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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14 - 42.
Book Four. Distinctions 14 - 42
Fifteenth Distinction
Question One. Whether to Every Mortal Actual Sin there Correspond a Proper Satisfaction
I. To the Question
A. About Satisfaction Taken Generally
5. About the Separation of Satisfaction from Satisfaction Taken Universally

5. About the Separation of Satisfaction from Satisfaction Taken Universally

40. As to the fifth article [n.10], I say that satisfaction, taking it in this way (which however is total and not lessened satisfaction), reconciles the one making satisfaction to him whom he has offended, because either the offense is implacable, which is contrary to mercy, or, if it is placable, it is so through nothing more than through satisfaction said in this way. But it is impossible for anyone to be reconciled to God and yet remain in some sin.

41. Hence [Ps.-]Augustine On True and False Penitence, ch.9 n.24 [in Lombard’s text, Sent. IV d.15 ch.7 n.4, and also in Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 33 q.3 d.3 ch.42], “I know that God is enemy to every criminal; how then would he who keeps back his crime receive pardon from another, and without the love of God obtain pardon, without which no one ever found grace? An enemy of God is he while he perseveres in his offense. It is a sort of impiety of infidelity to hope for half a pardon from him who is Justice.” It follows, then, that it is impossible to satisfy God about one sin while remaining impenitent in act about another mortal sin.

42. But if the separation of this satisfaction from another satisfaction be understood such that, while a man is actually returning to God some sort of contrition or satisfaction for this sin, indeed sufficient for this sin, he is not actually returning satisfaction sufficient for another sin - I say that the satisfaction proper to this sin can be separated from the satisfaction proper to that sin, and this as to the effect, though not as to the affection, at least in habit. For as to the effect this is plain, because just as it is not necessary for the intellect to consider simultaneously this sin and that one, so it is not necessary for the will to be penitent simultaneously about this sin and that one, and this when taking ‘to be penitent’ for any of the four significations set down in the preceding distinction, question one [d.14 n.62]. But nevertheless, while he considers one sin and is penitent about it, he does at least in habit satisfy for the other, that is, he is ready in mind, should he think about it, to make satisfaction at some time for it.