a. Against the Opinion in Itself

45. There is reason against this position, even if no other reason save from the following principles: the first of which is that “a plurality is not to be posited without necessity” (Physics 1.4.188a17-18), the second of which is that one should not posit of any nature what derogates from its dignity, unless this be evident from something that agrees with such nature (this principle can be got from the Philosopher, On Generation 2.10.336b27-29, “we always say that nature desires what is better, and as in the whole universe, so also in each part, one must rather posit for it what is better, and provided it not evidently appear that it does not belong to it”). But now a plurality is being posited, because such species are infused by God or angels, and without necessity - because this nature has sufficiently in itself the resources to be able to reach its own perfection without such givens infused by God or angels. Hence it seems here that only because the perfection of this nature is not understood in itself is recourse being had to God or angels.

46. This opinion also cheapens the nature of the intellective soul. For just as a nature is cheaper simply that has power for no operation or only for a cheaper one, so proportionally is a nature that has no power for an operation that belongs to it cheaper than one that does have such power. Now the separated soul has for you [Aquinas] no power from its intrinsic resources (even when extrinsic factors are concurrent with it) for any operation that belongs to it unless God or an angel give it the sort of species in question - but a stone does have power from its intrinsic resources, without such a begged-for infusion, for an operation proportioned to it, because it can descend toward the center and remain there. Therefore, the soul is more cheapened by this position, in proportion to its nobility, than the nature of a stone is.

47. Again, he who has this opinion holds elsewhere [Aquinas, On Metaphysics 5 lect.12] that two accidents of the same species cannot exist together; but the infused species of a stone as object is of the same species as the intelligible species acquired by the soul here in the body; therefore either the infused species will not remain, or the one acquired here must not remain. But the second is false, because since the proper subject of this species is incorruptible, and since the species itself can of itself incorruptibly remain, it follows that it will in fact remain. Therefore, another species of the stone will not be given to it by God or an angel and, consequently, either it will never understand a stone, or it will be able to understand it through the species it previously received from things - which they [Aquinas and his followers] deny.

48. If you say that the species is not given to what possesses it already - this does not seem reasonable, that this soul [sc. the one that possesses it already] should lack the sort of perfect species given to another soul not possessed of it;The translation given here rejects the punctuation and grammatical markings in the printed text, which are hard to decipher. The sense of the argument seems to be that if an infused species is only given to a separated soul that does not have the species already, then first: the separated soul that does not receive the infused species (because it already has the species acquired from things) will lack this perfect infused species, though other souls will have it, which seems unreasonable; and second: this separated soul, which does not receive the infused species (because it has the acquired one), will understand, if it understands, through the acquired species, and this is opposed to the opinion being defended here, that separated souls understand only through infused species. ¹⁵ and this response is at least maintained against the opinion [in question here], because there will then be an intellection through a species previously received from the thing.

49. If you say the infused and acquired species differ in kind the way acquired and infused virtue (which exist simultaneously) differ - this is assumed as axiomatic, and was dealt with in Ord. III d.26 n.11, 22, 24-26, 102-111. But suppose the axiom is conceded to them as to the virtues; the proposed conclusion does not follow here, because infused virtue will have its own different rule from the one that acquired virtue has, and from difference of rule a virtue different in species will be able to be posited, because a virtue (by the essential idea of a virtue) depends on the rule it is conformed to. But it will not be possible to imagine here a specific difference between an infused species and an acquired species, because there is no difference here save only that of effective principle or of mode of effecting, and such difference does not distinguish effects into species, Augustine, On the Trinity 3.9 n.20“What is understood from each of two sources is perhaps single, but the things it is understood from are different, as that if the name of ‘the Lord’ be written in gold and in black ink, the first is more precious the second more cheap, but what is signified by each is the very same.” ¹⁶ [cf. Ord. III d.27 n.11].