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II. To the Initial Arguments
38. As to the first argument, Solomon [n.3] was there the proclaimer, now arguing on the part of the foolish, now replying according to the opinion of the wise; and he made the remark in question [n.3] when proclaiming on behalf of the foolish. But he contradicts it later (Ecclesiastes 12.5, 13-14), “Man will go to the home of his own eternity,” and later “Let us all equally hear the end of the speaking: fear God and observe his commandments, that is, let every man fear and observe. God will bring everything that happens under the sun into judgment etc.”
39. As to the second [n.4]: although the heaven will never be worn away in substance, yet it will be as to its effect on things here below in its generating and corrupting them, for its influence will cease after the judgment. And thus far can the verse in I Corinthians 7.31 be understood, “The figure of this world is passing away.” Or one could say that this verse is speaking of the heaven that St. Peter is speaking of in 2 Peter 3.10, “The heavens will be consumed in heat,” which is only understood of the elemental heaven [Ord. II d.14 nn.4-8].
40. As to the third argument [n.5], the Philosopher is there distinguishing circulation in celestial bodies from circulation in corruptible bodies, because in the former case the substance is not corrupted by the motion and so the substance returns the same - not meaning its ‘to be’ by this motion, but that it comes to be present to the same part by returning motion. Now circular motion in things down here is according to corruption and return of substantial form, and so the numerically same thing does not return here as it does there. But as to whether Aristotle universally denies that the numerically same thing can return, see question three [nn.173-179].
41. To the final argument [n.6] one can say that a composite can return the same, though the same union of parts not return. For that union is not of the essence of the whole, nor is that union the total entity composed of the parts, nor is it the form of the entity. But because union is simply necessarily required for the total entity, and nothing seems to be numerically the same unless what is necessarily required for it is numerically the same, therefore it seems truer that the union will return the same - and this if union is taken for the relation of the parts united with each other but not for the uniting, which remains only for the instant of resurrection. For the uniting can be posited as different, just as the change in question [sc. the resurrection] is different from generation.
42. And when the argument is made that the union was interrupted [n.6], I say that an interrupted thing can return numerically the same, not only the thing absolutely but also its respects, if the terms of the thing return numerically the same. For I believe that Mary had the same relation to the Son after Christ’s passion as she had to him before his passion, and yet it was interrupted in the death of the Son, because of the destruction of the term, and in the death of Mary,1 because of the destruction of the foundation.
43. And if you say that this response seems to contradict itself, because it denies that the uniting returns the same, and yet this is necessary for the coming to be of the whole and, according to the above statement, nothing can return the same unless that return the same which is necessary for the thing’s being - I reply: let it be that the uniting, as it is a passive receiving, is necessary for the coming to be of the whole, then it follows that there is not the same coming to be of the whole unless the uniting is the same, and this I concede. And then either it is the case that neither will be the same, which is probable, because the change in question, as was said [n.41], would not be the same as the generation of man; or both will be able to be the same, because there is no contradiction involved.