Question Two. Whether in God there is Mercy

49. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the second question: argument is made that there is not:

Because, according to Damascene ch.28, “mercy is compassion for another’s ill;” in God there is no compassion because there is no passion; therefore etc.

50. Again, mercy is prompt to take away another’s misery and to have compassion on him; but God is not thus prompt to take away misery, because since he could take it all away, he would take it all away.

51. On the contrary:

Psalm 102.8, “Patient and full of mercy.”

I. To the Question

52. I reply: mercy in us is a habit or, however it may be called, a form whereby we do not want the misery of another, such that it first inclines us to an act of not wanting misery in another, and this either misery in the future (and then it preserves the other from misery, if it can), or misery in the present (and then it relieves from misery, if it can); and, as a consequence, after this operation it disposes us to passion, namely displeasure at imminent or present misery.

53. As to the second, namely insofar as mercy inclines us to this passion, mercy is not in God. And the name of mercy seems principally to be imposed on the basis of this passion, going by etymological exposition of miseri-cord [Latin for ‘mercy’], that is, having a heart [cor] for misery [miseria], because by sharing another’s misery one has in this a heart for misery, that is, a heart communicating in misery.

54. But as to the operation ‘not wanting misery’ whether present or to come, mercy is properly in God.

55. Proof of this as to imminent misery:

For just as no good happens unless God wills it, so nothing is prevented from happening unless God wills against it; but many miseries capable of happening are prevented from happening; therefore God has an adverse will with respect to them.

Likewise about present misery:

For no misery is taken away unless God’s will is opposed to the misery being present; but many miseries are often taken away; therefore etc.

56. A distinction can be made about this misery, as also about willing misery not to be present; because just as we distinguish in God an antecedent willing and a consequent willing, so could a double ‘willing-against’ be distinguished in him with respect to misery. And just as he always has an antecedent willing as regard the good of a creature, so he always as an antecedent willing-against as regard the bad of a creature, prohibiting it or taking it away, according to the statement of the Apostle I Timothy 2.4, “He wants all men to be saved.” But just as he does not always have a consequent willing with respect to good, so neither a non-willing with respect to removing evil. The first [antecedent] non-willing does not belong to someone merciful, but the second [consequent] one does.

57. And it can be distinguished thus, that he has a non-willing in respect of an imminent evil either totally or partially. If in the first way, the mercy is said to be ‘liberating’ mercy, namely mercy that excludes all evil, whether imminent or already present; in the second way the mercy is called partial or mitigating mercy, namely mercy that does not exclude the whole evil but some part of the evil that is due to this or that man according to his merits. Now mercy in both ways exists in God, because he comes also to the aid of some by prohibiting all imminent evil or by relieving present evil or at least by diminishing the misery due.

II. To the Initial Arguments

58. As to the first argument [n.49] it is plain that that description of mercy holds as to the remote or ultimate effect of it, namely the ordered passion of suffering along with, which follows from the ordered action of not-willing evil to one’s neighbor. But it has been conceded that mercy is not in God as to that remote effect but only as to the proximate effect, which is not-willing misery to be present.

59. To the second [n.50]: mercy does not inflict misery save according to right reason; but now right reason sometimes commands that misery is to be inflicted on some people, so that (according to some) justice in the damnation of the reprobate may appear; and therefore God does not inflict punishment save in the way he has made determination, along with mercy or the command of right reason, that it be inflicted.