B. To the Second

151. As to the second [n.77], that authority is speaking of the intellect as it has scientific intellection, of the sort that is abstractive only - and yet the precise cause does not thus come from the nature of the intellect, because the singular can also be understood by that abstractive knowledge, although not by us now (on which elsewhere, Ord. II d.9 n.122, d.3 nn.320-321).

152. If you object that a power that does not know the singular as singular does not remember, because a rememberer cognizes something as it is here and now, which is proper to a singular - I reply: actual existence belongs to nature first; hence ‘this nature’ is not formally existent because it is ‘this’, but because of nature; now nature, as existent, is what the intellect intuitively knows, and the knowledge of an existent as existent is sufficient for remembrance of it to be possible. When, therefore, you say that the remembering power knows this as this, I deny it. When you give as proof that it knows something as it is here and now, if by ‘now’ you mean ‘existent’ and by ‘here’ you mean

‘present in itself’, I concede that it knows something as existent in its presence in itself. If so, then there are proper singulars beyond the ‘here’ and ‘now’, so that they can be singulars of nature but not as of a singular - though they are not of anything save what is singular by intrinsic or adjunct singularity; however, they do not include, nor do they per se presuppose, singularity as the precise reason whereby they are present.