I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

1. Exposition of the Opinion

8. Here it is said [Thomas Aquinas, Sent. IV d.48 q.1 a.1] that Christ will judge in the form of a servant.

9. The reason is of this sort, that: “judgment requires lordship in the one who judges, according to Romans 14.4, ‘Who are you, who judge the servant of another?’ Therefore, it belongs to Christ to judge in the respect in which he has lordship over men; but he is lord of men not only by reason of creation but also by reason of redemption. Hence Romans 14.9, ‘For Christ died and rose for this, that he might be lord of the living and the dead’. Therefore, power of judging belongs to him in the nature in which he is redeemer.”

10. Again: “The judgment is ordered toward this, that some may be admitted to the kingdom and some excluded. But the attaining of the Kingdom does not belong to man because of the goods of creation by themselves, for the impediment coming from the sin of the first parent has supervened on them, and if this impediment were not removed by the merit of the redemption, no one would be admitted to the Kingdom. Therefore, it is fitting that Christ, insofar as he is redeemer, should preside over that judgment in his human nature, just as that judgment, by the favor of the redemption displayed in that nature, introduces into the Kingdom.”

11. This is confirmed by Acts 10.42, “He has been constituted by God judge of the living and the dead.”

12. And from this is deduced further that: “since by the redemption of the human race in general the whole of human nature is made better, as is contained in Colossians 1.20, ‘Making peace by the blood of his cross, whether things in heaven or things that are on earth’, therefore has Christ through his cross merited lordship, and so judiciary power, not only over men but over every creature; hence Matthew 28.18, ‘All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth’.”

13. But it is added that he will not in his deity appear terrible to everyone in judgment, because he could not appear without joy, and the impious then will have no joy.

14. The proof of the first point [n.13, sc. he could not appear without joy] is that: “in something delightful can be considered the thing that is delightful and the reason for its delightfulness. And just as, according to Boethius De Hebdomadibus, ‘that which is can have something over and above its ‘to be’, but the ‘to be’ has nothing admixed with it besides itself’, so can ‘the thing that is delightful’ have something admixed with it because of which it is not delightful; but that which is the reason for delightfulness can have nothing because of which it not be delightful. Therefore, the things that are delightful by participation in goodness, which is the reason for delightfulness, are able not to give delight when apprehended; but it is impossible that that which is goodness in its essence not give delight when apprehended.”

15. This [n.13, sc. the impious will then have no joy] can be confirmed through the John 17.3, “This is eternal life, to know thee;” therefore eternal life consists in that vision. But eternal life cannot be had without joy; therefore, in no way is conceded to the reprobate that which eternal life consists in.

2. Rejection of the Opinion in Itself

16. Against the first conclusion of this opinion [n.8]. It is one thing to say ‘Christ will judge in human form’ and another to say ‘Christ will judge according to human form’. For this proposition is true, that ‘Christ in human form creates souls’, but not this one, ‘Christ according to human form creates [souls]’. Rather, whatever he made (namely whatever the Word made from the time he assumed human nature, because he did not, in his act of making, set aside his human nature), he made in his human nature, unless you restrict the phrase ‘in his human nature’ to mean what is meant by ‘according to his human nature’, where is to be noted not only the concomitance of the human nature with the act, but the causality of the human nature with respect to the act.

17. If you understand the remark ‘Christ will judge in human nature’ in the first way, the question is not other than the same as this one, ‘whether, when he judges, he will set aside his human nature’.

18. Therefore, in order for there to be a question, another understanding must be obtained, which is more properly expressed thus, ‘Christ will judge according to his human nature’. But this is false when speaking of ‘to judge as principal judge’. Proof: principal judgment (as can be got from what was said above in the preceding distinction [d.47, n.17]) is the perfect and proper determination of what is to be rendered to someone according to his merits; but this perfect determination includes a perfect dictate of the intellect that this is to be so rendered, and a complete determination of the will through an efficacious willing that is sufficient of itself for the execution of what has been determined.

19. But Christ according to his human nature cannot have such a willing with respect to the reward to be rendered to a person judged, because he cannot have principal command efficacious for uniting any soul to the beatific object, for according to Augustine On Seeing God 6.18 [quoting Ambrose On Luke] “It is in God’s power to be seen; for if he wills, he is seen; if he does not will, he is not seen.”

3. Rejection of the Conclusions of the Opinion

20. As to the reasons for this conclusion [nn.9-15], they do not prove it as regard principal judgment [n.18], because Christ did not, through the act of redemption, merit principal lordship with respect to man [n.9].

21. Proof: for Christ as he is redeemer possessed the idea of a cause that is meritorious for us; but a cause that is only meritorious cannot be a principal cause; for it only causes because it is accepted by some more principal cause, which principal cause, because of what it has accepted, does the principal causing. Therefore, let it be that, because of the redemption, we are bound to the Trinity as to supreme Lord by some new right, beyond the right of lordship that the Trinity has from creation (which would be true if redemption, as accepted by the Trinity, were as great a good for us as creation) - still, it does not follow that it is by reason of the redemption that we are obliged to Christ as supreme Lord according to his human nature.

22. Likewise as to the second point [nn.10-12, 19], because, insofar as he is redeemer, he does not introduce as principal introducer but only as meritorious cause.

23. Against the second conclusion [n.13]: an absolute naturally prior to something else can without contradiction exist without that something else; the vision of the divine essence is something absolute, at least as to any relation to joy, and is naturally prior to that joy, for an object does not cause delight if it is not first apprehended. Therefore, the vision of the essence could, without contradiction, exist in someone without delight.

24. Nor would the Philosopher deny this save because he would posit a simply necessary conjunction of causes in the universe, such that (according to him) it is simply necessary for the first cause to act along with second causes, according as it can act along with them. But by acting along with an intellectual nature (to the extent it can act along with it), an intellectual nature that already sees the divine essence, delight follows, because by acting along with the proximate cause of that effect it is, as far as it itself is concerned, necessitated to that effect.

25. But theologians deny this proposition: ‘whatever a second cause, as far as concerns itself, is necessitated to, the first cause is necessitated to’; because they deny that the first necessarily acts, as far as it can, along with the second.

26. The reasoning [n.14] is not valid; for it only proves that the idea of delightfulness, which is goodness, cannot not be delightful. But the conclusion does not hold that ‘therefore it cannot not cause delight’, because ‘the delightful’ asserts something in itself, or if it states a respect, only an aptitudinal one, which necessarily follows the foundation; but ‘to cause delight’ states a contingently causable later effect, especially because of the divine will’s contingent determination for acting along with the delightful thing itself.

27. To the confirmation from John 17 [n.15], I reply (without the authority’s gloss [sc. Aquinas’ gloss there]), according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 12.7.1072b26-27, “An act of intellect is life;” therefore an act of an eternal intellect is eternal life - if actually so, actually; if aptitudinally so, aptitudinally. But now the vision of the divine essence, if it were conceded to the damned, although it would not be eternal actually, yet it would be so aptitudinally (as far as concerns the side of the possible act or power), or it would be apt to be eternal, and     therefore to be eternal life; but if you infer from this, ‘therefore it would be beatitude’, the conclusion does not follow.

28. Rather, if you say that Christ says that ‘in this is beatitude [sc. and not ‘eternal life’], that they know you etc     .’, then you do not accept the text of the Gospel but a certain gloss of a more particular understanding of the letter of it. So if you wish to weigh the word precisely without any gloss, the solution is that the word is ‘eternal life’; but if you wish to argue through certain glosses that it is speaking of beatitude, then it is permitted for me likewise to add a gloss that does not distract the text: ‘to know you’ by loving and enjoying.

B. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

29. To the question. Taking as supposition (from d.47 n.17) that judgment is a complete determination of that which is to be rendered to someone for his merits, and that this complete determination includes a perfect determination of the intellect about it and a perfect ‘willing’ of the will (efficacious willing [nn.18-19] not just any willing), it follows that ‘to judge as principal’ includes ‘to dictate as principal’ and ‘to have efficacious willing as principal’. But nothing is said to do something as principal that is subordinate, in its acting, to some second thing as principal; therefore, ‘to judge as principal’ only belongs to an intellectual nature whose intellect is not subordinate to some other in its dictating, and whose will is not subordinate to something in its efficacious willing - which efficacious willing can be said to consist in so commanding the willed thing that on the command the effect follow.

30. But as it is, the intellect of Christ’s soul is subordinate to divine truth in dictating, and especially about things about which there can only be a certain dictating if it follows from rules determined by a divine will contingently disposed with respect to them (of which sort are all things that regard the beatitude and misery of those to be judged). But the will of the soul of Christ is subordinate to the divine will in rightly willing; and to the extent it efficaciously wills something by commanding it efficaciously (such that by its command the thing come about), it is necessarily subordinate to the divine will, because the will of his soul is not omnipotent. Therefore, it is impossible for Christ according to his human nature to judge as principal. For, in brief, the whole of created nature together does not have efficacious command with respect to the fact that ‘this soul sees God’. I call ‘efficacious command’ a command on which, from the command itself in itself, and not from another cause, the effect follow. Nor would the will of Christ presume to command as principal that Peter will be blessed, but only to command in subjection to the true author, as that the command become efficacious from another as the superior, in virtue of whom the command is made.

31. In another way ‘to command’ can be taken, not as being such altogether principal commanding, but as a commanding by commission or in subjection to the true author, a command excelling with a singular excellence, namely an excellence by which there could not be by commission any authority that is higher.

32. And in this way I concede that Christ judges according to his soul, for although it could be committed to a pure creature that its intellect would rightly dictate about retribution, and that its will would righty will, and that on its right willing would always follow the happening of the thing willed (although not causally from itself, but from the divine will always enforcing that efficacious willing) - yet it could not be committed to a pure creature that its every willing would be fulfilled by the same [created] person, because then a pure creature would be omnipotent. Therefore, the highest commission possible is that not only would everything that was determined by the will infallibly come about, but that it would come about by the same person whose will it was, so that thus that person would have an efficacious command, whose created will determines in its own order as much as it can the coming about of something.

33. In this way does the will of Christ’s soul make determination with subordinate authority and with this sort of subordinate commission, because although that will not command as principal, just as it is not lord as principal, however it does well give command (as having lordship with respect to what is commanded) but it commands as commissioned (because it commands as having lordship subordinate to the supreme lordship of God) - and yet it does so command that its command has, from that person, complete efficacy. And if someone attribute another authority of judging to the soul of Christ, it seems to be blasphemy, by attributing to created nature what is proper to the Creator.

34. Now this way, just as it does not concede omnipotence to the soul of Christ, so neither does it deny to it the highest excellence that can belong to a creature.

35. Nor should the authorities adduced for the opinion (Romans, “that he may be lord of living and dead,” and Acts, “judge of living and dead,” and Matthew, “all power has been given to me” [nn.9, 11, 12]) be understood of principal, but of subordinate, lordship and judiciary authority or power, yet of the most eminent kind that can exist under the principal.