Export a Citation 
Print View
hide main text 
show main text 
hide table of contents
show table of contents
previous
Forty Sixth Distinction
Overview of Questions
1. “But there is a question here about the very bad...” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.46 ch.1 n.1].
2. Since in this forty sixth distinction God’s justice and mercy are treated of as they come together in the punishment of the bad, four questions are therefore asked: first, whether there is justice in God; second, whether there is mercy in God; third, whether in
God justice is distinguished from mercy; fourth, whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.
Question One
Whether in God there is Justice
3. As to the first question, argument is given that there is not [justice in God]: Because in Ethics 5.10.1134b9-11 it is said that there is no justice form a lord to a servant because there is no equality between them; therefore much more is there none between God and creatures or conversely, because this Lord most of all could say to his servant what is said in I Corinthians 4.7, “What do you have that you did not receive” from me?
4. Again, Ethics 10.8.1178b8-27 says that it is unfitting to praise separate substances for works of virtue, as Aristotle argues there specifically about justice [cf. Ethics 5.3.1129b25-30a9]; and it is confirmed by a likeness, that there is not temperance in God, therefore similarly not justice either.
5. Again, justice inclines one to render what is owed, but God is debtor to no one.
6. On the contrary:
Psalm 47.11, “His right hand is full of justice.”
I. To the Question
A. First Opinion about the Definition of Justice and its Distinctions
7. Here first about the definition of justice:
8. Its most general idea is posited by Anselm On Truth 12, that “justice is rectitude of will, kept for its own sake.”
9. This idea is made specific by justice as Aristotle treats of it in Ethics 5.3.1129b30-30a9, who adds (in addition to the above idea) that it is ‘toward another’.
10. And taken in both ways, it is clear that justice belongs to God.
For, in the first way, he has rectitude of will, indeed un-pervertible will, because the first rule is ‘kept for its own sake’ [n.8]. Now insofar as it is ‘kept’, it states a receiving or undergoing with respect to someone who does the keeping, but it is ‘kept for its own sake’, that is always spontaneously held for its own sake.
11. In the second way too the point is plain, because God can have rectitude toward another, and therefore in every act of his toward another there is rectitude.
12. This second rectitude is subdivided, because either it is as it were universal to another, namely as to legislator and law insofar as law is determined by the legislator (and this is called legal justice by some); or it is particular, namely in something determinate belonging to the law, that is, rectitude toward another.
13. And this second one is subdivided, because it can either be ‘simply toward another’ or ‘toward one’s self as other’. And this second member is plain from what is said in the material about penance [Ord. IV d.14 n.154, d.16 nn.18-24], that it is punitive justice not only with respect to another simply, but with respect to oneself as other, because punishment of oneself as guilty is conceded to oneself as minister of the judge.
14. The first of these, namely legal justice, could be posited in God if there were another law prior to the determination of his will, with which law (that is, with which legislator as other) his will would rightly agree. And it is indeed this law: ‘God is to be loved’ - if however it is rightly called law, and not a practical principle of law. At least it is a practical truth, preceding every determination of the divine will.
15. Now particular justice, justice ‘to oneself as other’, exists in God, because his will is determined by rectitude toward willing what befits his goodness. And this is as it were the rendering of what is due to himself and to his goodness as other - if however it could be called particular, because it is in some way universal, namely virtually.
16. And these two members, namely legal justice and particular justice toward oneself as other [nn.14-15], are as it were identical in God, because they are rectitude of the divine will with respect to his goodness.
17. If we speak then of the remaining part of justice, which is justice simply to another, it is divided into commutative and distributive - and thus is justice in us distinguished, as is plain from Ethics 5.5.1130b10-31a9. In distributive justice equality of proportion is required, not equality of quantity; in commutative justice, according to some, equality of quantity is required not equality of proportion (these are expounded in Aristotle ibid.).
18. To the issue at hand:
Commutative justice properly concerns punishment and reward, namely so that rewards may be rendered for merits (as by mutual exchange) and punishment for sins.
19. Distributive justice has regard to superadded natures and perfections, as it were, namely so that the perfection proportioned to nature be distributed to them. Just as in the case of our distributive justice, persons according to their ranks in a republic have proportionally distributed to them the goods pertaining to those ranks, so in the hierarchy of the universe a nobler nature has distributed to it by the hierarchy, that is, by God as prince, nobler perfections or perfections agreeing with that sort of nature, and an inferior nature has distributed to it the perfections agreeing with it.
20. The first of these justices [sc. commutative justice] cannot simply be in God with respect to creatures, because equality simply cannot be in him; but it can in some way be in him according to proportion, as between master and slave. For it befits a generous master to give a greater good than the slave could merit, provided however there is the following sort of proportion: that as the slave does what is his, so the master gives what is his, and does the same by punishing less than deserved.
21. But the second justice [distributive justice, n.19] can exist simply in God, because he can simply give to natures the perfections due to or agreeing with them according to the degrees that perfect them.
22. Thus, therefore, the whole distinction of justice in its genus [nn.10-17], in the way it can belong to God, can be reduced to the two members, so that justice in the first way is called ‘rectitude of will in its order to what befits the divine will’; in the other way ‘rectitude of will in its order to the exigencies of what there is in the creature’. This distinction can be got from Anselm Proslogion 10 where, speaking to God, he says, “When you punish the bad, it is just, because it befits their merits.” As to the second member he adds at once, “when you spare the bad it is just, not because it is appropriate to their merits but to your goodness.”
23. And a distinction so great is put between these members because God cannot operate against the first justice nor operate tangentially to it, but he can act tangentially to the second, though not universally, because he cannot damn the just or the blessed.
24. If it is objected that this and that justice cannot be different in God, because then one justice would be rule (as the first justice) and the other would be ruled (as the second); but in the divine will there cannot be any ruled rectitude. - And there is proof of this in us: the same thing inclines to the end and to what is for the end as it is for the end; therefore if what inclines to the end were simply perfect, it would simply perfectly incline to what is for the end, as is plain of the charity of the blessed; but the first divine justice is simply perfect; therefore no other justice beside it is required in the divine will.
25. As to the remark that sometimes God is not able to act tangentially to the second justice [n.19], it does not seem probable, because he can simply do, and thus will, whatever does not involve a contradiction; but he cannot will anything that he could not will rightly, because his will is the first rule; therefore God can rightly will whatever does not include a contradiction. And so, since this justice determines to something whose opposite does not include a contradiction, God can will and rightly well and act tangentially to this second justice.
26. As to the first of these points [n.24], the objectors would perhaps concede that there is not a double justice in God but only a single one, having however as it were different effects, as ‘willing in accord with what fits his own goodness’ and ‘willing in accord with the exigency of the creator.’
27. But the second argument [n.25] seems clearly to prove that whatever the first justice inclines the divine will toward, the second justice will be able to incline it toward, since it inclines determinately and by way of nature. But it does not so incline without the divine will being able to will against it and tangentially to it; and so there will not be a distinction between these willings as to ‘being able to act tangentially to it’ and ‘not being able to act tangentially to it’.
B. Scotus’ own Response
28. Without rejecting the distinctions, I say in brief to the question that in God there is only one justice in being and in idea. However, beside this justice, there can, by extension of the term, be a justice, or rather something just, in the case of creatures.
1. About the Justice that is in God
29. The first is made clear in that, since justice properly is habituated rectitude of will, and since it inclines as it were naturally toward another or to oneself as other, and since the divine will does not have a rectitude inclining it determinately to anything save to its own goodness as other (for as to any different object whatever, it is merely contingently disposed, such that it has power equally for this and for its opposite) - since this is so, the consequence is that the divine will has no justice save to render to its goodness what befits its goodness.
30. Thus too it has one act in being and in idea, to which this justice, which is in reference to its will, determinately inclines; but this act has regard by consequence to many secondary objects (and this in the way stated in Ord.1 d.35 nn.28-33), because the divine intellect, besides having one first object and one first act, has regard to many secondary objects. But the difference between there and here is in this, that there the intellect has regard to secondary objects necessarily, while here the will has regard to secondary objects contingently alone. And therefore, not only does the act here of will, as there of intellect, not depend on those secondary objects, but neither is it necessarily determined to them, as neither is the act of intellect necessarily determined to them.
31. Now if we want to distinguish the act one in being into many acts in idea, (just as there an intellection one in being is distinguished into many intellections in idea as it passes over many secondary objects) - I say that in respect of these acts there are no justices distinct as it were in idea; but neither is there one justice however distinct or indistinct, because a habit inclines to one thing by way of nature (and thus determinately), so that, by this fact, tending to the opposite is repugnant to a power habituated by the habit.
32. But to no secondary object is the divine will thus determined by anything in itself, so that it be repugnant to it to be justly inclined to the opposite of the secondary object; because as it can without contradiction will the opposite of the secondary object, so can it justly will the secondary object, otherwise it could will absolutely and not justly, which is unacceptable.
33. And this is what Anselm says Proslogion ch.11, “That alone is just which you want, and that not just which you do not want,” so that in this way, if there be posited in the divine intellect some habit intellective with respect to itself and other things, the divine intellect could be by reason distinguished so as to incline to many secondary objects more than [could the divine will] in the case at hand, because the intellect there is determinately inclined to many secondary objects, not so the will here.
34. However, it can be said that this single justice, which inclines determinately only to first act, regulates the secondary acts, although none of them necessarily, such that it not be able to regulate the opposite; and it does not, as it were, precede the will, inclining it by way of nature to some secondary act. Rather the will first determines itself to any secondary object, and thereby is this act regulated by first justice, because consonant with the will it is made adequate to - first justice inclining it, as it were, in favor of rectitude.
2. About Justice in Creatures
35. In a second way, ‘the just in creatures’ is called so from the correspondence of one created thing to another - the way it is just, on the part of the creature, that fire is hot and water cold, that fire goes up and water down, and the like, because the created nature requires this as something correspondent to it; and the way we could say in the case of polities that, though there were justice in the prince alone, yet there would be a just in some way in things to be ordered, namely so that these sorts of things may be disposed in this way and those sort in that way, because the things themselves, as they are of a nature to come into the use of citizens, demand this.
36. But the first intrinsic divine justice makes no determination for this just [in creatures], whether in respect of first act (in the way this act does not regard this object [the just in creatures]) or in respect of second act, because this divine justice inclines determinately as it regards this object (as was said [nn.31-33]).
C. Difficulties as to the Definition of Divine Justice, and the Solution of Them
37. Against these conclusions:
First, because this justice cannot be in any will unless this will be inclined agreeably to the dictate of prudence, and consequently to the conclusion of a practical syllogism; but the divine intellect does not syllogize since it does not proceed discursively.
38. Again, the divine intellect apprehends the doable first before the will wills it, and the will cannot disagree with the apprehending intellect; but the intellect apprehends this doable thing determinately, such that it does not apprehend this and that doable thing indifferently, because then it would have erred; therefore the will determinately wills this doable thing, such that it cannot will the opposite if it wills rightly.
39. Again, if it is just for Peter to be saved and God justly wills this, then it is unjust for Peter to be damned, and so, if God can will this, he can will something unjust.
40. To the first [n.37] I say that if in us there can be some moral virtue inclining us to agree with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, much more is there in us a practical habit of appetite that inclines us to agree with the first practical principle, because this principle is truer and consequently more right. But justice, which is in God single in reality and in idea (as was said [n.28]), inclines agreeably to the first practical principle, namely ‘God is to be loved’.
41. But if you take this justice strictly, that it does not incline agreeably to the conclusion of a practical syllogism, therefore it is not any special virtue - I concede that the justice that is in God is only as it were a universal and radical virtue, from whose rectitude all the particular justices are of a nature to proceed, though not by necessity.
42. To the second [n.38] I say that the [divine] intellect apprehends the doable thing before the will wills it, but it does not determinately apprehend ‘this is to be done’, which apprehending is called commanding; rather it offers it as something neutral to the divine will, from which will as a result, when the will determines through its volition that ‘this is to be done’, the intellect apprehends ‘this is to be done’ as true, as was said in the material about future contingents, Ord. I d.39, Lectura I d.39.
43. However, on the supposition that the intellect were to apprehend a ‘this is to be done’ about something before the will were to will it, just as it apprehends it about this, ‘God is to be loved’, the inference does not by natural necessity follow that ‘it apprehends this and the will cannot disagree, therefore the will by natural necessity wills this’. For the will cannot disagree as to the object (namely so that it will against or will for what the intellect shows to be willed), but in manner of tending toward that object it disagrees or, more properly, is distinguished, because the intellect tends toward the object in its way (that is, naturally) and the will in its way (that is, freely). And those powers always agree that always tend to the same object in their own ways of tending, as imagination and intellect do not disagree if the imagination tends to the object as a singular and the intellect to it as a universal.
44. To the third [n.39] I say it is like in polities, that the legislator has regard to the simply just in itself (which is the just of the public good), but does in a certain respect have regard to some partial justs, always to be sure in proportionate relation to the former just [of the public good] - and therefore in certain cases it is not just to keep just laws concerning these partial justs, namely when observation of them would tend to the detriment of the public just, namely the well-being of the republic. So God is determined simply toward the public good, not by commonness of aggregation, as in a city, but by commonness of eminent containing, which is the just that befits his goodness. But everything else that is just is particular, and now this is just, now that is just, according as it is ordered toward or fits in with this just [of the common good].
45. I say, therefore, that God can will Peter to be damned and justly will it, because this particular just thing, ‘Peter is saved’, is not required for the public good necessarily so that its opposite could not be ordered to the same public good, namely to fitness with God’s own divine goodness; for that goodness is indeed an end which requires for the end no entity with determinate necessity.
II. To the Initial Arguments
46. To the first main argument [n.3] I say that there is no equality there simply save to oneself; so neither is there justice there simply save to oneself as other; but the sort of equality can be posited there that can belong to a greatly excelling lord to an exceeded servant.
47. To the second [n.4] I say that there are no virtues there according to what belongs to the imperfection that is in them, but after that which belongs to imperfection is taken away, as is plain in the example adduced about temperance; for the example requires that in a tempered nature there can be some immoderate delight, and this belongs to imperfection. And for this reason we can more properly posit justice there [sc. in God] than temperance, because justice does not require any excess in passion or any such imperfection as temperance requires. However, whether justice as it exists there is a virtue as regard this idea, that it be ‘distinct formally from the will and as it were the rule of it’, or is only ‘the will under the idea of the first rule determining itself’ [n.24], is a doubt; because if the second is posited the argument is solved more, since then justice is not there under the idea of moral virtue.
48. To the third [n.5] I say that God is not debtor simply save to his own goodness, to love it. But to creatures he is a debtor by his own liberality, to communicate to them what their nature demands, and this exigency in them is posited to be something just as a secondary object of his justice. However, in truth, nothing is determinately just, even outside God, save in a certain respect, namely with the modification: ‘as concerns the part of the creature’. But what is simply just is related only to the first justice, namely because it is actually willed by the divine will.
Question Two. Whether in God there is Mercy
49. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the second question: argument is made that there is not:
Because, according to Damascene ch.28, “mercy is compassion for another’s ill;” in God there is no compassion because there is no passion; 
therefore etc 
.
50. Again, mercy is prompt to take away another’s misery and to have compassion on him; but God is not thus prompt to take away misery, because since he could take it all away, he would take it all away.
51. On the contrary:
Psalm 102.8, “Patient and full of mercy.”
I. To the Question
52. I reply: mercy in us is a habit or, however it may be called, a form whereby we do not want the misery of another, such that it first inclines us to an act of not wanting misery in another, and this either misery in the future (and then it preserves the other from misery, if it can), or misery in the present (and then it relieves from misery, if it can); and, as a consequence, after this operation it disposes us to passion, namely displeasure at imminent or present misery.
53. As to the second, namely insofar as mercy inclines us to this passion, mercy is not in God. And the name of mercy seems principally to be imposed on the basis of this passion, going by etymological exposition of miseri-cord [Latin for ‘mercy’], that is, having a heart [cor] for misery [miseria], because by sharing another’s misery one has in this a heart for misery, that is, a heart communicating in misery.
54. But as to the operation ‘not wanting misery’ whether present or to come, mercy is properly in God.
55. Proof of this as to imminent misery:
For just as no good happens unless God wills it, so nothing is prevented from happening unless God wills against it; but many miseries capable of happening are prevented from happening; therefore God has an adverse will with respect to them.
Likewise about present misery:
For no misery is taken away unless God’s will is opposed to the misery being present; but many miseries are often taken away; therefore etc .
56. A distinction can be made about this misery, as also about willing misery not to be present; because just as we distinguish in God an antecedent willing and a consequent willing, so could a double ‘willing-against’ be distinguished in him with respect to misery. And just as he always has an antecedent willing as regard the good of a creature, so he always as an antecedent willing-against as regard the bad of a creature, prohibiting it or taking it away, according to the statement of the Apostle I Timothy 2.4, “He wants all men to be saved.” But just as he does not always have a consequent willing with respect to good, so neither a non-willing with respect to removing evil. The first [antecedent] non-willing does not belong to someone merciful, but the second [consequent] one does.
57. And it can be distinguished thus, that he has a non-willing in respect of an imminent evil either totally or partially. If in the first way, the mercy is said to be ‘liberating’ mercy, namely mercy that excludes all evil, whether imminent or already present; in the second way the mercy is called partial or mitigating mercy, namely mercy that does not exclude the whole evil but some part of the evil that is due to this or that man according to his merits. Now mercy in both ways exists in God, because he comes also to the aid of some by prohibiting all imminent evil or by relieving present evil or at least by diminishing the misery due.
II. To the Initial Arguments
58. As to the first argument [n.49] it is plain that that description of mercy holds as to the remote or ultimate effect of it, namely the ordered passion of suffering along with, which follows from the ordered action of not-willing evil to one’s neighbor. But it has been conceded that mercy is not in God as to that remote effect but only as to the proximate effect, which is not-willing misery to be present.
59. To the second [n.50]: mercy does not inflict misery save according to right reason; but now right reason sometimes commands that misery is to be inflicted on some people, so that (according to some) justice in the damnation of the reprobate may appear; and therefore God does not inflict punishment save in the way he has made determination, along with mercy or the command of right reason, that it be inflicted.
Question Three. Whether in God Justice is Distinguished from Mercy
60. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the third question; it seems that it is:
Cassiodorus Exposition on Psalm 50.16, “These two things are adjoined,” and he is speaking of mercy and justice.
61. Again, if they were not distinct but were the same, then both would have the same effect. The consequence is plain, because the same formal principle has only the same effect; but the consequent is false, because the effect of mercy is to set free without merits, the effect of justice is to condemn where there are no merits or to save on behalf of merits.
62. On the contrary:
Augustine City of God 11 ch.10, “God is so far simple that he is whatever he has,” and this holds of what is said in respect of himself; of this sort are mercy and justice; therefore, God is justice, God is mercy - therefore the one is the other.
I. To the Question
63. To the question:
When upholding the first opinion set down in the first question [nn.9-27] it is stated [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that mercy is a certain part of justice said in the first way, namely the justice that is fittingness with God’s goodness [n.26], because it fits his goodness to have mercy.
64. However, when upholding the second approach [nn.28-36], it is plain that justice and mercy are not formally the same, because justice in relation to the first object has regard to divine goodness, but mercy has regard to something in the creature (after having also set aside the just that can be in the creature, namely exigency, because mercy is not in God in this respect, when there is thus something just in the creature). But this object [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice] do not have a primary regard to this thing [sc. mercy] and that thing [sc. justice] unless in this thing [sc. mercy] and that [sc. justice] there is some distinction or formal non-identity in this thing [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice].25 However, along with this non-identity formally there stands an identity simply, as was said in Ord. I d.13 nn.40-43, d.8 n.209 [also d.2 nn.388-410, d.5 n.118].
65. But if a question is asked about the order of justice (taken in this way) in this thing and in that, justice is simply prior by comparison with the objects, in the way object is simply prior to object.
66. But on the side of them between themselves, as they are intrinsic to God, they only have an order in the way that other perfections (which are not formally the same) are posited to have an order - by the fact that one is said to be present really (if the distinction were a real distinction) prior to another, and consequently one is prior, according to this distinction they have, to the other. And with this possible priority is justice prior to mercy, according to the remark of Anselm Proslogion 11, “From justice mercy is born.”
II. To the Initial Arguments
67. [To the first] - As to the first argument [n.60]: Cassiodorus is using ‘two things’ in an extended sense for dualities in a certain respect, according to what was stated in the aforesaid [n.64] Ord. d.8 n.209. Nor is it necessary to expound ‘things’ as realities and formalities, because the distinction between thing and thing is like that between reality and reality, or formality and formality.
68. [To the second] - As to the second [n.61], it is said [Richard of Middleton, Sent. IV d.46 pr.2 qq.1, 3] that mercy connotes something other than justice, although the two are simply the same between themselves.
69. But to the contrary: the sort of distinction from it required by connotation is not from it as it is in itself but as it is taken and meant, because for this is connotation required. But the argument requires that there be some distinction between them in themselves as they are causes of distinct effects.
70. Nor is a difference of reason, as is said [by Richard of Middleton, ibid.], sufficient for this, because a relation of reason is that by which any effect is really effected. Rather, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in the cause, as was proved in Ord. I d.13 n.39; but this distinction of effects essentially depends on a distinction in the cause; therefore, the distinction is not one of reason only.
71. I concede therefore, as to the argument, that just as intellect in God is not formally the will, nor conversely (though one is the same as the other by the most true identity of simplicity), so too is justice in God not formally the same as mercy, or conversely. And because of this formal non-identity, this [sc. justice] can be the proximate principle of some effect extrinsically [sc. mercy], the remainder of which effect is not a formal principle in the way in which it would be if this and that were two things; because ‘being a formal principle’ belongs to something as it is formally such.
72. Against this: the divine ‘to be’ is most actual, therefore it includes all divine perfections; but it would not include them all if there were such a formal distinction there, because whatever is distinct from it formally is there actually, and consequently it is, as distinct, act there, and so the [divine] essence, as it is distinct, does not include every act.
73. Again, if distinct real formalities are there, then distinct realities are there, and so distinct things. Proof of the first consequence: because every proper formality is distinct in reality.
74. As to the first point [n.72], the divine ‘to be’ contains unitively every actuality of the divine essence; things that are contained without any distinction are not contained unitively, because unity is not without all distinction; nor are things that are simply really distinct contained unitively, because they are contained multiply or in dispersed fashion. This term ‘unitively’, then, includes some sort of distinction in the things contained that suffices for union, and yet for such union as is repugnant to all composition and aggregation of distinct things; this cannot be unless a formal non-identity is set down along with a real identity.
75. As to the argument [n.72], then, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as they are formally the same, because then it would not contain them unitively.
76. And if you say that it contains as much as can be contained - this is true according to the ‘to be’ of one idea; but nothing of one idea can in a more perfect way than unitively contain many things that are not formally the same.
77. To the second [objection, n.73] one could say that there are as many formalities there as there are realities and things there, as was shown in Ord. I d.13 nn.34-35 [cited supra n.70]. In another way, the consequence ‘many real formalities, therefore many realities’ could be denied, just as ‘many divine persons, therefore many deities’ is denied; but the first response is more real.
78. [To the argument for the opposite] - As to the argument for the opposite [n.62], it proves the true identity in God of anything with anything (speaking of what is intrinsic to God himself); but from this does not follow ‘therefore anything whatever [in him] is formally the same as anything else [in him]’, because a true identity, nay the most true identity, that suffices for what is altogether simple, can stand along with formal nonidentity, as was said in the cited distinction [n.64; Ord. I d.8 n.209].
Question Four. Whether, in the Punishment of the Bad, Mercy Goes Along with Justice on the Part of God as Punisher
79. Fourth [n.2], the question is asked whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.
80. Argument that it does not:
Augustine 83 Questions q.3 says, “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is in authority, since God is greater than any sage, does man not become worse. But he who adds bad to bad makes the whole worse, just as he who adds good to good makes the whole better, Topics 3.5.119a23; therefore etc . [sc. therefore God does not add bad to bad; punishment adds bad to bad; therefore God does not punish, therefore a fortiori not justly and mercifully either].
81. Again, Deuteronomy 25.2: “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be;” but the fault of any sinner at all is temporal and finite; therefore, according to justice, the punishment of anyone at all will be of such sort. So there is no justice in eternal punishment for a temporal and passing fault.
82. Again, just punishment is for correction of the one punished; but no one who is damned is corrected by his punishment. The first statement is proved by the Philosopher Rhetoric 1.10.1369b12-14 [cf. Ord. IV d.14 n.105].
83. Again, James 2.13, “Judgment without mercy will be done to him who did not show mercy;” and Augustine on Psalms, Psalm 118.151, “You are near, Lord,” in sermon 29, “When God does not pity, vengeance is given;” therefore, in the damned there is justice without mercy.
84. Again, Revelation 18.7, “Give to Babylon as much torment and grief as she gave glory to herself and was in delights;” so there is a strict correspondence of punishment with guilt without any remission and mercy.
85. On the contrary:
In Psalm 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth;” where Cassiodorus [n.60] says, “These two things are always adjoined in the ways of the Lord.” And in Scripture enough is said about both, as Psalm 10.8, “The Lord is just and has loved justice etc.,” and Psalm 76.8-10, “God will not forget to be merciful.”
I. To the Question
A. The Common Response
1. Exposition of It
86. As to this question, the opinion is with probability held [Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Innocent V, Cassiodorus et al.] that in every divine work mercy is found along with justice, according to Psalm 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.”
87. The reason for this is that an artisan, when voluntarily producing an effect conformably to his own rule, is just, for ‘justice renders to each what is due’ [Cicero, Nature of the Gods 3.15, Justin Institutes I tit.1 ch.10]; what is most due to an artifact is that it agree with its rule; but God is such an artisan for every creature.
88. Likewise mercy exists in coming to the aid of present need to stop it, and of impending future need to prevent it; but God, when producing each creature thus and so, is coming to the aid of what is in need; therefore etc .
89. In favor of the presence of these two [justice and mercy] together, there is the following sort of congruity: The more that several virtues incline toward some one and the same work, the more is that work perfect, just as, by opposition, the more a work is blamable, the more is it against the inclination or rectitude of the several virtues. Every work of God, as it is his, is most perfect; therefore it comes from every virtue that can come together in the same work. But mercy and justice can come together in the same work, as is plain from the solution of questions 1-3 of this distinction [nn.29-36, 40-45, 56-57, 64-66].
2. Weighing of It
90. But the first reason [n.87], which proceeds from the idea of justice and mercy, takes the works of them very generally; for if justice consists properly in returning what is due, and if nothing is due to an artifact save according to the will of the artisan, it follows that in the production of the artifact there will be no justice strictly speaking; but God is such an artisan with respect to the creature. Therefore, what is taken in the phrase ‘it is due to an artifact to be conformed to its rule’ must be denied when ‘due’ is taken strictly, because God is not in debt to this artifact. But if the phrase is taken to mean that this is required in an artifact for it to be duly fashioned, from this no justice in the producer follows, if he only give freely to the artifact that it be so conformed, without any previous exigency on the part of the artifact - as is the case here.
91. And the reason about mercy [n.88] overly extends mercy to the alleviation or exclusion of any defect whatever, although mercy is only properly for alleviating or supplying defects that belong to misery, and not everything defective is capable of misery.
92. The congruence too about the coming together of several virtues involves a doubt, because it is not certain that in the divine will there can be any idea of any virtue -not only of a virtue non-distinct in reality (this is certain), but of one not distinct formally either, for the will, because it is infinite, suffices for all rectitude of act more than any superadded virtue however distinct in reality or in idea. But if a virtue that is distinct formally from the will be granted there, as wisdom or some intellectual virtue in the intellect, it is not clear that the coming together of several virtues for the same work is required for the highest perfection of the work.
93. Let it be, too, that these reasonings [nn.87-89] prove the conclusion generally about God’s positive works (because manifest rectitude is there, and even exclusion of need), yet, because some evil is inflicted in the punishment of the bad (such that the one punished becomes needier after punishment than before), it does not seem that these reasons equally prove the conclusion in this issue at hand.
B. Scotus’ own Response
94. Therefore, as to the question, one must see first what the punishment of the bad is; second, whether it is from God; third, whether justice concurs with it; fourth whether mercy does.
1. What the Punishment of the Bad is
a. About the Essence of Punishment or about Sadness
95. About the first [n.94]:
Punishment is ‘a perceivable lack of an agreeable good in an intellectual nature’, or ‘a perceivable presence of a disagreeable evil’ in the same. Now the good of intellectual nature is double in kind: namely the good of advantage and the good of the honorable. The useful good, indeed, which is posited as a third, is reduced to either other of these, according as it is ordered toward it. And although sometimes the ideas of the advantageous and the honorable good come together in the same thing (as in the enjoyment of God in the fatherland), indeed although generally everything honorable is advantageous (but not conversely), yet the supreme advantage is beatitude and it would be advantageous even if, per impossibile, it were not honorable; also, the supreme good is charity and it would be honorable even if, per impossibile, it were not advantageous. Therefore in an intellectual nature there is a double punishment by privation of this double good: the first is called the bad of injustice or of guilt, and it can be called obstinacy in sin; the second is called the punishment of loss, or either loss or damnation.
96. The disagreeable bad in a nature merely intellectual cannot be any operation of that nature taken in itself, because any operation of it at all is agreeable. Indeed, every act of understanding, taken in itself, agrees with the intellect, and every act of willing agrees with the will; and likewise every act of willing-against, taken in itself, agrees with the will, because the will has willing-against as freely as it has willing, and so even when comparing this power with the former [sc. understanding], the operation of one is not disagreeable to the other. So, nothing will be found there [sc. in an intellectual nature] that is disagreeable positively to such nature save a distinct suffering opposite to its operation, or a disagreeable operation - not disagreeable in itself but because it is unwanted; such a passion is sadness. An unwanted operation, and indeed any unwanted thing generally, is cause, when put into effect, of sadness. Such sort of unwanted operation is immoderate consideration of fire, as was said before in d.44 n.7, which is against the command of the will that wills freely to use its intelligence for application now to this object, now to that; but now the intelligence is, contrary to this willing, detained always in intense consideration of fire, whereby it is impeded from perfect consideration of other objects, as was said there [ibid.]
b. About the Four Forms of Sadness
α. About the Privation of the Honorable Good, or of Grace, by Guilt
97. Now the sadness is there [in an intellectual nature] in a fourfold way in genus: double sadness about privation of double good.
One sadness indeed is about privation of the honorable good, or of grace, through guilt. For there is sadness about its own obstinacy in sin, which is the first privation - or at least about the sin committed in life, wherein it is now without remission left abandoned. The sadness is not indeed about this or that sin in itself as the sin is the sort of thing it is, but because the sin is a demerit with respect to punishment of loss; that is, the sadness is not because God is offended, but because, thinking on the fact it was immoderate in appetite, it deprived itself by sinning. And this sadness can properly be called the ‘pain of the worm’, namely sadness arising from remorse about sin committed, not because it is sin but because it is a demeriting cause with respect to the pain of loss.
β. About the Privation of the Advantageous Good, namely Beatitude
98. Sadness about the lack of the advantageous good, namely beatitude - this either has no name but can be called all-absorbing sadness, because that of which the desire is most of all present in nature, and specifically in it along with restraint by the justice it abandoned - the perpetual lack of this object of desire, when perceived, saddens totally by way of absorption; or its name is ‘pain of loss’, taken so as to be transitive in construal, that is pain about loss; for to call the mere lack of what is advantageous the ‘pain of loss’ is an intransitive construal.
γ. About the Double Positive Disagreeable
99. And there is a double sadness about what is positively disagreeable: one about the perpetual detention of fire as definitively locating it [sc. intellectual nature] in a place; another about the detention of the intellect in intense consideration of fire as object. Which two positives, namely two detentions, are not wanted and are therefore disagreeable - not so as to destroy the nature of the power they are in, but in the way it is disagreeable for the heavy to be above and in the way this would be sad for it if it were perceived by it. And these two sadnesses about double detention can be named as follows: the first as ‘penalty of incarceration’, the second as ‘penalty of blinding’ - read as transitive in construal, taking penalty for sadness and the term added in the genitive for the object that causes sadness.
100. In this way, therefore, we have two punishments in genus by privation of a double good, and a quadruple punishment by positing a quadruple sadness, with respect to which there are two positive causes (two unwanted detentions) and two privations (the unwanted and perceived privations).
2. Whether the Punishment of the Bad is from God, or about the Four Penalties
a. About the First and Second Penalty or Punishment
101. About the second article [n.94]:
The first penalty [n.97], namely the continuation of guilt without intermission, which continuation can be called ‘obstinacy’, does not have God for positive cause. For just as guilt, when committed, does not, as guilt, have any positive cause, so neither does it to the extent that guilt as guilt is continued; and, as guilt, it is the first penalty, according to the remark of Augustine Confessions 1.12 n.19, “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every sinner should be a punishment to himself;” and there was discussion of this in Ord. II d.7 n.92. Now this guilt, as continued, is from God as negative cause, namely as not remitting it. He is not, however, the first cause, but the will itself voluntarily continuing it is the demeritorious cause that God does not remit it - or at least the will itself, when it committed it, demerited, though it not always continue it after the act of the sin.
102. The second penalty likewise, since it is a privation, has no positive cause, but does have God as negative cause, because having him as not conferring beatitude; but this ‘not causing’ of God’s has another cause, a cause of demerit, in the [one punished], namely guilt, whereby it was said [n.97] that this advantage is not conferred on him.
b. About the Third and Fourth Penalty or Punishment
103. But the two unwanted punishments, namely the two detentions [n.99], are from God, because they are positive realities and consequently good.
And the first detention is from God immediately, at least as it is perpetual, because although fire may detain a spirit as if formally, yet it does not effectively locate him in place, namely neither by effectively detaining him in this ‘where’ nor by prohibiting him from that ‘where’; nor does a spirit locate himself, at least not perpetually. Therefore God is immediately cause of this definitive, perpetual detention.
And of the other detention, namely of the intelligence in intense consideration of fire, the proximate but partial cause is the fire. Now God is the remaining and immediate cause, because according to the common order of causes, an object should, in acting on someone’s intelligence, have a causality subordinate with respect to his will; but here the object is not subordinate to the will of the spirit himself, rather it moves against his will, as if immediately subordinate to the divine will.
104. These four sadnesses, then, since they are positive effects, are from God, but all are so mediately, namely through the medium of apprehension of the unwanted object.
3. Whether Justice Goes Along with the Aforesaid Punishments or Penalties of the Bad
105. About the third article [n.94] I say that since justice is taken in two ways in God (as was said in this distinction, question 1 [n.22]), there is in this punishment not only the first justice, namely because it befits divine goodness to punish thus, but also the second, because this punishment is a certain exigency or just correspondence of penalty to guilt.
106. And this can become clear by running through the aforesaid punishments.
a. About God’s Justice in the First Penalty
107. The first punishment [n.97] indeed is not inflicted, nor could it be inflicted justly, since it is guilt formally but a penalty left afterwards, as Augustine says On Psalms, Psalm 5 n.10, “When God punishes sinners, he does not inflict his evil on them but leaves the bad to their evils.” I understand this of the first penalty, which is the guilt left afterwards, or not remitted, or the abandonment of the sinner in this sort of guilt; and this, in the way it was said to be from God in the preceding article [n.101], is thus justly from him. For he justly abandons or does not remit, whether because the will voluntarily continues to will badly, or because it remained in sin without penance to the end (which time, however, was precisely reckoned to it for penance), or, third, because in wayfaring it sinned, where it deserved by demerit to be thus left behind.
108. Just indeed it is that he who continues malice not be freed from malice by another - and not this case only but he who could have left malice behind and had time precisely reckoned for this and is not corrected in that time but perseveres in evil; for it is just that, when the time has elapsed, he be left to that evil. Third too (which is less evident), if someone by his guilt has thrown himself into an incapacity of escaping, not only of escaping by himself but also by anyone’s help save his whom he then offends, he justly deserves to be abandoned in his incapacity - in the way that, if someone were to throw himself voluntarily into a pit from which he could not get out by himself, or in any way, save by the help of another whom he despises and offends by throwing himself therein, he can justly be left behind in it.
109. These three points are sufficiently clear as to the issue at hand, because someone damned is continually in some bad act of will (as seems probable), and persists impenitent up to the end of life, and offends as wayfarer by tottering into sin from which he cannot escape by himself save only by disposing himself with congruous merit, and that for this state of life, through the whole of which state he passed fruitlessly without such merit.
b. About God’s Justice in the Second Penalty
α. Exposition
110. The second penalty too [n.98] is from God in this way, that is, negatively, because it is from him as not conferring beatitude. Justly is it from him, because as he justly requires the honorable good in order that the advantageous good be given in return for it, so he justly requires a sin that takes away the honorable good in order that the privation of the advantageous good be given in return for it. And this just correspondence of the privation of the advantageous good with the privation of the honorable good puts that guilt in order, the way guilt can, while it remains, be put in order; for, absolutely, guilt is against order, and therefore it cannot remain in the whole along with the order that can exist in the whole, while the whole remains, unless something be added that the order of the whole requires to be added. An example: rottenness in a bodily member is simply against the good order of the body, because, if it is not taken away, the better order of body that is able to be had cannot stand while the rottenness stands, unless something is applied to it, namely something else that corresponds to the rotten member according to the natural order of the body, that is to say, unless something else is applied that would prevent the sort of communication between the rotten member and the other members that there would be if there were no rottenness.
111. In favor of this is Boethius Consolation 4 prose 4 n.21, “The base are more unhappy when given unjust impunity than when punished with just punishment.” And no wonder, because in the first place there is no good save the good of nature, which good however is vitiated by the evil of guilt; in the second place, beyond the good of nature there is a good which reforms guilt, that is, the just correspondence with it of the penalty.
β. Two Objections and Response to the First
112. On the contrary:
Between bad and bad there does not seem to be any relation in which goodness may exist.
113. Again, it would be better at any rate if the first bad were taken away than if it remained and another corresponding bad were added, as is apparent in the example about the rotten member [n.110], where expulsion of the rottenness were simply better for the body than were the prohibition of communication between that member and the other ones.
114. As to the first [n.112]: there is a necessary correspondence between false and false, so there is a just correspondence between the bad of the dishonorable and the bad of the disadvantageous.
γ. Response to the Second
115. [Others’ response] - As to the second it is said [Aquinas, ST, Ia q.22 a.2 ad 2, q.48 a.2 ad 3] that the universe’s being better requires that some evils be allowed in it; and this is taken from Augustine, Enchiridion, 8 n.27: “The Omnipotent One judged it better to allow evils to come to be, because he is able from those evils to elicit greater goods.”
116. Again ibid., 3 n.11, “evils suitably placed do the more eminently commend goods.”
117. And this conclusion is drawn specifically in the issue at hand [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.46 q.2 a.1, q.1 a.2], because, by the allowance of faults and of punishment for them, the justice in divine effects is apparent, and it would not be apparent if no fault were allowed. Augustine says this in City of God 21.12, “The human race is separated into parts, so that in some may be shown what merciful grace is capable of, in the rest what just vengeance is capable of; for neither would both be shown in all of them.”
118. Further, this commending of the good by the juxtaposition of evil is referred back to the glory of the saints [Aquinas, ibid. d.46 q.1 a.3], about whom Isaiah 66.24 says, “They will go out and will see the corpses of men, and it will be for the satiety of all flesh,” in accord with Psalm 57.11, “The just will be happy since he has seen vengeance.”
119. And Augustine treats of this in City of God 20.21.
120. It would therefore have to be denied [sc. by those, nn.115-119, who thus respond to the objection, n.113] that it would be better for the universe that the bad of guilt be taken away from the bad [n.113], because then the goodness would be taken away that there is in just punishment, and punishment cannot be just or good if all guilt were taken away.
121. Nor is the example about the rotten member valid [n.110], on the ground that, just as removal of rottenness would be better for the body than the withering of the member with its rottenness remaining, so it would be better for this person that his guilt and punishment be taken away than that the double privation along with such mutual correspondence remain in him, because each privation is bad in itself and bad for him, and worse than the correspondence of this to that would be good for him.
But that correspondence is better in the universe than no such correspondence being in the universe, because a plurality of degrees of goodness belongs to the perfection of the universe - just as it would be better for the moon to have the light of the sun [sc. as its own], if it could have it while its nature remained, but not better for the universe, because then there would not be all degrees of luminaries in the universe.
122. [Scotus’ Response] - Against this:
Neither has the highest nature possible been made in the universe nor will it be made, as is maintained with probability, nor will all possible degrees of beatitude in beatifiable nature be in the kingdom of heaven. If then God will not make, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, all the degrees of goodness that are not only good for the universe but good in themselves and good for those who have them, what necessity is there that, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, there be this lowest goodness, which is in itself bad and bad for him who has it? Indeed, it is worse than any goodness that is in itself good and good for him who has it. Surely it would be better that all such [lowest goods] are taken away and that in their place goods are given that would be good in themselves and good for those who have them, namely their blessedness?
123. This excludes the first reason [n.115]: for greater goods are not elicited from the bad, as it seems, than are the goods that are taken away by the bad. For this depriving punishment is not simply better than the charity or beatitude that is deprived.
124. As to the other point touched on, that ‘evil suitably ordered the more eminently commends the good’ [n.116], it seems that eminent commendation of the good does not require that what is also evil is suitably ordered, since all of it is evil because against order. Nor is there a likeness about diverse colors in pictures, because every color is something positive and moves sight in its own way; but if a painter could leave in one place a vacuum, not for this reason would the picture be more beautiful.
125. The next point, about the manifestation of divine justice [n.117], does not seem to prove the conclusion; for it is a more eminent act, even of justice, to reward him who deserves well than to punish him who deserves ill. Indeed, the lowest justice is vindictive justice, hence its act should never be purely elective, as in the case of reward or exchange, but as it were elective with a certain displeasure. And that act of will is less perfect, because in order for it to be good it should be less voluntary; for a robust choice for revenge is cruelty. Now this inference does not follow: ‘divine justice does not appear in the lowest act that can belong to justice, therefore it does not appear’; rather it more eminently appears in other more eminent acts of justice.
126. The fourth point, namely about the happiness of the blessed [n.118], does not seem it should move us; for just as, according to Gregory Dialogues 4, “God, because he is pious, does not feed on torment; because he is just, he is not assuaged by vengeance on the wicked,” so is it much more repugnant to the blessed to feed on torment, because this is attributed to God precisely because of justice, and justice sometimes compels the judge to avenge when another, not a judge, feels compassion for the one punished. But let it be that the blessed are now conformed to divine justice and therefore are happy about the punishment of Judas, surely they would be happier about his glorification if he were beatified? It is plain that they would be; for now Peter rejoices more in the beatitude of Linus [Bishop of Rome after Peter] than in the damnation of Judas; but if Judas were beatified, Peter would be happy about his beatitude just as he is now about the beatitude of Linus.
c. About God’s Justice in the Third Penalty
127. Excluding these views then [nn.115-121], and confirming the reasons taken from the words of Augustine [nn.115-118], it can be said that in the third penalty [n.99] the justice of exigency sufficiently appears; for, just as fitting the good is a ‘where’ in the noblest body (a ‘where’ circumscriptively for the bodies of the blessed and definitively for the good angels), but with liberty for another ‘where’ at will (because it is a feature of glory to be able to use one’s motive power for any ‘where’ that is not repugnant to glory), so is it just that the reprobate be placed in the most vile body, which is the earth, and to be limited to that ‘where’ in which they are deprived of motive power - which power they would use badly if they could, because of the malice of their will.
d. About God’s Justice in the Fourth Penalty
128. In the fourth penalty too [n.99] there is justice, because as the intellect of the blessed is determined toward seeing the noblest object, that is, the divine essence, and as concomitantly their will is determined toward enjoying that object (with liberty remaining, however, to consider and love other objects, the consideration and love of which do not impede that good), so is the intellect of the bad determined toward intensely considering an object that is disagreeable, because not wanted, and imperfect, because corporeal, and their will determined toward something placed in existence that is saddening, and the liberty to consider and will other things is taken away, by which, when considered and willed, this punishment could be lessened. And the reason both in the case of the good and in that of the bad is that they merited precisely through their intellect and will. And these powers are the noblest of an intellectual nature, in whose perfection or imperfection, by consequence, consists precisely the perfection or imperfection of such nature.
e. About God’s Justice in the Other Four Penalties
129. Now in the other four penalties, namely the sadnesses [n.100], justice sufficiently appears, because the consummation of the penalty requires sadness.26 But if about damned men after the judgment there is put, in place of the second detention [sc. the devils’ intense consideration of fire, nn.99, 103], burning in fire, and in place of the fourth sadness [sc. sadness about such intense consideration of fire, n.128] pain in sense appetite, then there is justice from the correspondence of this bitterness with the inordinate delight it had in sin.
4. Whether Mercy Goes Along with the Punishment of the Bad
130. As to the fourth article [n.94], as was said in d.46 q.2 [n.57], liberating mercy removes the whole of misery; mitigating but not liberating mercy removes part of what is due. The first is not relevant here, but the second.
a. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas
α. Exposition of the Opinion
131. For this the following reason is given [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.46 q.2 a.2]: “Agent and patient always correspond to each other proportionally, such that the agent is related to action as the patient to passion. Now things unequal among themselves do not have the same proportion to other things unless the other things are unequal among themselves - the way that six and four, because unequal, have the proportion of double to the similarly unequal three and two. Therefore, when the agent exceeds the patient, the action must exceed the passion.”
132. And there is confirmation of this conclusion, because we see in all equivocal agents that the patient does not receive the whole of the effect.
133. From this conclusion to the issue at hand the inference is as follows [Aquinas, ibid.]: “The giver is disposed the way an agent is, and the receiver is disposed the way a patient is; therefore, when the giver exceeds beyond the receiver, it is fitting that the giving exceed the receiving that is proportionate to the receiver. Now ‘less bad’ and ‘more good’ are reckoned as the same, as is said in Ethics 5.7.1131b22-23; therefore as God always gives beyond desert, so he always inflicts bad less than desert.” p. Refutation of the Opinion
β Refutation of the Opinion
134. Against this position. First as follows:
If two things have the same proportion to two other things, then, to the extent that one term of the first pair exceeds the other term of that first pair, to that extent one term of the second pair is exceeded by the other term of that second pair; and this holds when speaking of ‘so much’ and ‘as much’ according to proportion, not according to quantity. The point is plain in his example [n.131]: for just as six is one and half times four, so three is one and half times two. But never because the agent or giver in the issue at hand infinitely exceeds the sufferer or receiver does the agent exceed the patient, or the action exceed the passion, nor yet the act of giving go infinitely beyond desert.
135. If you say that, on the contrary, divine action and giving, as far as concerns God himself, is infinite because it is his act of willing - then the argument [n.131] is not to the purpose. For from this does not follow that the agent has some extrinsic causation greater than the passive thing is suited to receive, nor does it follow that something be extrinsically given that is greater than the receiver is fitted to receive; but it only follows that the agent’s action, as it remains in itself, is something more perfect than the reception of it; such would be the case if in the effect were given to the recipient nothing save the minimum that was proportioned to the recipient.
136. Again, his example is to the opposite purpose [n.131]: for if the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent, then: either some other passive object does, and in that case an equivocal agent would always require several passive objects at once; or no passive object does, and in that case the agent will have, along with the effect in the passive object, another effect standing by itself - both of which results are manifestly unacceptable.27
137. Hence, although the argument, when it speaks of the action, could be qualified by raising a difficulty in this way, that an action is taken that remains in God himself as agent, yet when it speaks of the effect (in the way the argument here says that the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent [n.132]), it is manifestly false; and thus is it false also when it speaks of the action as it is in the passive object [n.133] (the way the Philosopher speaks in Physics [3.3.202b19-22]). 138. To the reasoning then [n.131]: either the major is false or the minor,28 or it equivocates over ‘proportion’, and this when speaking of action as it is something in the passive object. For if [the minor] takes proportion properly, and thus takes it that there is a similar proportion between agent and action and between patient and passion, the proposition is false, as is this proposition ‘the patient exceeds the form received in it as much as the agent exceeds the form given by it’. Nor does this understanding of a like proportion between these four terms follow from the antecedent, that ‘the agent is proportioned to the patient’; for they are proportioned in this respect, that the one is such actually as the other is potentially, where the two are the extremes of one proportion. How can from this be inferred that these two terms have a like proportion to the other two terms, namely action and passion, save by supposing that action is such actually as the passion is potentially? - which is false. But if it takes ‘proportion’ in some way improperly, namely not according to exceeding and exceeded, but in some other way, according to which the major could perhaps have an appearance in some way of truth, then thus is the second [sc. the major] not true, that ‘unequals have a similar proportion only to unequals’ [n.101].
b. Scotus’ own Opinion
139. I say therefore that for this conclusion, namely that there is mitigating mercy in punishment, a better foundation is obtained from James 2.13, “Mercy triumphs over justice,” because, as was said at the beginning of the solution [n.89], “the more that several virtues come together in some work, the more perfect is that work;” thus, if judgment is from justice and, along with this, from mercy, it is so much the more perfect. Such is the case if, when inflicting something that justice commands to be inflicted, something is remitted that mercy inclines toward remitting; and so mercy triumphs over divine judgment to the extent that divine judgment is more perfect coming from mercy than it would be coming from justice alone.
140. Against this: on the contrary, mercy seems to destroy just judgment, for as vengeance is to be exacted by justice, so must it be exacted in proportion to the fault; therefore, as it would be against justice not to avenge, so would it be against justice not to avenge totally.
141. I reply: to give an undue good is not against justice because it is an act of liberality, and the act of one virtue is not repugnant to another; but to take away a due good is against justice. Now as it is, ‘to give good’ and ‘not to inflict bad’ keep pace with each other as far as justice is concerned; therefore ‘to inflict bad beyond what is due’ is against justice because it is to subtract a due good; but ‘to inflict bad less than what is due’ is not against justice, as neither is ‘to give an undue good’ against justice.
142. On the contrary: the argument still stands, because then ‘to inflict no bad’ would not be against justice, nor would ‘to confer or give the maximum undue good’ be against justice.
143. There is a confirmation, that to this guilt with three degrees of intensity there corresponds, in strict justice, a penalty having three dimensions or parts, a, b, c. From what has been granted, it is consistent with justice that c not be inflicted. From this follows, first, that, by parity of reasoning, it would be consistent with justice that b not be inflicted (because b is not more necessarily commanded to be inflicted than c is), and so on about a. Secondly, it follows that if justice permits one degree in the sin to go unpunished with its own proper punishment, then by parity of reasoning justice can permit another degree to go unpunished, and so the whole to go unpunished.
144. Look for the response.a
a.a [Interpolation] One must say that justice has a latitude in its degrees beyond which, if God did not punish, he would not be using justice. Therefore, although he could dismiss one degree of the penalty or two, yet it does not follow that he could therefore dismiss any degree, because then he would pass beyond the latitude required for justice. And thus is the response to these two arguments plain [nn.142-43].
It could be said in another way that if he were to dismiss [any degree] he would not be acting against justice absolutely considered, because whatever he did he would justly do, since his will is justice itself, and his will would be acting according to justice, though not ordained justice.
The first solution [first paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from Ord. IV dd.18-19 nn.24-26; and the second solution [second paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from the present distinction [nn.29-34].
II. To the Initial Arguments
145. As to the first main argument [n.80], Augustine speaks of the evil of guilt, not of penalty, because God is indeed the judge of the bad, Deuteronomy 32.35, “Vengeance is mine; I will repay.”
146. On the contrary: the proof of Augustine does stand at least, that “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is not in authority, as Augustine himself argues; but a man becomes worse through punishment, because bad is added to bad.
147. I reply: when a first bad stands, the second added bad, though it be worse than it, yet is not worse simply, because not worse in comparison with the universe, whose order requires that the first bad, while it remains, be put in order by another bad. An example: it would have been better for the man born blind in John 9.1-41 to have had sight from the beginning, but not better in its ordering to the manifestation of the divine wisdom and goodness. When therefore the phrase “a man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority” is taken, either it must be expounded of the evil of guilt or, if it is about bad simply, one should say that this man does not become simply worse through the added penalty, though he have a more multiple evil, because the proportion of the second bad to the first in him is just.
148. As to the second [n.81], it is said [Aquinas, Sent. IV d.46 q.1 a.1] that if the bad man had lived perpetually he would have sinned perpetually, and therefore he is perpetually punished because in his will he has sinned perpetually. And this is the reasoning of Gregory, Moralia ch.19 n.36.
149. On the contrary: someone sins with the intention of repenting; therefore, neither implicitly nor explicitly does he sin with perpetual willingness.
Response: he exposes himself to the perpetuity of sin, as was said in the solution about someone throwing himself into a pit [n.108], and especially so when he remains without penance for the whole time of his life.
150. There is another way of speaking, which seems to be Augustine’s in City of God 21.11, where he seems to say that justice does not require a perpetual penalty to be inflicted in order for it to be sufficient for the guilt, but the penalty is perpetual for the reason that the person is perpetual and remains perpetually in guilt. For Augustine says, “What holds of the removal of men from this mortal city by the penalty of the first death, holds of the removal of men from that immortal city by the penalty of the second death.” And a little before, about certain penalties inflicted in this city, he says, “Surely penalties similar to eternal ones are seen to hold for the manner of this life? Indeed, that they cannot be eternal is for the reason that the life too itself that is punished by them does not stretch into eternity.” He means to say that there is a sort of guilt that does not merit total exclusion from the city, and that this is temporal even in respect of civic life; but some guilt is so great that it merits total exclusion from this civic life, and the intensity of it corresponds to the guilt - but the extension happens to be finite because the life is finite. So, in the issue at hand, mortal guilt deserves total exclusion from the supernal city, but for this reason precisely is it perpetual, that the life is perpetual along with the guilt.
151. The reason for this seems to be that it would be possible for God, according even to the strict rigor of justice, to reckon out a penalty so intense that it would sufficiently correspond to the guilt even if nature were to be at once annihilated; therefore, the fact that an eternal penalty is now inflicted is not because eternity belongs per se to the idea of the penalty insofar as a penalty is equally punitive [sc. gives punishment equal to the fault], but the penalty happens to be eternal because of the eternity of the person punished and of the persisting guilt. And this reason better preserves how “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be” [n.81], speaking of the intensity that is per se required in a penalty - infinite extension is accidental to it, for the aforesaid reasons [nn.150-151].
152. To the next [n.82] I say that medicine is double: curative and preservative. Thus is punishment a double medicine: it is inflicted on the corrigible to cure him, and inflicted on the incorrigible to preserve, not him indeed, but others, if it is for the good of the community that some penalties be made determinate by the legislator, and that they be inflicted on the delinquent. And not only in the determination but also in the infliction are medicines preservative for those who are in a state of preservation. But that they are medicines in neither way for the one punished is not repugnant to justice; the point is plain in the civic penalties that are exterminating or determinate for great guilt.
153. To the next [n.83] I say that James’s meaning is about liberating mercy, and likewise Augustine’s.
154. To the next [n.84]: the ‘as much...as’ does not deny equality of quantity but equality of proportion;29 that is: let him who has glorified himself more inordinately than another be punished more than another in like proportion. Thus, even if the reward exceed merit, he who has merited more than another is proportionately rewarded more -“which may He grant us who lives and reigns God for ever and ever.”