Forty Seventh Distinction

Question One. Whether there is a Future Universal Judgment

1. “A question also accustomed to be asked is how sentence of judgment will be given” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.47 ch.1 n.1].

2. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether there is a future universal judgment.

3. That there is not:

John 12.31, “Now is the judgment of the world.”

4. Again, Nahum 1.9, “God will not inflict punishment on that very thing twice.”

5. Again, Augustine Epist. 99 to Hesychius ch.1 n.2, “The state in which a person’s last day will find him is the state in which the world’s last day will find him.”

From all these authorities, along with the addition that each one’s judgment is when he dies [cf. Hebrews 9.27, “It is appointed for man once to die, and after that the judgment”], it follows that no other judgment may be expected.

6. The thing is proved by reason, because a sentence is only handed over to be carried out after the final judgment, for in vain would judgment follow the carrying out of the sentence; but the damned will be damned and the blessed will be blessed before the day of judgment; therefore, execution will happen before judgment of the sentence that is then to happen; so the judgment would happen then in vain.

7. Again, Psalm 1.5, “The impious will not rise up in judgment.”

8. Again, Matthew 19.28, Christ says to his Apostles, “You will sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel;” therefore the Apostles will not be judged.

9. And in favor of this is Gregory, Moralia 26.27 on Job 36.6 (and it is in Lombard’s text here in d.47), that “in the judgment there will be four orders;” one of the orders is those who will judge and not be judged.

10. On the contrary:

Augustine City of God 20.21, speaking of the end of the book of the Prophet Isaiah [66.22-24] says, “The prophet himself promises the ends of the Church, which will be reached through the last judgment when distinction has been made between good and bad.” There he treats at length of the words, “All flesh will come to adore in Jerusalem in my sight, and they will go out and see the members of the men who sinned against me,” using the Septuagint translation that he commonly used. And at the end he adds, “In the good ‘flesh’ and in the bad ‘members’ or ‘corpses’ are spoken of; assuredly is it made clear that after the resurrection (faith in which is wholly confirmed by these words for the things) there is a future judgment when the good and bad will be separated in their confines.”

I. To the Question

A. About the Divisions of Judgment

11. I reply:

Judgement is taken in general for any certain knowledge, and in this way are the senses called a judgment when they distinctly apprehend an object or distinguish an object from an object (where perhaps a more distinct apprehension is required). Hence in On the Soul 3.2.426b12-15, the common sense is said to judge of the sensible objects of the diverse senses.

12. In another way is a judgment said to be a certain intellectual apprehension, even any apprehension at all; and in this way definitive knowledge of anything can be called a judgment about the quiddity of the thing, according to the remark in Ethics 1.1.1094b27-28 that “Each person judges well what he knows, and of these things is he a good judge.”

13. Judgement is said still more properly of any true proposition, for, according to Augustine, On Free Choice 2 ch.14 n.152, “no one judges about eternal rules but in accord with them judges other things;” therefore a judgment is a certain apprehension of something through something else. Now every true proposition is apprehended to be true through something else, because if it is an immediate proposition it is still judged true through the ideas of the terms, according to Posterior Analytics I.3.72b24-25, “We know the principles insofar as we know the terms.”

14. More properly still is judgment said of a proposition that is a conclusion, because judgment is passed on a conclusion not only through the terms but through a principle.

15. Judgment is said of a practical conclusion yet more specially than of a speculative one, because a judgment is a dictate of the practical intellect consonant with justice, and justice does not regard matters of speculation but of practice.

16. Again more specially: since a law not only determines things to be done and avoided, but determines the rewards to be given for good merits and the punishments to be given for bad merits (so that from love of rewards men may be drawn to acting well, and from fear of penalties or punishments drawn away from acting badly), judgement is more properly taken as a certain determination about rewards or punishments to be given than as a determination about other practical truths. Now although anyone could elicit these truths from practical principles and thus make judgment by a process of reasoning, as it were, yet still judgment is more strictly taken as it pertains to him who has authority to make determinations, according to the remark (Gregory, Decretals II tit.1 ch.4, Gratian, Decretals p.2 cause 11 q.1 ch.49, Justinian, Code 7 ch.48 nn.1, 4), “A sentence passed by one who is not judge of it is null.”

17. The most complete idea, then, of judgment rests in this, that it is ‘complete and authentic determination of rewarding someone according to his merits’. I say ‘complete’ as to firm determination of the intellect and effective determination of the will, that is, of a will that is able and intends to reward according to the determination of the intellect. And this is what is specified by the word ‘authentic’, because by this is understood that it belongs to him who, according to his effective volition, can bring into effect the determination of the intellect and the determination of the will.

18. From this is in general plain the division of judgment into that of approval and that of condemnation; because certain things can be manifest to a judge from which things it follows in particular that this man is to be rewarded (namely because he merited well) or to be punished (because he merited badly); and the first sentence is one of approval and the second one of condemnation.

19. Next to these, two other sentences sometimes follow in us: namely if worthy merits be asserted for someone and the judge find the things asserted not true, a sentence follows rejecting him from the reward; likewise if some things worthy of punishment are asserted against someone and they are found not to be true, a sentence follows of absolution or of absolving him (namely, ‘we pronounce such a one, accused before us, to be innocent’).

B. About the General Judgment

20. On the second point,The three points [per n.26], which are not expressly explained by Scotus, seem to refer to the three parts of the topic: future, general (universal), judgment. So the first point is about what is meant here by judgment [nn.11-19]; the second is about its generality; the third [n.26] is about its future being, or about how it will be carried out. ³⁰ I say that when judgment is taken most properly [sc. as practical judgment about reward and punishment, n.17], and according to each member of the division [sc. approval and condemnation, nn.18-19], there will be a general judgment. No demonstrative proof can be had for this, because it is less known than the resurrection and yet, as was said above [n.18], the resurrection cannot be demonstrated.

21. But elements of congruity can be set down.

The first is of this sort, that it is congruous for all the bad to be finally separated from the good, for ‘the bad does not live with the good save either for the purpose that the bad be corrected or that the good be exercised by the bad’, according to the remark of Augustine [On the Psalms, ps. 54 n.4]. But now there will come a final determination, where neither the good are to be exercised nor the bad corrected, so it is congruous for a general sentence to be finally passed; therefore congruous too for there to be a general judgment so that this general separation may appear just.

22. The second congruity is that although there is justice in the secret judgments that are made about individual persons, yet it is not manifest to everyone; therefore, it is reasonable that God have some general judgment in which the sentence or justice may be manifest that he has used in particular judgments.

23. The third congruity is that just as things come from the first efficient cause, so are they led back to the first as to their end. But besides the special goings forth of things from God through the operation that Christ speaks of in John 5.17, “My Father works until now, and I work,” there was one universal going forth in the first creation of things. Therefore, by similarity, it is congruous that besides individual returns to their end, there is one final return to their end and, in consequence of this, one final sentence of separating out, because the bad are not made to return.

24. The fourth, and it is nobler, is that besides the fact that each one is ascribed for the kingdom or to jail, the whole multitude foreseen to be for the kingdom and the whole other multitude for the jail should at some point be determined for the possessing of it, so that there may thus be a separating of the two families or two cities, as Augustine treats of through the whole of City of God.

25. So although now this person and that are individually ascribed for the kingdom, now this one and now that one for the jail, yet it is congruous for there to be a general judgment by which the whole multitude foreseen for the kingdom be sent to possess that kingdom, and the whole other multitude be left behind for the gloomy jail.

C. About the Acts of Judgment to be Passed that Precede and Complete it

26. About the third:See previous note. ³¹ in this judgment there will be something preceding it, namely the making known of the merits and demerits because of which such and such a sentence will be passed; and something else that completes it, namely the bringing in of the sentence and execution of it (though the passing and execution could be distinct).

D. Doubts about the Universal Judgment

1. First Doubt

27. The first doubt is whether the judgment happen in time or in an instant and, if in time, whether brief or not brief.

It is possible, indeed, that all the merits of each individual are made known to everyone, so that, as regard the manifestation of them, it is a miracle. However, let each intellect be dismissed to its own natural mode of understanding - and then, in such manifestation, a long time would be required for successive understanding of the merits first of this one, second of that one, and so on about each.

28. It is, secondly, possible that to each will be made manifest his own merits or demerits in particular, and the merits and demerits of others in general.

29. And this in two ways:

Either such that each does consider individuals, yet this one as just and to be rewarded because of merits conceived in general, and that one as unjust and to be punished because of demerits conceived in general.

30. Or, in another way: not by conceiving individual persons in particular and their merits in general but conceiving both persons and merits in general, namely by conceiving that all those left behind on earth are reprobate and justly to be condemned, but that all those caught up with Christ in the clouds are just and to be rewarded.

And of these two ways the first would require a long succession, because the consideration of all persons one by one (though without consideration of all the merits) could not be done at once by the created common intellect without a miracle.

31. In a third way in general, or fourth in particular,The first possibility, n.27, is particular only. The next two, nn.28-30, are both particular and general. Hence this next way, n.31, is fourth in particular and third in general, provided the distinct understandings in question are of merits shown either in particular or in general. ³² it would be possible that, by the divine power (not only as manifesting things but as causing an act or acts of knowing), distinct understandings of all merits (and this as to all persons) exist simultaneously in each intellect; for things that are not repugnant formally and that can be received by some intellect successively can, by divine power, be received simultaneously by the same intellect.

32. And if this last be posited [n.31], then the preliminary stage need only be in an instant, and next the following completion, namely the sentence passed, if pronounced vocally, must be in time. If passed only mentally, it will be possible for it to be in an instant, not only as to Christ pronouncing it but as to those for whom or against whom the sentence is pronounced; for Christ would be able to make them conceive in an instant such and such a sentence.

33. About this fourth way [n.31], if the verdict there will be vocal, or the pronouncement of sentence vocal, the thing will be in time; but if it will be in an instant, both must be merely mental. And the possibility of it was already stated [n.8], because it seems more in agreement with the Gospel [Matthew 25.28-46] that the verdict and the pronouncement of the sentence will be vocal - whether the verdict is made manifest to individuals suddenly, or in a short time or a long time.

2. Second Doubt

34. Now as to the place, some say [Richard of Middleton] that it will be in the valley of Josaphat, according to Joel 3.12.

35. But the Apostle I Thessalonians 4.17 plainly holds that “the good will be caught up to meet Christ in the air;” the bad will be left behind on the earth, and consequently the good will not be in the valley of Josaphat. Perhaps the bad will be there, or round about in as much space as will be able to contain them. For it is perhaps conjectured by someone [Richard of Middleton] that the Judge will not go lower down in the air that he was at the Transfiguration or the place where he was transfigured before his apostles, in which transfiguration he displayed a sign of his future glory.

II. To the Initial Arguments

36. As to the first argument [n.3], there follows in that place, “Now will the prince of this world be cast out” - the prince, namely the devil, who up to the coming of Christ ruled as prince in the world, although tyrannically. Therefore, the judgment of the world, which Christ says is ‘now’, was for that casting out, because sentence was pronounced that the devil was to be cast out through Christ’s passion.

37. As to the second from Nahum [n.4], and likewise as to Augustine [n.5] and the argument that follows [n.6], I say that each individual, insofar as he is a private person, is judged, even finally, when he is at the end of the life pre-established for him. But insofar as he is a part of the family destined for the royal court, or of the family destined for prison, he will be judged along with others in the final judgment.

38. And hereby is plain the response to the statement of Gregory about the four orders in judgment [n.9]:

The perfect, indeed, as regard the verdict preceding the sentence, will not be judged; nor will they, or others, be judged in the judgment that pertains to them as private persons; but the sons of the Kingdom will, in the saying from Matthew [25.34], “Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom,” be judged in the general judgment as heirs of that kingdom.

Infidels likewise, will not be judged as to the preceding verdict, for they will not be judged in the general judgment; but in the saying [Matthew 25.41], “Depart, you cursed,” they and others, against whom the verdict is pronounced, will be judged in common as members of the prison. And then will joy accrue to each of the elect, beyond what he had in the particular judgment, because each one will rejoice in the integrity of his city; and some punishment will accrue to each of the damned, beyond the particular judgment assigned him, because the completeness or fullness of the prison will crowd each of the prisoners in.

39. As to the passage [n.7] from the psalm “The impious will not rise up in judgment,” it is true - they will not rise up “to life,” according to what was said to Antiochus in II Maccabees 7.14, “But for you there will be no resurrection to life.” And this is plain from what is added in the psalm, “nor will sinners rise up in the council of the just” - whether what is taken there is ‘of the just’, that is, ‘God’s counsel about the just is that they be perpetually beatified’, or whether what is taken is ‘council of the just wherein they take counsel’, the ‘council of the just’ is in all things to agree with the divine will, and in that council the impious will not rise.

Question Two. Whether the World is to be Purged by Fire

40. Secondly I ask whether the world is to be purged by fire.

41. That it is not:

Because then fire, the same fire, would be purged by fire, and so the same thing would purge itself, which is unacceptable.

42. On the contrary:

In Psalm 96.3, “Fire will go before him,” (and it is adduced in Lombard’s text).

I. To the Question

A. Needed Preliminaries

43. I reply:

This conflagration, or purgation by conflagration, which is predicted in many authorities and especially II Peter 3.11-12, is possible for God in many ways, because it is possible for him in every way that does not involve a contradiction.

44. But let inquiry be about what way is more consonant with the nature of the parts of the universe:

It can be that some fire be newly created and of great or small size; and it can be that it is at once in some total breadth and thickness about the earth, and only everywhere by motion round the earth.

45. And both of them can be: namely the first, that fire be generated, and the second, that it be generated in some determinate part above the earth and not everywhere save by motion round the earth. Let enquiry, then, be about these two points, namely production of the fire and the place of the production or conservation or continuation.

B. About the Production of Infernal Fire

46. About the first point: If the fire is posited as created, it is necessary to posit that an equal amount of some other corruptible body is annihilated; or that in the whole corporeal or incorporeal substance a compressing occurs that corresponds to the quantity of this created fire; or it is necessary to posit that this created fire is together with some other body. Also, if it is posited as created, and consequently created from some other thicker body (for fire is the most subtle body among corruptible bodies), it is necessary to say that some other corruptible body is as much compressed as the body from which it is generated is rarer, or that, conversely, a rarer body is converted into a denser one proportionate to this quantity.

47. Therefore, if it were generated from air, either air would have to be converted into water, or water into earth, in as great proportion as would cover the spreading of the generated fire.

48. The thing is plain in an example: For let it be that the whole sphere of air be divided into ten parts, from one of which the fire is generated; and the fire has ten parts each one of which is equal to that [one part of air] from which the whole fire is generated - where will the nine parts [of the remaining air] have their location? Either two bodies must be together, or they must be compressed (or other bodies standing around must be) until they do not fill up the place of nine parts [of air]. But if this happen by the conversion of these nine parts into water, a place for the converted fire will be obtained even though there be no compression of anything else; because those nine [parts of air] do not generate one part of water, but almost do,If ten parts of air are assumed to produce, on conversion, one part of water, then nine parts of air will produce, on conversion, something less than one part of water. ³³ which [one part of water], along with nine previously generated parts of fire (one of the parts is located in the place of the air corrupted into fire), fill the whole place of the ten parts of air. And then there would be a flood of water along with the flaming of the fire, though not in as great a quantity as is the flaming of the fire; for the water would exceed the preexisting water in a part that is a tenth of the generated new fire.Scotus follows the prevailing view, derived from philosophical tradition, that the elements of the physical world are the four of earth, water, air, and fire, with earth being the grossest and fire the subtlest, and with earth at the center and the others round it (in progressive order of subtlety) at different levels or spheres. His example is complex, nevertheless, in expression, but it seems to amount to the following. The whole of the existing air is divided into ten parts and one of these parts is converted into fire. The converted fire itself has ten parts and, being less dense than air, these ten parts together fill up the space of all ten parts of air even though only one part of air was used to generate the ten parts of fire. So, there are nine parts of air remaining that have no place left to exist in. Either then they occupy the same place as the generated fire (so that more than one body is in the same place), or the air is compressed, or other surrounding bodies are, until the nine parts of air no longer fill up the same place as before. If this compression happens by conversion of the nine parts of air into water, and this water fills the same place as one part of air or a bit less (and so the same as one part of fire or a bit less), there will be a flood of water that exceeds any pre-existing water by a part that is equivalent to a tenth part, or a bit less, of the generated fire. The oddity here is that this new water will be in the same place as a tenth part, or almost, of the fire. For the fire converted from one part of air occupies the place of all ten parts of air, so that the nine parts of air not converted into fire and now assumed to be converted into one part or less of water (and so compressed into the equivalent of the place previously occupied by one part or less of air) must occupy the place occupied by one part or less of fire. The flood will indeed be a flood. ³⁴

C. About the Place of Infernal Fire

48. On the second point [n.45]: Since fire only remains outside its sphere in continuous generation (according to the remark of the Philosopher, On Youth and Old Age [5.470a3-5], “it is always coming to be”), how would it persist in any complete sphere round the earth? How also would it purify things, since purification is only by the consuming of something impure, as of vapors or other such mixed bodies, in which there is impurity of air?

D. More Probable Solution

50. Briefly, then, as to the first article, it seems more probable that, just as fire can exist outside its sphere in foreign matter, namely in an ignited body, as burning coal or flame (not that the form of fire is truly in the solid parts, unless it be posited that disparate specific parts together perfect the same matter, which seems unacceptable), so can the vapors existing in the air be ignited by juxtaposition [sc. with the sphere of fire]. And this successive ignition, now of these vapors, now of those (at least for all the air placed above the habitable region of men), can be called the conflagration.

51. And by it is the air well purified, because ignited bodies are converted at once into true and pure air. Since the air is predominant in its region, and since the ignited body, because of mutual contrary qualities in it, namely fire and vapor, resists the air a little (for it also in a way acts for the destruction of itself, but non-ignited vapor was not thus at once convertible by fire into pure air), it is apparent how flame thus has power for purifying gross air. For by the preceding action of an ignited body, and a body having a fiery quality in its watery self and having substantially the quality of water, the gross air is disposed by the containing body so as to be at once converted into what contains it.

And thus is pure air generated, which was not able thus to convert into itself a larger amount of gross vapor.According to the traditional theory of the disposition of the four elements in their pure state, earth is naturally below water which is naturally below air which is naturally below fire. Impure air is impure by containing earthly elements, but when earthly elements (body) are burning, they take on the quality of water (dissipating and becoming fissile, even exuding water), and so rise from the earthly to the watery element, that is, to the element next to the element of air. The previously impure air is now without most of its grosser elements and also now next to the element of air, by contact with which it becomes at once pure air. Thus can fire purify air of its grosser elements so that it becomes pure air. ³⁵

II. To the Initial Arguments

52. To the argument [n.41] I say that fire always remains pure in itself with natural purity, because it is supremely active (such that it would at once convert into itself anything of an extraneous nature that would ascend to that region [of fire]), and because nothing rises by the action of heavenly bodies to the region of pure fire, so as thus to make fire impure. Now it is specifically this impurity from the smoke of sacrifices offered to idols and from infection from the sins of men that does not ascend to the sphere of fire, because neither that smoke nor any other infection from impure acts can ascend to the fire. But this purifying is posited because of the impurity of the air that is contracted from acts of human sin; therefore, it does not follow that the fire purifies itself.