II. To the Initial Arguments

67. [To the first] - As to the first argument [n.60]: Cassiodorus is using ‘two things’ in an extended sense for dualities in a certain respect, according to what was stated in the aforesaid [n.64] Ord. d.8 n.209. Nor is it necessary to expound ‘things’ as realities and formalities, because the distinction between thing and thing is like that between reality and reality, or formality and formality.

68. [To the second] - As to the second [n.61], it is said [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.46 pr.2 qq.1, 3] that mercy connotes something other than justice, although the two are simply the same between themselves.

69. But to the contrary: the sort of distinction from it required by connotation is not from it as it is in itself but as it is taken and meant, because for this is connotation required. But the argument requires that there be some distinction between them in themselves as they are causes of distinct effects.

70. Nor is a difference of reason, as is said [by Richard of Middleton, ibid.], sufficient for this, because a relation of reason is that by which any effect is really effected. Rather, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in the cause, as was proved in Ord. I d.13 n.39; but this distinction of effects essentially depends on a distinction in the cause; therefore, the distinction is not one of reason only.

71. I concede therefore, as to the argument, that just as intellect in God is not formally the will, nor conversely (though one is the same as the other by the most true identity of simplicity), so too is justice in God not formally the same as mercy, or conversely. And because of this formal non-identity, this [sc. justice] can be the proximate principle of some effect extrinsically [sc. mercy], the remainder of which effect is not a formal principle in the way in which it would be if this and that were two things; because ‘being a formal principle’ belongs to something as it is formally such.

72. Against this: the divine ‘to be’ is most actual, therefore it includes all divine perfections; but it would not include them all if there were such a formal distinction there, because whatever is distinct from it formally is there actually, and consequently it is, as distinct, act there, and so the [divine] essence, as it is distinct, does not include every act.

73. Again, if distinct real formalities are there, then distinct realities are there, and so distinct things. Proof of the first consequence: because every proper formality is distinct in reality.

74. As to the first point [n.72], the divine ‘to be’ contains unitively every actuality of the divine essence; things that are contained without any distinction are not contained unitively, because unity is not without all distinction; nor are things that are simply really distinct contained unitively, because they are contained multiply or in dispersed fashion. This term ‘unitively’, then, includes some sort of distinction in the things contained that suffices for union, and yet for such union as is repugnant to all composition and aggregation of distinct things; this cannot be unless a formal non-identity is set down along with a real identity.

75. As to the argument [n.72], then, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as they are formally the same, because then it would not contain them unitively.

76. And if you say that it contains as much as can be contained - this is true according to the ‘to be’ of one idea; but nothing of one idea can in a more perfect way than unitively contain many things that are not formally the same.

77. To the second [objection, n.73] one could say that there are as many formalities there as there are realities and things there, as was shown in Ord. I d.13 nn.34-35 [cited supra n.70]. In another way, the consequence ‘many real formalities, therefore many realities’ could be denied, just as ‘many divine persons, therefore many deities’ is denied; but the first response is more real.

78. [To the argument for the opposite] - As to the argument for the opposite [n.62], it proves the true identity in God of anything with anything (speaking of what is intrinsic to God himself); but from this does not follow ‘therefore anything whatever [in him] is formally the same as anything else [in him]’, because a true identity, nay the most true identity, that suffices for what is altogether simple, can stand along with formal nonidentity, as was said in the cited distinction [n.64; Ord. I d.8 n.209].