idea of the good and true. Now he perfects more principally what he perfects per se under his proper idea than what he perfects only terminatively under the idea of an attribute.

25. Again, grace is consummate glory; but grace is principally in the essence of the soul, and redounds, under the idea of habit and virtue, to the powers;     therefore etc     . [cf. Ord. II d.26 nn.11-23].

26. Again, distributive justice has regard to the worth of the receiver according to geometrical proportion, namely so that to the more worthy more good be distributed; but an intellectual nature is, in reality and in idea, more noble and more worthy than its power;     therefore etc     .

27. And this argument coincides with the first reason for this question [n.16]. But the addition is made that “perception of this perfection only belongs to the essence through the powers: through the intellect indeed in knowing the essence, through the will as tasting it, as Hugh says on the above cited chapter 7 [n.21], ‘Two there are: knowledge and love; knowledge illumines, love (as feeding) satisfies; in this does beatitude consist: to know and love the good’,” or it consists in knowledge and love of the good.

28. But as to the authorities of the philosophers for the opposite [nn.9-13], the response is made [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 13 q.12] that according to the intention of the philosophers “the beatitude of man or angel does not concern their essence but only their power, through the medium of its operation. And they said this because they did not see true beatitude, which true beatitude consists not only in act of will and intellect but principally in the object itself’ - and this by in-flowing or circumincession in the way stated [n.23].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. Against the Opinion in Itself

29. Against these views:

First as follows: God is not disposed in himself differently now than before, nor does he in-flow into this soul or angel differently now than before (if one considers essence precisely on each side), because there is always uniformity as to the in-flowing of the divine essence into the creature’s essence while the essence of the creature remains; so, if there is some newness in the beatified soul, it must be through some effect caused by God in the soul’s essence. The effect is said to be the beatitude of the soul formally, and this effect cannot be principally in the essence as the essence is distinguished from the power, because then it would be first act; but by no first act, distinct from second act, can a creature immediately attain the beatific essence.

There is a confirmation: nothing is properly speaking changed unless something new formally inhere in it; someone blessed is disposed now so differently than someone non-blessed before that he changes from misery to beatitude; but the divine essence is not by any in-flowing the essence of the blessed; therefore, something else must be in the blessed whereby he is formally blessed.

30. Again, in-flowing is prior in nature to any operation, since it is according to some first act, as was argued [nn.23-24, 29]; therefore it could, without contradiction, exist without operation, and consequently someone who is not operating but disposed as someone asleep could be principally blessed - which Aristotle considers unacceptable, Metaphysics 12.9.1074b17-18 [n.11]

31. Again a creature is blessed in some way proportionally to the way that God is blessed; but God is not blessed precisely by the fact he is the same as himself, but by the fact he understands and wills himself as object - otherwise, from the fact that he is blessed it could not be inferred that he is intelligent, because if he did not have an intellect he would still be the same as himself, just as a stone is the same as itself.

32. This point is argued briefly as follows: if divine beatitude does not consist, by way of its completion, in the identity of the beatifiable thing with the beatific object, then neither does the beatitude of the creature consist in any identity or internalizing of the beatific object through in-flowing; because if operation is required there [in God], over and above identity, much more is it required here [in the creature] over and above inflowing; because whatever were posited here as beatitude, something corresponding to it eminently would be beatitude principally there; but to the in-flowing by which the soul is said to be deified, as it were, identity corresponds there far more eminently.

b. Against the Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

33. As to the reasons adduced for the opinion [nn.21-28], some are against the opinion, and those for it are not compelling.

α. About the First Reason

34. For first, the way of positing it [n.21] seems to concede that this in-flowing is first in the power, and thus that beatitude is principally in the power.

Proof of the antecedent: for this way of positing states that through love, which is a transformative force, the lover begins to go out of itself and to be what it loves, and that this can only come about by circumincession or in-flowing. From this it follows that, through love, a circumincession or in-flowing of the beloved into the lover comes to be. But it is plain that love or affection, which Hugh is speaking about [n.21], are per se powers of the will.

35. Also the phrase ‘to go out of itself’ is metaphorical, as is apparent from the Philosopher in Politics 2.4.1262b7-13, for a thing is no less what it was because it loves something else [cf. Ord. I d.1 n.179]. But the reality of this sort of metaphor, and of all metaphors like it is this: that by receiving or valuing the beloved and by resting in the beloved the lover is more truly the beloved than it is itself. And this meaning is plainly stated by Hugh in the cited passage [n.21]: “He who longs only for what he loves even despises himself in comparison with what the loves.”

And this is what Augustine says City of God 14.28, “The city of God was made by a love of God proceeding to contempt of self (namely of the lover).” To this extent, therefore, does the lover go out of himself, because he thinks little of his own being in comparison with the beloved, so that he would prefer his own being rather than that of the beloved to be destroyed. But from this does not follow any circumincession or inflowing such as he argues for [Henry of Ghent, n.23].

36. The first reason [n.23] is not compelling, because it proceeds from the idea of this in-flowing [nn.34-35]. This in-flowing too, that in beatitude there be a certain special in-flowing - it is not an in-flowing of the divine essence into this [creaturely] essence as the divine essence is essence, but it is an in-flowing of the divine essence as beatific object into this [creaturely] essence as this essence attains the divine essence as object; but it attains the object more principally and immediately through the power.

37. What is argued there about redounding [n.23], that it takes place from the prior to the posterior and not conversely, is not compelling, because nothing prevents something being prior and posterior with respect to the same thing in different ways; and, in the way in which something is prior, it is possible for what is proper to this something to redound from it into something else which, in that sort of way, is posterior (just as, although ‘being’ redounds into heat from substance, yet conversely ‘to cause heat’ belongs to substance from heat). So, if there were a priority of the essence with respect to the power, and this by a redounding of a first act perfecting the essence (if there were any), the essence would come to be in the power; yet the second act, which belongs first to the power, will redound from it into the essence.

From this then the opposite can be argued as follows: that thing is more principal from which something redounds into another thing; but beatitude redounds into the essence as it is essence from beatitude as it is power, just as the attaining of the beatific object too belongs in this sort of order to the essence and the power.

β. About the Second Reason

38. The second reason [n.24] is not compelling. For, when speaking of ‘to perfect formally’, this proposition is false: ‘the divine essence more principally perfects the essence than it perfects the power’, because God does not, as in-flowing into the essence, perfect it formally but only as an extrinsic cause. But when in-flowing into the power he perfects it (as it is an extrinsic cause) the way an object does, and he perfects it formally by a created form, which created form is the operation that attains it [= the divine essence] as object. But if you speak of a ‘to perfect’ that perfects by in-forming in some way or other, and if you take it that the divine essence more truly perfects the soul than the power by in-flowing- if this were conceded, the proposed conclusion does not follow. For the ‘to perfect’ in question belongs to first act; it is not therefore the ‘to perfect’ that is the perfecting of the beatified person.

39. And if you say “it is enough for me that it be more truly a ‘to perfect’ than is any ‘to perfect’ of second act” (for from this follows that the essence will be more principally perfect with a nobler perfection than the power is, and therefore it will also be nobler, even more perfect, with beatitude, or with something, than beatitude is) - I reply: substance is more a being than any accident (Metaphysics 7.1.1028a33-b6); therefore the essence of an angel or a soul is more perfect simply that its inherent beatitude, which is an accident; therefore, it is not unacceptable that some perfection that is the first act of a soul or angel in substantial being be a truer perfection of it because more intimate. And let it also be a nobler perfection than beatitude or anything pertaining to second act; however, beatitude is the noblest second perfection, as was said in the preceding solution [nn.36-37, also nn.16, 21]; but some first perfection is simply nobler in creatures than any second perfection, where the first and second perfection are distinct in reality.

40. The proposition can also be denied that [n.24] ‘the deity by in-flowing more truly perfects the essence than the power [n.24]’, because the in-flowing into the essence as essence is in a way general to every creature, though in proportion to each according to its grade of being; but the in-flowing that is of the essence as object into the power is of a special most noble nature. There is therefore some in-flowing into the power nobler than the in-flowing that is into the essence, though that which is into the essence as to existence is more principal to the essence than to the power, just as also the existence is.

41. If it is argued against this that the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as object presupposes the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as making itself intimate to [creaturely] essence, and that that is more perfect on which another depends than conversely - I reply: “not everything prior in generation is prior in perfection” (Metaphysics 9.8.1050a2-10); but the preceding of the in-flowing that is by intimacy [into the essence] to the in-flowing that is in idea of object [into the power] [n.40] is not proved to be prior save in generation; for it is not a necessary active cause of the later inflowing, because it exists when the second cannot be had, as in the wayfarer.

42. Of these two responses to the second reason [nn.38, 40] the first seems truer, and it sufficiently solves the fact that some simply more perfect in-flowing is not beatific and that another simply less perfect in-flowing is beatific. An example: the most perfect in-flowing is into human nature as it is united in person to the Word, and yet this inflowing is not formally beatific, as is plain in Ord. III d.2 nn.10-23, though this doctor [Henry] say the opposite, as was said there; but the in-flowing of the Triune God into Michael, which is simply less perfect, is simply beatific.

γ. About the Third Reason

43. The third reason [n.25] is taken to the opposite, because grace immediately perfects the power, not the essence, as was said in Ord. II d.26 n.24; for a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited and indifferent to several things perfects it indifferently in its order to those several things (just as that, if some form were to perfect the sun insofar as the sun is unlimited in action with respect to all things inferior to it, it would perfect it indifferently in its order to one action and another); but grace does not perfect the soul indifferently in its order to intellection and volition, but only in its order to volition; proof: for volition is graced primarily and nothing else is graced save by it.

44. If objection be made to the major [n.43] on account of the term ‘indifferently’, at least this proposition is true, that ‘a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited to several actions does not perfect it precisely in its order to one action’, because at once the opposite of the subject term follows, namely that the form perfects it as it is limited and determinate to one action; but grace perfects the soul precisely for intellection and volition such that an intellection preceding volition is not graced nor meritorious, and an intellection following volition is only graced because it is commanded by graced volition.

45. If objection be raised against the minor of the first reason [n.43], because ‘essence is not active but passive, with these powers being intermediaries’ - although this is false of the will at least, as was said in Ord. II d.25 nn.69-73, yet a similar minor can be taken about passive power, ‘no form perfects a receptive subject insofar as it is indifferent to several thing which perfects it precisely in its order to one of them’; grace is of this sort, as before [n.43]. Indeed, no habit seems to perfect essence save as essence has the idea of power.

46. Let there, at length, be a stand in this: ‘no form perfects something insofar as it is unlimited or indifferent to several things which would precisely perfect it if it were determinate to one of them’; but if the soul were only the intellect, it could not be perfected by grace because, even if it had an act, it could not have a graced act; but if, per impossibile, the soul were only the will, it could be perfected by grace, because if, per impossibile, it had an act, it would have that act a graced one.

δ. About the Fourth Reason

47. The fourth reason [n.26] is taken to the opposite, because he to whom a greater good is due should have it rendered to him in the way in which it can more be a good for him; but beatitude can more be a good for the soul if it is in the power than if it were immediately in the essence. Just as it is a greater good for the soul to see God through the intellect than through the essence (as it is essence), because ‘to see’ is not of a nature to be good for the soul save through the intellect, just as ‘to have the beatific object as beatific’ is not of a nature to be the soul’s good save through the power that, by operation, attains that object.

48. The point that is there added [n.27], that perception of beatitude principally belongs to the power, seems to prove the opposite of the proposed conclusion, because perception of the beatific object (by seeing and tasting it) is not accidental or adventitious to beatitude, as Hugh says in the authority that he brings forward, “In these,” he says, “does beatitude consist: to love and know the good” [n.27].

49. There is also proof by reason, because misery essentially includes perception of a disagreeable object, speaking of the complete misery that is accompanied with penalty; for the principal penalty, which consists in sadness (as was said in d.44 nn.83-112), is per se consequent to the perception of a disagreeable object; therefore perception of an agreeable object does not follow beatitude [sc. as something not essentially included in it], because then beatitude would not delight as equally necessarily as misery torments.

50. As to what is added from the philosophers [n.28], it does not seem probable that it contradicts them as regard this first mark of beatitude, that it consist in operation or not; for though they did err, or rather did not attain what object beatitude is in, or rather what idea it is under, yet this first mark of it wherein it is the fundamental perfection of a rational creature - namely whether it is in the power or the essence (whose distinction we get from them), whether too it is in operation or in habit (which we similarly get from them) - does not seem likely to have escaped their notice.

B. Scotus’ own Response

1. A Double Understanding of the Question is Possible

51. To the question, therefore, I say that there is a double understanding of the question:

One is: if the supposition is made that the perfection of essence is one thing and the perfection of power another, which of these is beatitude principally? And in this way does the aforesaid opinion [of Henry, nn.23-24] seem to say that the in-flowing that is in the essence as it is essence (which is prior in a way to the operation that is the perfection of power) is beatitude principally.

52. According to this understanding I say that beatitude does not consist principally in the essence, because nothing that perfects essence, as it is essence distinct in whatever way from power, can be other than first act, and perhaps not a habit. Now nothing such can be beatitude principally; indeed that ‘beatitude exists without operation’ includes a contradiction, but that ‘first act is without any second act whatever’ does not.

53. The other understanding of the question can be of this sort:

By positing that the perfection is the same and unique for the essence and power (wherein unique beatitude consists), does that unique beatitude perfect the essence more principally than the power?

54. And in the first understanding [nn.51-52] there is a comparison of two perfections perfecting the essence and the power - which of them is more principal?

55. In the second understanding [n.53] there is a comparison of the same perfection to two receptive subjects - which of them is more principally perfected by that perfection?

56. In this second understanding it would seem that diverse answers must be given according to diverse opinions about powers. Because if the powers be posited to be accidents, since that is ‘more principal’ by which something else is and not conversely, and since the ‘by which’ can be taken equivocally for prior and more remote cause or for posterior and more immediate cause - in the first way the essence is more principally perfected by any power whatever; in the second way not so, because the essence is the more remote cause with respect to anything of which the power is cause, but the power is the nearer cause.

2. What View Should be Held

57. Because, however, I do not believe this opinion [n.56] to be true (as was said [in Rep. IIA d.16 nn.11, 18-19]), neither also is it clear that it is the same thing to be more principal with respect to ‘being’ and with respect to any perfection consequent to ‘being’, since something can be cause of something in being and yet that other thing receives [perfections] through no other cause; rather, if it were uncaused, it would receive [them] - just as God is cause of a triangle in being, yet, if a triangle were uncaused, it would by itself have three angles equal to two right angles.

58. And this is most of all true where there is no process in the same order, as suppose if one thing be prior in order of active principle and after that the second thing is prior to a third in order of passive principle. Even in the same order this only holds if the priority is essential, understanding this as follows, that it be impossible for the second to be prior to the third unless the first be prior to the second and to the third (as is plain in efficient causes, where a posterior can cause without a prior that is not essentially or necessarily prior in this way).

59. But, in the issue at hand, there is in the idea of the receptive subject no such essential priority thus of essence to power in the receiving, because if the immediate receptive subject could exist per se without an intermediate, it could per se receive, with the intermediate receiving neither mediately nor immediately. But a hypothesis is necessary (on the supposition that this hypothesis is necessary for many things), that, in the case of things distinct in absolute being, either one of them can, without contradiction, exist without the other.

60. It seems, therefore, that if the opinion were probable [n.59], yet in no way would it have to be conceded that the essence received the operation more principally than the power.

61. Dismissing, therefore, these and other opinions about powers, and dismissing the equivocations about what is ‘more principal’, I say that that is simply more principal with respect to a which, when anything else whatever has been per possibile or per impossibile removed, would be disposed in the same way toward a, and that nothing else, with it removed, would be thus disposed toward a.

62. This reasoning is proved from the idea of firstness, that that is first with respect to something, which when taken away there is nothing that is of this sort with respect to that something; but, when anything else is taken away, it is disposed in the same way toward that something; and it simply is simply more principal. These clarifications are made on behalf of the major [n.61].

63. But now, whether a power is a perfection that is unitively contained in the essence, or whether it is an essential part of the essence, or whether it is disposed differently in this way and that (according to different opinions), the essence would not receive beatitude when the power is, per possibile or per impossibile, taken away; but when the essence is per possibile or per impossibile taken away, the power would receive beatitude. Therefore, in the way in which firstness is, in fact or in idea, possible there, the power receives beatitude more principally, and consequently beatitude perfects the power more principally.

64. The proof of the minor [n.63] is from the preceding solution [n.52], that beatitude, according to that solution, consists in operation; now operation would perfect the power if it existed alone without the essence, but would in no way perfect the essence if it existed alone without the power.

65. If to this proof of the minor an objection is drawn from the fact that no accident perfects another accident but perfects only a substance, yet one accident is prior to another - according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 4.4.1007b2-4, 12-13, “For an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident to the same thing,” and later, “for this is no more an accident of that than that is of this” [cf. Ord. IV d.12 n.108]. So, if the power is an accident of the essence, then in whatever way it were, per possibile or per impossibile, to exist without the essence, it could not receive an accident; but the essence could receive a mediated accident, whether it received it afterwards or before, because it is receptive of both accidents, and immediately so under the idea of being the subject.

66. The minor of this objection [sc. the power is an accident of the essence] I do not reckon to be true, as I said [n.63], but let it be. The major, however [sc. no accident perfects another accident], is false, as was said in [Ord. IV d.12 nn.146-151].

67. And the fact is plain from Avicenna, Metaphysics II ch.1, because fast and slow are accidents of motion, and curved and straight accidents of line.

68. And it is plain too by reason, because whatever belongs to something per se in the second mode [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-b18] is an accident of it, for in that mode the subject is put in the definition of the predicate as something added on that does not belong [to a definition] with respect to an accident save as to the subject of it. But there are many accidents that are present per se in the second mode in accidents and in no substance, as is plain of all the properties of the mathematical sciences, none of which is about any substance as about its first subject [Ord. IV d.12 n.143].

69. But what is adduced from the Philosopher [n.65] needs expounding, because if he means precisely that ‘because two accidents are accident of the same subject, therefore one is accident of the other’, it follows that surface is as accident of whiteness as whiteness is of surface.

70. The same follows from the second authority, that ‘this is no more accident of that than that is of this’ [n.65].

71. His understanding then is not about ordered accidents, one of which is the idea of receiving the other, but about the disparate accidents of which he gives examples, as ‘white’ and ‘musical’.

72. Now this suffices for his purpose there, as he wants it to be impossible for there to be an infinite regress in predications per accidens, as I have elsewhere expounded his intention [Ord. IV d.12 n.158].

C. To the Initial Arguments of the Second Question

1. Response to the Individual Arguments

73. As to the first argument [n.16]: the major could be conceded about perfectible things and perfections of the same order, but not when comparing something perfectible by a perfection of one order with something perfectible by a perfection of another order (and I mean here by ‘perfections of another order’ first act and second act). And when taking the inference in this way, all that follows is that the essence, if it have some perfection that is first act, will be more perfect than any perfection that is second act; now beatitude is not the noblest perfection simply, but the noblest among second acts.

74. Alternatively, and it reduces in a way to the same, the statement that ‘to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a nobler perfection’ is true in the order of perfections which have regard to that perfectible thing; now beatitude does not have regard to the essence, as essence, for first perfectible thing. But if you compare the order of perfections to the order of perfectible things, I concede that to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a simply nobler perfection, intrinsic or extrinsic; but there is no need to concede this determinately of something accidental or extrinsic if it is not capable, under the idea under which it is a nobler perfectible thing, of the accidental perfection. So it is in the issue at hand, even as to the accidental perfection that is a habit, which does not perfect the essence as it is essence - and much more so as to the accidental perfection that is operation.

75. As to the second argument [n.17], I concede that if the power could exist per se it could be perfected by operation, and the essence could not be perfected without the power. And therefore the argument does conclude well against those who say that the power is really other than the essence [nn.20-28]. But it is nothing to us who say that the same real thing is under one idea essence, and has the perfections that are first acts, and is under another idea power, and has the perfections that are second acts; nor do I say that these different ideas are caused only by an act of intellect, but they come from the nature of the thing, as was said in the question about the powers of the soul [Rep. IIA d.16 nn.11-13].

76. As to the third [n.18], I say that it is not unacceptable to concede that intellectual nature is beatified per accidens, that is, not first or not immediately, and this when speaking of priority or immediacy according to idea; though it would be unacceptable to say that it was beatified per accidens when speaking of an accident in some way real.

2. An Objection to these Responses and its Solution

77. Against these responses [nn.73-76]: the idea according to which God is blessed is no less noble than the idea according to which he beatifies. But he beatifies under the idea of essence; therefore under no less noble an idea is [anyone]The Latin says simply ‘he is beatified’, where the ‘he’, in grammatical context, would refer to God. The text can be read in this way, since God as subject may be said to be beatified by himself as object. However, it seems it might be better read, in logical context, as about any creature who is beatified by God. ⁴¹ beatified; the idea of power is less noble.

78. I reply: speaking of the fundamental idea under which [anyone] is beatified, it is true that the idea according to which [God] beatifies is not less noble in its fundamental and formal idea. Speaking of the proximate formal idea according to which [anyone] is beatified and of the formal idea according to which [God] beatifies (which, according to some [Richard of Middleton], is the idea of the true and good [n.24]), there is still no greater nobility on this side than on that. But by positing, in a third way, that [God] beatifies objectively according to the idea of essence, not only fundamentally but formally (and [anyone] would be beatified immediately according to idea of intellect and will), it is consistent to say that he beatifies immediately according to a nobler idea than [the idea according to which anyone] is immediately beatified. Nor is this unacceptable, that something receive a second perfection according to a less noble idea than it is perfect [by] with a first perfection.