3. Scotus’ own Opinion

30. As to this first article, then [n.9], I say that there is possibility on the side of God, because of his omnipotence (whether some other cause has the possibility for this I do not deal with here, but it will be spoken about in question 3 [nn.221-222]); and on the side of the object there is possibility simply, because no contradiction is involved.

31. And this is proved against the first opinion by authority and by reason - and this whether the bringing back is through change or without change, for both are possible, as was argued against the second opinion [nn.27-29].

32. And what is touched on by the second opinion, about having regard to matter as it is a ‘what’ [n.26], was touched on in the material about the Eucharist in d.11 nn.148, 58. For if there were any good sense to the remark it would perhaps be this, that God does not have regard to matter as it passes from form to form in a certain order, the way a natural agent necessarily has regard to it, because a natural agent cannot pass immediately from just anything to just anything.

33. But this difference does nothing for the possibility of bringing back the numerically same thing or not, because the order in question has regard to forms in their specific ideas and not in their identity or distinction. For the form of vinegar can succeed immediately to the form of wine, and the converse not immediately; but that the form of vinegar succeeds to this form of wine or to that is indifferent, just as water is indifferently generated from this fire or from that. Therefore when an agent has regard to the order of forms in a change, it can, just as if it were acting immediately without such order, have something preceding the form to be induced by it; and consequently, if it had the power absolutely to bring back the numerically same thing, it would not be prevented by its being determined to this or that order of forms in its acting.