B. First Article: about the Memory of the Past in the Sense Part of the Soul

1. Whether the Remembering Power Knows the Act while it Exists

97. In this regard a doubt can be introduced, and it is whether the remembering power knows the act while it exists, of which act as past, as of immediate object, it is the memory. For it seems that if it does not then know it, neither will it remember it afterwards. But the proof is not necessary, because one sense does not seem to reflect on the act of another sense; and though it not perceive the act of another sense while it is present, there is no clear proof that it will not be able to perceive that act as past after it has passed. At any rate, let the conclusion of this article be examined on the supposition of the above certainties [nn.90-96].

98. It seems that memory cannot be set down as an act of the sense part.

First, from the condition that it perceives time; but “time is nothing but the number of motion according to before and after,” Physics 4.11.219b1-2, and this cannot be perceived without collating the after with the before; but the senses are not able to collate, because this is proper to the intellect.

99. Again, it was said in the fourth inference [n.93] that the remembering. power must perceive the act while it is present. But the sense power cannot perceive the act of sensing while it is present (at least not universally), because the act of the supreme sense power cannot be perceived by any sense, neither by a lower nor a higher one (as is plain), nor by itself, because that power does not reflect back on itself or its act, and yet there can be memory of any sensation in us (as we experience); therefore this remembering does not generally belong to any sense power.

100. But since the argument here is from something that was earlier said to be doubtful [n.97], the argument therefore is taken from something else supposed certain as follows: not only does the sense power not perceive first anything but some sensible quality (hence the Philosopher On the Soul 2.425b17-20, in order to concede that vision is in some way perceived by sight, says that vision is in some way colored), but also it does not receive the proper species of anything other than some such quality. But the sensation of which it is the remembering cannot in any way be set down as a sense quality, because any sensation (whether of color, or sound, or flavor) can equally be remembered; therefore the species required for remembering is not that of any sense as of the receptive power.

2. It Seems that No Sense Operation is to be Posited in the Sense Part that Cannot be Conceded to a Brute

101. Again, one should not posit in the sense part any sense operation that cannot be conceded to a brute (the proof of this is that there can be a sense part in some brute that excels as to all the sense acts that we experience); but this remembering cannot be proved to exist in a brute from a brute’s acts.

102. Proof of the minor [n.101]:

There are all these acts of brutes we see from which the conclusion [sc. brutes have remembering] could the more be drawn, as those that seem to be acts of prudence or foresight, as is plain of ants gathering grain to the same place and at a definite time (as in summer).

103. Similarly, acts of revenge or exacting justice, as it were, such as yielding to benefactors and punishing those that offend, seem to belong to brutes insofar as they know the past as past.

104. Likewise, third, about acts pertaining to preservation of the species (as the nest-building of birds and feeding young and the like), which do not seem regularly to belong to them without knowledge of the past as past.

105. Fourth, because some brutes are teachable (as the Philosopher maintains On Memory 1.430a15-22 and On Sense 1.437a9-14), but teaching is not without memory of the past as past.

106. Now all these acts can be carried out without remembrance of the past as past; therefore, no act proves that this act of remembrance exists in brutes.

107. The minor of this argument [n.106] is proved by running through the acts in question.

For as to uniformity with respect to place and time (as appears in ants [n.102]), this can be saved by mere apprehension and retention of a species of what is delightful, without apprehension of the past as past. For if it was delightful to this ant to deposit grain here, and if the delightful species remains in imagination, it will move the sense appetite to seeking it as delightful, and so to coming again to this place. But as to why ants gather at one time and not at another, explanation must be given from the side of their [bodily] complexion, or why it is delightful for them to gather grain in this way and not in that. And whether this is attributed to natural industry or some other cause, at least this does not prove remembrance of time, for although an ant born this year has never experienced want in winter it gathers in summer just like an ant ten years old (if an ant could live so long); therefore it does not get this act for such time from the remembrance of the past. But if the frequenting of the same place shows it comes from the past, the response is that it comes from the delightful previously apprehended, without apprehension of the past as past.

108. Similarly to the second [n.103], about revenge or benefit from a wounded or placated animal for, in brief, the delightful image of what pleases, or the saddening image of what offends, is formally impressed and always pushes the sense appetite to motion in conformity with the object (namely of avenging or benefiting), at least when any other delightful or saddening thing ceases that was moving more strongly. Therefore, if in the intermediate time this action is suspended by something present, at the end of the time the phantasm at once moves, and there follows in the sense appetite a motion proportioned to the object, which motion did not follow before because it was impeded by some object moving more strongly. There is here, then, no apprehension of the past as past but only of the thing that is past, whose persisting species moves to revenge or thanks when some other thing that was moving more strongly ceases.

109. Likewise about the third [n.104]: because [building nests and feeding young] is delightful to these brutes wherever they are from, it is necessary that at least some intrinsic cause (from a [bodily] complexion disposed or altered now in this way) must convince them to gather such and such twigs for making a nest and for constructing it in such and such way; and this is not delightful otherwise, when their complexion is disposed differently; and from this delight they operate, not from the apprehension of the past as past. The proof of this is that if there were a brute animal propagated in its first year, it would just as much provide for itself things necessary for building a nest as if it were however many years in age; therefore nest building is not from knowledge of the past as past.

110. Fourth, about learning [n.105], this is more easily solved, as it goes along with the second [nn.103, 108]. And it is solved by the fact that, from frequent sensing of things delightful and saddening conjoined, there is impressed on the animal a delightful and saddening phantasm, and in the following way, that when one of them moves it, the other from the conjunction at once moves it. Therefore, when present food moves the appetite to consume, at once the phantasm of a rod beating it moves it at the same time, and consequently moves it as something saddening to be fled from; and if from much frequency the phantasm of the latter is impressed on it as very saddening, the brute withdraws itself from the delightful thing more than the delightful thing attracts it.

3. The Contrary Position of Aristotle, which is more Probable

111. These arguments can be responded to by upholding the intention of the Philosopher in On Memory [n.76], that memory is in the sense part, and by turning the arguments to the opposite.

112. For first about the perception of time [n.107], the Philosopher concedes it there saying that by the first sense part by which we perceive magnitude we also perceive time. Nor is it an objection that time is successive, because motion is successive and yet motion is of itself sensible (from On the Soul 2.6.17-21); nor is it an objection that time is number, because number is of itself sensible (ibid.). Also, the Commentator maintains, Physics 4 com.98 ‘On Time’, that if the motion alone of phantasms is perceived, time is perceived. But the exposition of this could be that such motion is perceived by the intellect, not by the power of imagination.

113. To the next [n.108] it will be possible to say that some sense can receive the species of the act of sensing and retain that species after the act passes away and, consequently, it can by that species have an act after passage of time and so remember.

114. And when you make objection about the act of the supreme sense power [nn.108, 99], one can concede that memory of its proper act does not belong to a sense, just as neither does it belong to any other sense to remember its proper act (as is taken from Augustine Free Will 2.3 n.9-10), but this belongs only to a superior sense with respect to the act of a lower sensitive part.

115. If can be said in another way, as the Philosopher seems to think (On the Soul 3.2.425b17-25), that sight in some way senses that it sees, because sight is in some way colored; and so it could be conceded that the sensing of the supreme sense part is in some way continued under the object of the supreme remembering part. And if you evidence the reflecting of that sense part on itself, this proves no more than Aristotle proves about sight perceiving vision.

116. To the final one [n.109], although the acts of brutes could probably be saved by positing, not memory properly in them, but only imaginative knowledge of the object that is past (though not as past), yet the things we see in their acts are more easily saved by positing memory in them.