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The Ordinatio of John Duns Scotus
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Ordinatio. Book 4. Distinctions 14 - 42.
Book Four. Distinctions 14 - 42
Thirty Sixth Distinction
Question Two. Whether Age of Childhood Can Impede Matrimony

Question Two. Whether Age of Childhood Can Impede Matrimony

41. Second I ask whether the age of childhood can impede matrimony.

42. That it cannot:

Because anyone can accept a power before he can use it; therefore in a contract of matrimony, where there is a giving of use and an accepting of power, anyone can accept the power and give before he have power for the use - and so a child can. There is a confirmation, because the age of childhood does not impede the reception of Order (this was spoken of above in distinction 25 [n.75]), and yet he receives there the power to carry out the act of Order, which he cannot at that time carry out.

43. To the opposite:

Gregory IX, Decretals IV tit.15 ch.2, “A child, who is not able to render the debt, is not fit for marriage.”

44. Besides, those cannot contract matrimony who cannot transfer power over their body; but a child does not have power over his body; therefore, he cannot transfer or give it.

I. To the Question

45. I reply: as was said above, distinction 34 nn.9-10, impotence does simply prevent contracting, because in this contract there is a giving of the power of marriage, and he who does not have the power gives nothing.

46. This reason is probative about children for the time for which they are children. But because this impotence is not permanent, but future power is expected, therefore can a child now promise power for the future time at which he will have it; and this happens in betrothals, because a child can contract a betrothal but not matrimony.

47. If you say he can give it for the future - I reply: this is not to give but to promise.

48. And the response that is put there about defect of intention [d.34 n.12], whether this is adduced for the contract or for matrimony, is nothing as to b [sc. the power], because he can have discretion enough for due intention before he have the power, if intention have to be exchanged in this contract.

49. If the time of childhood be asked for, a time of fourteen years is regularly put for a male, twelve for a female; but, however, “malice sometimes makes up for age” [Code of Justinian II ch.32 n.3], and bodily complexion anticipates the regular age. And then, from the fact he has the power and sufficient discretion, he can contract, because he has what he ought to have, and sufficient consent and signs.

II. To the Initial Argument

50. To the argument and confirmation [n.42], I concede that someone can receive a power before he can use it, but he cannot give a power before he have it; and in this contract there is a giving of power.