To the Initial Arguments

47. To the first main argument [n.3] I say that the case of someone baptized through fear of pain and the case of someone contracting [matrimony] through fear of pains are not alike, for three reasons:

First, because the condition of the baptized is made better, but the condition of one who contracts matrimony is made worse; and therefore it is [not]The ‘not’ is printed in the Vatican edition, but it seems to be a mistake. ⁸² enough that someone coerced through fear into receiving baptism intend to receive baptism; but in matrimony this does not suffice, but freedom is required; hence too those who cause there to be violence in it are excommunicated.

Second because the will of the superior ratifies someone’s becoming, by such coerced consent, a child of the Church, but does not so ratify it in the matter at hand.

Third, because in the case of baptism there is not as properly a marriage as an adoption. And it can well be that less of the voluntary suffices in someone who is adopted than in someone who contracts matrimony; hence someone who does not have the use of reason can be adopted but cannot be betrothed.

48. To the second [n.4] I say that a brave man is not altogether fearless, because this degree of audacity means to be afraid in nothing; but the brave man is fearless where one should not fear or be afraid. Hence Aristotle too adds in the same place [Ethics 3.9.1115b10-15], “But he is afraid where he should be afraid, that is, he is afraid where right reason bids he should be afraid.” And right reason dictates being afraid and fearing where a greater evil threatens, and consequently fearing death or prison more than this unpleasant act [sc. coerced matrimony].

49. To the third [n.5], in the case of inducement through fear there is much of the involuntary and little of the voluntary; and it is the reverse in the case of inducement through blandishments and pleasures, because there is much of the voluntary there and a moderate amount of the involuntary;a for in the first case, if the will were left to itself, it would at once spring back; but in the second case, if an enticed will were now left to itself, it would perhaps go on pursuing. Therefore, the case of the involuntary when enticed by blandishments is not like how it is with coercion through threats and terrors. And the reason is that the will frequently agrees with the sense appetite, and the sense appetite, being affected by some agreeable object, is inclined more and more, but when affected by a disagreeable object it flees more and more.

a.a [Note by Scotus] An example: if a stone were to choose to be above, there would, so that it not grow weary, be much of the involuntary there and little of the voluntary, because being above is simply unnatural to it.

50. As to the last one [n.6], that chapter [from Decretals] can be expounded as ‘must by congruity’ and not as ‘must by necessity of precept’. And as to what is added from the Digest, the civil law is speaking there; but canon law is the contrary. Hence the remark of Paul’s, Ephesians 6.1, “Children obey your parents,” is not understood as applying to this [sc. matrimony], because a child is not obliged to obey a father in this. As to what is added about spiritual matrimony, I say the case of a carnal father and the case of a spiritual father are not alike, because a carnal father does not have as much obedience over a son for carnal matrimony as a spiritual father has over a son as to spiritual matrimony. And the fitting reason is that in the latter case, the one who contracts it is made to be of a better condition, but not so in the former.