II. To the Initial Arguments

68. To the first initial argument [n.35] I say that it does not follow the soul is in vain united to the body. For let it be that this union come about for the perfection of the soul, namely so that the soul acquire its perfection from such union; it does not follow that, if it could acquire it in another way, it is united in vain. For if something is ordered to an end, it does not come to be in vain if the end could be acquired in another way; just as if health could be acquired by surgery and medicine, surgery does not become vain though health could be acquired by medicine. So, if knowledge could be acquired by the use of the senses and in another way by the soul when separated, the union does not become vain from the fact that it agrees with one of these ways of acquiring knowledge.

69. An answer in another way, and more to the point, is that the union of soul and body is not ultimately either for the perfection of the body or for the perfection alone of the soul, but for the perfection of the whole that consists of these parts. And therefore, though no perfection could accrue to this part or to that which could not be had without such a union, yet the union does not come to be in vain because the perfection of the whole, which is principally intended by nature, could only be had in this way.

70. To the second [n.36] I say that something is a necessary medium for one virtue that is not a medium for another virtue, speaking of necessary medium, as in transferring a body from place to place, where some medium is necessary for the natural moving power, so that the natural power cannot transfer it from a distant ‘where’ to another ‘where’ saveThe word ‘save’ seems necessary for the sense though the printed text omits it, probably through a typographical error. ²⁰ through a ‘where’ in the middle; and yet it is not a medium necessary for divine power, which can at once transfer it from any ‘where’ to any other ‘where’. So, in the issue at hand, a perfect abstractive virtue needs a medium, namely imaginative being, between the sensible object outside and the pure intelligible thing; but a more perfect abstractive virtue does not need this medium. Hence the argument [n.36] can be turned toward the opposite, that if the virtue of the separated intellect were more perfect than that of the conjoined intellect, it could transfer the object from extreme to extreme without such a medium.

71. Or it could in another way be said that under one of the two extremes falls imaginable being, because this is simply sensible being. But this extreme has under it diverse things and in diverse degrees, because the sensible thing outside is in some way in a more remote sensible degree from intelligible being than the sensible thing is as it is in imaginable being. But as it is, some virtue in some degree in the extreme is able to act and some lesser virtue is not able to act, but it can act from some degree closer. So here, although the abstractive power of our conjoined intellect cannot act by abstracting the intelligible thing from the sensible thing save from this lowest sensible degree, namely the imaginable, yet the higher or more efficacious virtue can abstract from a more distant degree, namely from the degree of the sensible thing outside.

72. To the third [n.37]: conceded that knowledge can be acquired of anything ceteris paribus.

73. And when you say about distance in place that it is not a hindrance, I reply that this does not follow, because a determinate presence of the object to the power is required; but a disproportionate distance prevents this determinate presence. And no wonder, because at least an object that is in some way here active cannot act on a passive object however much in the distance it is; and consequently I concede that knowledge of an object however much in the distance it is cannot be caused in a separated intellect, as not in a conjoined one either.

74. If it is objected against this that, according to Boethius Hebdom. PL 64, 1311, “it is self-evident that incorporeal things are not in place” [cf, Aquinas, ST Ia q.2 a.1], therefore they do not require distance in place in their operation - I reply: the Philosopher seems to posit that a determinate distance is required for the operation even of separated substance; hence in Physics 8.1.267b6-9 he seems to posit that the intelligence moving a sphere is in some part of the sphere, from which part the motion begins, as if at least a definitive presence to place of the mover were doing something for the action of moving. Likewise in Physics 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6 [On Generation 1.6.323a22-31] he maintains of express intention that agent and patient are present together - which is understood either of presence together by contact, where it cannot be greater, as in bodies, according to him [sc. of two bodies in contact, one body is not more in contact with the other than the other is with it], or where presence can be greater, but the greater one, namely mutual presence, is the one meant [sc. one thing can be more present to another than the other is to it, as in affection, but the greater presence is mutual presence, when the affection is on both sides]. But a spirit can have a greater presence to body than by contact; therefore, by Aristotle’s express intention, presence together by contact will [for a spirit] be by mutual presence, and consequently too great a distance does impede action.