II. To the Initial Arguments

46. To the first main argument [n.3] I say that there is no equality there simply save to oneself; so neither is there justice there simply save to oneself as other; but the sort of equality can be posited there that can belong to a greatly excelling lord to an exceeded servant.

47. To the second [n.4] I say that there are no virtues there according to what belongs to the imperfection that is in them, but after that which belongs to imperfection is taken away, as is plain in the example adduced about temperance; for the example requires that in a tempered nature there can be some immoderate delight, and this belongs to imperfection. And for this reason we can more properly posit justice there [sc. in God] than temperance, because justice does not require any excess in passion or any such imperfection as temperance requires. However, whether justice as it exists there is a virtue as regard this idea, that it be ‘distinct formally from the will and as it were the rule of it’, or is only ‘the will under the idea of the first rule determining itself’ [n.24], is a doubt; because if the second is posited the argument is solved more, since then justice is not there under the idea of moral virtue.

48. To the third [n.5] I say that God is not debtor simply save to his own goodness, to love it. But to creatures he is a debtor by his own liberality, to communicate to them what their nature demands, and this exigency in them is posited to be something just as a secondary object of his justice. However, in truth, nothing is determinately just, even outside God, save in a certain respect, namely with the modification: ‘as concerns the part of the creature’. But what is simply just is related only to the first justice, namely because it is actually willed by the divine will.