A. About the Conclusion in General

9. In general, all impotence simply and permanent, namely that cannot be aided by nature or art, impedes contracting matrimony simply, if it precede it, and dissolves one already contracted.

10. And for this there is, from the nature of this contract, a threefold reason:

First because this contract is a giving of the power of the body for such act, if it be asked for; but thisScotus’ pronouns are, again, ambiguous (implicit in the verb or noun and not separately expressed), but where they are made express they are mainly in the masculine gender. In English one just has to translate making adjustments case by case. ⁹³ [impotent person] has no such power; therefore he can give nothing such; therefore neither can he so contract.

11. Again, in this contract one obligates oneself to such act, if it be asked for; but such an act is impossible for him, even if it be asked for; therefore he obligates himself to what is impossible. But an obligation for what is impossible is null, by divine Law; therefore, divine Law does not approve such an obligation; therefore it is null.

12. Again, some other person intends to exchange the power of body with the power of body of a second person; therefore, the belief is that the other person is able, conversely, to make the exchange; but the other person cannot; therefore there is error here pertaining to something that is per se required for the contract; such an error makes the contract null, as was said above, d.30 q.1 nn.9-13.

This then is said about impotence in general.

13. But if such impotence follow a consummated matrimony, it does not dissolve it, because the power was handed over, and the one to whom it was handed over has been put in possession of it; therefore it cannot be revoked on account of any supervening impediment.

14. But if such impediment intervenes between a ratified and a consummated matrimony, it is doubtful whether it dissolve it; Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 33 chapter 1, seems to state the negative side, other chapters the affirmative side, “marriage is confirmed by carrying out the office [of matrimony];” and afterwards follows, “before it be confirmed, the impossibility to perform the office dissolves the bond.”

15. The contrary seems to be the case, for the power has already been given; therefore, if an impediment to the use of it happen afterwards, not for this reason can the prior giving be rescinded. Whether it did not precede a ratified matrimony, if yet it did precede a consummated one, would be difficult to judge, unless perhaps there was, intervening at that time, a removal of some part necessary for the act.