II. To the Initial Arguments

31. To the initial arguments.

To the first [n.3]: the authority from On the Soul 3 must be understood as to the acquiring of intellection, and this the first acquisition firstly done. But it must not be understood of use; and the reason is that the intellect can use a form previously acquired, although those things are not had that were necessary before for acquiring the form. The senses, speaking of exterior sense, cannot thus use a form previously acquired, because the senses do not conserve for later operation a form or species previously received. In another way it could be said that this proposition [of the Philosopher] is understood as holding of this life, because the Philosopher knew by experience the intellection that fits us only for this life; for he had experience of no other.

32. To the second [n.4]: the intellect is corrupted, that is, impeded in its operation, and it is as if it is kept corrupt by something corrupted within, for without the operation of imagination it cannot proceed to its own act. But from this does not follow that it is corrupt or corruptible in itself, nor that something else is necessarily required for its act, but only that it is required according to the order of powers that is now found in human nature as to operation on the same object.

33. To the third [n.5] I say that the passive intellect is not there understood to be the possible intellect, but to be some sense power, which power some call the cogitative power. And it is true that every sense power is corrupted, and therefore that the passive intellect, taken in this way, is corrupted too. But the passive intellect is not corrupted in the sense in which we say the possible intellect is passive.