C. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

86. And then as to what was adduced for the first opinion [nn.73-77], it can be replied that Christ promulgated that for the time of his own Law, namely the Gospel Law, so that, just as he brought back matrimony in the way it was instituted in the law of nature (namely, so it be of one man with one woman, although, however, bigamy was licit in the Mosaic Law), so he brought back a matrimony simply perfect, that is, indissoluble, for his Law, the way it was instituted in the law of nature. And thus does he make invalid for his Law the contract that was licit for the Mosaic Law, which was the leasing of bodies for the procreation of offspring for a time - namely until the woman would be lacking favor in the eyes of the man. It is just as Christ also emptied out many other imperfections licit under Moses, by bringing back the things that were, for perfection, going to be permanent in his Law. And therefore it was, from when the Gospel was promulgated, damnable to have several wives or to dismiss one and marry another; but it was not damnable before. Thus would they say about this opinion.

87. And so from then on, according to this opinion, the Jews were bound not to have two wives but one only, and in no way to be separated from her.

88. As to Christ’s proof [n.75], it is plain he is speaking for the law of nature; and in this did he sufficiently refute the Pharisees, because they were not sufficiently observing matrimony as it was in the law of nature, and he showed that he himself was rationally establishing inseparability for his own Law, because this is consonant with first institution in the law of nature.

89. As to what is added about the response of Christ to the Pharisees, “for the hardness of your heart God permitted you to put away your wives” (which many [Lombard, William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise] consider was only permission, not concession [n.75]), I say that Christ “permitted” it, by which he means that Moses did not prescribe this, nor even advise or approve it but, as if it was licit by a certain necessity, did not prohibit it. Nor is this permission deceptive as to something illicit; for that would be to say nothing other than that Moses would permit them to go to damnation, not by showing them that this would be a way of damnation, but rather by insinuating the opposite; and this no legislator can justly do, even in human laws, which leave many evils unavenged, according to Augustine On Free Choice I ch.6 n.42. And if the legislator not punish every evil, and thus permit it because he does not punish it, yet in no way does he in his law concede it. Hence unjust would be the human law that would write down something that was against that law [of nature].

90. And as to what is added there, that “for the hardness of your heart etc.” [n.75], it does not prove that it was illicit; for frequently the hardness of subordinates is a reason that something be relaxed for them that otherwise would not be relaxed, and that would be useful for them not to be relaxed - provided however they were tractable. It is like a prelate, when seeing a college prone to something whose opposite would be more honorably something to observe, although he could usefully establish the opposite if the subordinates were easy to sway, yet he can very well not establish it; or if it is established, he can well relax it, and honorably, lest, with it standing in place, they multiply their sins more.

91. As to the glosses:

The first [n.75] seems it should be denied, because Moses, as legislator, was only the herald of God. But he who wants to give exposition of them can say: Moses permitted it, not God immediately prescribing it to Moses among the other precepts. Hence never in the first four books of the Law is it found that God prescribed this to Moses or to anyone. Therefore. this is more precisely of Moses (as also are all the things that are in Deuteronomy and are not elsewhere) than are the things that elsewhere God spoke to Moses. And this is the fitting reason, that the relaxations, as pertaining to human working out, God did not want to place in Scripture as if they were put forward by himself the way they were put forward by his servants. Hence too the alleviation of the labor of Moses, who sat all day judging the people, was not expressed by God immediately per se, but Jethro [Exodus 18.13-27], the kinsman of Moses, expressed it, as pertaining to human working out.

92. As to the other gloss [n.75], it is easy to see that it says nothing against this opinion. For it is true it was not the precept of God, namely ‘to dismiss her’, but that if he dismiss her he give her a bill of divorce; but it was ‘the counsel of man’, not as of a man, but as of a herald of the divine Law.

93. As to the remark of Augustine [n.76], I concede that, by the delay which [Moses] imposed in the writing of a bill, he did insinuate that the dismissal was absolutely displeasing to him; not only therefore was he who did not dismiss her doing better then than he who did dismiss her, but he who dismissed her was doing badly, though not so badly that he sinned mortally against matrimony, as he would have done if he had not had license from the Law.

94. To the point about divorce [n.77], the answer is plain in [the solution of] the first [argument; n.86]; for it is true that Christ condemned divorce for the time of his own Law.