II. To the Initial Arguments that are for the First Opinion

95. To the initial arguments [nn.69-71] for the first side [n.72].

To the first argument [n.69], the answer is plain from the solution [nn.86-88]. And when it is said that it is against the law of nature that “what God has joined etc.,” I say that it is not against the law of nature, because not against the principles of the law of nature, nor against the conclusions deduced immediately from the principles, that such a contract, according to this opinion, be made for a time; nor is it simply against the education of offspring. For God could have ordained otherwise as to the education of offspring, but not as acceptably as now. However, it then was against a certain good that is consonant with the law of nature, namely against indissolubility; and against such a good can God give dispensation, to avoid a greater evil.

96. To the second [n.70] I concede that matrimony simply is a perpetual obligation. But matrimony in a certain respect can be an obligation firm for a time, though not perpetual; and thus do I concede that in the Mosaic Law there was not any ‘matrimony simply’, unless perhaps some wanted, beyond the perfection of the Law, to obligate themselves perpetually, which was not necessary insofar as they had contracted a marriage under that Law.

97. Or it could be said that, if there was matrimony perfect or simply, and so an indissoluble obligation, it is a true matrimony, unless the Legislator were to revoke or dispense from it - and he did dispense from it when the woman was too displeasing to her man, inasmuch as uxoricide was feared - as was said above about a non-consummated ratified matrimony, that it is dissolved through entry into Religion [supra d.31 n.22]. And yet it was a matrimony simply, and not just a leasing for a time. But the Legislator in such a case makes dispensation for pursuit of a greater good; but here [sc. in the Mosaic Law] for avoiding a greater evil.

98. To the third [n.71] the case is not alike, because the reason for dispensing is not alike; for it is not as great an evil if a woman hate a man as the converse is, because sex itself holds back a woman from exterior revenge more than it holds back a man, just as was it also conceded to one man, for the good of offspring, to have several wives. But this was not conceded to the woman, because it would be against the good of offspring if one woman had several men. And so, in neither of these cases, is it alike for a man and a woman.