II. To the Initial Arguments

38. To the first argument [n.3], according to this final reasoning [nn.32-33], it is plain that a slave does not belong to his master as to everything, because he has his own right as to eating and drinking and sleeping, and in brief for performing whatever acts whereby his due services are not subtracted from his master; therefore since at that time he could now and then use the carnal act, he can obligate himself to it insofar as he does have his own right.

39. And as to what the Philosopher says about that cursed servitude where the slave is like cattle, it can be understood that the slave belongs to his master as possession or as money; but not because in his acts he is only led about and does not lead, for however much he is a slave, yet he is a man and so possessed of free choice. From which a great cruelty is apparent in the first bringing in of servitude, because it makes a man, free in choice and master of his own acts for virtuous action, into a brute as it were, as if not a user of free choice, nor able to act virtuously.

40. As to the second [n.4] the case is not alike, because he who makes profession in Religion submits himself totally to obedience to the superior of the Religion, and thereby he removes himself in totality from the accustomed services of his master. Not so he who contracts matrimony, but only in some acts, which can stand along with his rendering the due and accustomed services. And the Church does not want to prejudice the right of another, nor privilege anyone to the prejudice of another.