A. About the First Circumstance Excusing the Conjugal Debt Universally Taken

12. As to the first case, if one of the two has been suspended from or deprived of his right - and this can be because oneThe Latin is ambiguous and allows the pronoun, ‘he’ or ‘she’ (or ‘it’), to go unexpressed. Scotus presumably means ‘he’ or ‘she’ indifferently, and so the neutral word ‘one’ is here used instead. In what follows Scotus does sometimes make the genders of his pronouns explicit. ⁸⁴ does not have the right to ask immediately after a ratified matrimony (although one has still not lost their right, because still not sinned), then, because it is licit, after a ratified matrimony, to enter Religion, this does not have to be immediate, but it is possible for a time to remain in the world and deliberate. And if one were bound immediately to render the debt, one is bound to make oneself unsuitable for Religion.

13. And the reason why a spouseLatin word for ‘spouse’ here is coniunx, which can refer to wife or husband, but is more often used to refer to the wife, and Scotus so takes it in what follows. ⁸⁵ does not then have the right to ask, is because the use has still not been handed over, though the ownership has been. Hence before the handing over of use, one does not have the right to ask. For although one not sin if one hand oneself over for use, and if one does use it, one uses it well, however when the other wants it one is positively compelled. Nor do I believe that the Church suspends this use from them, but they are suspended from this right by Christ, or by Christ’s institution, otherwise anyone would have the use and the right of using immediately from when they have right and ownership.

14. Another case is when one is deprived of one’s right because of one’s own fault, as happens in fornication by the spouse, especially if only one of the two fornicated; for then the innocent party can repel him who fell,Scotus here, and following, uses a word in the male gender. ⁸⁶ whose sin stands publicly on his side. And he who fell loses the right to ask, because of the fact he did not keep faith, and therefore faith is not necessarily to be kept with him, at least affirmatively. Also, if both have fallen, then each is bound equally to render to the other, because equal crimes are destroyed by equal vengeance.

15. Another case in which one is deprived of one’s right without fault is when, if he is not unwilling but consenting, the other wants to be continent or enter Religion; for this is licit when one of the spouses renounces the right; for from the fact he has vowed chastity with the other’s permission and assent, the other does not have the right to ask of him the debt.

16. But let it be that, after the man’s entry into Religion,Here Scotus does make the gender of the parties clear with words explicitly for man (or husband) and wife. ⁸⁷ the woman, remaining in the world, is not continent, or fears that she does not want to be continent, is the man who has made profession to be withdrawn from Religion and returned to her? In Gratian,

Decretum, p.2 cause 33 q.5 ch.10 is expressly said, “he who has permitted his wife to take the veil, may not accept another, but let him be similarly converted.”

17. But the contrary seems to be expressly said in the first chapter of Gregory IX, Decretals III tit.22 ch.1, ‘On the Conversion of the Married’: “A married layman who, with the license and permission of his wife, has entered Religion and made profession, while his wife remains in secular habit and does not pass over into Religion or vow perpetual continence - we say that unless his wife pass over into Religion or promise to keep chastity perpetually, the man can and must be called back from the monastery.”

18. If it be said that this passage from the Decretals must be taken to mean ‘when the woman does not renounce her husband, or her right over her husband, save only for a time, so that her husband may be free for prayer’ - against this is the plainness of the letter, because there is contained: “he who, having entered Religion by the license and permission of his wife, has made profession.” But what by strict rigor should be done in this case - whether she should be compelled to continence or he withdrawn [from Religion] - the case, namely, when it was done without the knowledge of the bishop though in the presence of the monks and priests - is doubtful; because she seems to have renounced her right as to requesting the debt in perpetuity, by licensing him publicly to profession in Religion. For such renunciation does not necessarily require that it be done with the knowledge of the bishop; and if she made a sufficient renunciation, she has no right to ask for him back.

19. Likewise, the coercing of a woman to continence is something licit and, though penal, yet it is due from the license she gave to her husband; and coercing a husband, who has thus made profession, to stand with his wife seems to be inducing him to something illicit, because to mortal sin, by the fact he has vowed chastity; and he was able to make the vow, because he had been given license. At least this is touched on in the Rule of the Friars Minor [Rule ch.2], where, about those who wish to receive this life, it is said, “if they do not have wives, or if they do and their wives have already entered the monastery or have given license to them by the authority of the diocesan bishop, and a vow of continence has already been made, and their wives are of an age that no suspicion could arise about them, let them say to them the words of the Gospel etc.”

20. Hence, having set aside these conditions, namely about a vow of chastity made by the wife, or at least license given by authority of the diocesan bishop, it seems that today if would happen according to the above chapter [of the Decretals, n.17], namely that the man be withdrawn [from Religion] and returned to his wife.

21. And then, as to the fact that she is said to have renounced her right [n.18], I reply that she did not do so sufficiently and perfectly as to the forum of the Church, which has determined the due manner of this renunciation, by the making of a vow of continence and the giving of license by authority of the diocesan bishop.

22. And as to what is touched on about the mortal sin of the one withdrawn [from Religion, nn.14, 19], it could be said that sheHere Scotus’ pronouns become ambiguous, and they are made explicit in the English according to the way Scotus was using unambiguous pronouns in the immediately preceding paragraphs. ⁸⁸ is bound not to ask, because she was not able to renounce another’s right, and he thought he was absolved from that right, and therefore he did not at that time sin. However, when it is clear to him through the Church that he was not absolved from the right of his wife, he is bound to render to her what he was not able to renounce. I believe, however, that if she do give license, she sins mortally in calling him back, because she has obligated herself to a like continence.