III. To the Reasons for Aristotle’s Opinion

97. To the reasons for the opinion of the Philosopher:

As to the first [nn.54-59], a theologian would perhaps refuse to the Intelligence all potency productive of substance, and then the difficulty would seem to be how this potency would not belong to the Intelligence and yet does belong to a more imperfect substance. And even if a substance would not in this [potency] be made perfect in itself, yet this does belong to substance because of perfection, as was argued [n.59].

98. If again it were said to the Philosopher that this substance is communicative of itself by producing substance, the consequent does not hold that therefore it produces necessarily or sempiternally, because actual production of another substance is not for the good of this [producing] substance but of the universe; and the good of the universe does not require such production infinitely. And here the theologian would have to take his stand if he wanted to argue for his side from matters of belief, or even from things in some way probable according to natural reason - by showing that the perfection of the universe requires rather, or is equally compatible with, the ceasing of generation than the continuing of generation.

99. And further, from this is still not got the proposed conclusion about motion, as was replied to the reason for the opinion of the theologians [nn.68-69], but it would be necessary to show that the perfection of the universe rather requires, or equally permits, the resting of some bodies.

100. As to the second [n.62], one must deny the major in the case of an agent acting voluntarily, because [such an agent] can, by its old and immovable will, act in different ways on a passive object that is in itself old and unchangeable. And then as to the proof of the major: the extremes of this new relation are not the absolute nature of the agent and the absolute nature of the passive object (which are uniform), but are the agent and passive object as having a new form caused by the agent; and this foundation is new and therefore it can found a new relation to the agent.

101. If you ask whether this new caused thing has any new relation of passive object to agent [n.63], I say that there is none, because just as the first newness in the passive object is in its having this form, so the first new relation of it to the agent is according to this new form.

102. As to the third [n.64], I say that a thing can be contingent to either side in such a way that there is no repugnance to this contingency on the part of the heaven itself, because the thing of itself is in potency of contradiction; but the completion of the contingency to either side comes from contingency on the part of a cause moving voluntarily, such that its will is not necessarily determined to moving or to not moving.