B. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

29. To the question. Taking as supposition (from d.47 n.17) that judgment is a complete determination of that which is to be rendered to someone for his merits, and that this complete determination includes a perfect determination of the intellect about it and a perfect ‘willing’ of the will (efficacious willing [nn.18-19] not just any willing), it follows that ‘to judge as principal’ includes ‘to dictate as principal’ and ‘to have efficacious willing as principal’. But nothing is said to do something as principal that is subordinate, in its acting, to some second thing as principal; therefore, ‘to judge as principal’ only belongs to an intellectual nature whose intellect is not subordinate to some other in its dictating, and whose will is not subordinate to something in its efficacious willing - which efficacious willing can be said to consist in so commanding the willed thing that on the command the effect follow.

30. But as it is, the intellect of Christ’s soul is subordinate to divine truth in dictating, and especially about things about which there can only be a certain dictating if it follows from rules determined by a divine will contingently disposed with respect to them (of which sort are all things that regard the beatitude and misery of those to be judged). But the will of the soul of Christ is subordinate to the divine will in rightly willing; and to the extent it efficaciously wills something by commanding it efficaciously (such that by its command the thing come about), it is necessarily subordinate to the divine will, because the will of his soul is not omnipotent. Therefore, it is impossible for Christ according to his human nature to judge as principal. For, in brief, the whole of created nature together does not have efficacious command with respect to the fact that ‘this soul sees God’. I call ‘efficacious command’ a command on which, from the command itself in itself, and not from another cause, the effect follow. Nor would the will of Christ presume to command as principal that Peter will be blessed, but only to command in subjection to the true author, as that the command become efficacious from another as the superior, in virtue of whom the command is made.

31. In another way ‘to command’ can be taken, not as being such altogether principal commanding, but as a commanding by commission or in subjection to the true author, a command excelling with a singular excellence, namely an excellence by which there could not be by commission any authority that is higher.

32. And in this way I concede that Christ judges according to his soul, for although it could be committed to a pure creature that its intellect would rightly dictate about retribution, and that its will would righty will, and that on its right willing would always follow the happening of the thing willed (although not causally from itself, but from the divine will always enforcing that efficacious willing) - yet it could not be committed to a pure creature that its every willing would be fulfilled by the same [created] person, because then a pure creature would be omnipotent. Therefore, the highest commission possible is that not only would everything that was determined by the will infallibly come about, but that it would come about by the same person whose will it was, so that thus that person would have an efficacious command, whose created will determines in its own order as much as it can the coming about of something.

33. In this way does the will of Christ’s soul make determination with subordinate authority and with this sort of subordinate commission, because although that will not command as principal, just as it is not lord as principal, however it does well give command (as having lordship with respect to what is commanded) but it commands as commissioned (because it commands as having lordship subordinate to the supreme lordship of God) - and yet it does so command that its command has, from that person, complete efficacy. And if someone attribute another authority of judging to the soul of Christ, it seems to be blasphemy, by attributing to created nature what is proper to the Creator.

34. Now this way, just as it does not concede omnipotence to the soul of Christ, so neither does it deny to it the highest excellence that can belong to a creature.

35. Nor should the authorities adduced for the opinion (Romans, “that he may be lord of living and dead,” and Acts, “judge of living and dead,” and Matthew, “all power has been given to me” [nn.9, 11, 12]) be understood of principal, but of subordinate, lordship and judiciary authority or power, yet of the most eminent kind that can exist under the principal.