II. To the Initial Arguments

46. To the arguments.

To the first [n.3]: when taking ‘rising from sin’ to stand for ‘to be freed from sin’ I deny the consequence,

47. To the first proof [n.3], I say that there is no likeness, because ‘to sin’ is to act freely even as to this state of life; but to rise up, that is, to become immune from sin, does not require acting freely even as a wayfarer on the way; because, according to the first opinion [nn.18-20], to rise is only to pay the penalty, and this is to suffer it; or, according to the second opinion [nn.21-23], only through merits possessed as wayfarer before, and for that time accepted, is guilt now dismissed.

48. To the second proof of the consequence [n.3] I concede that it is easier to fall than to rise up, insofar as ‘rise up’ states a simply ordered act in the power of the one who rises; but in the remission of venial sin ‘rise up’ is not taken in this way [n.47].

49. To the third proof I say that it assumes something false, namely that ‘to rise’ is by a meritorious act that is then present. However, it is by a meritorious act that was present before, according to the second opinion; or by no meritorious act but only by suffering a deserved penalty for the sin, according to the first opinion.

50. To the second argument [n.4]: the consequence is not valid, and the reason is stated in the first opinion (and this according to that opinion). But according to the second opinion one would have to say that merits done in this life cannot be accepted at the moment of death for the deletion through them of mortal sin; because God has disposed mortal sin to be deleted only through the voluntary reception of the sacrament, or through some disposition meritorious, as it were, by congruity that is inherent then, or up to then, when the sin is destroyed. This is not so of him who dies in mortal sin.

51. To the proof [n.4] I say that although mortal and venial sin are of the same idea in genus of nature, or perhaps in malice of mores, just as the genus of virtue is distinct from what is of grace and what is sin (for it is not the same thing to be virtuous and vicious morally and to be just and a sinner theologically); but yet these are not of the same genus or idea in idea of divine offense; and so they are not remitted in the same way.

52. To the third [n.5]: the likeness goes this far, that as an angel when falling is at the term and not a wayfarer, so also is a man in death. But there need not be a likeness as to stable permanence in everything, but as to stable permanence in that which is principal in one who is already reaching the term. Off this sort is spiritual life by grace or spiritual death by mortal sin; and if a man die in the life of grace he will always live; but he who dies in mortal sin will remain so.

53. But about venial sin there need not be such stability, because venial sin is not something according to which the good or bad state of way or term is per se assessed. Or venial sin can stand with a good state and with a bad state, whether of the way or of the term; but when venial sin exists with a good state of the term, it must be deleted first before the ultimate term be fully possessed.

54. As to the fourth [n.6], it could well be conceded that death voluntarily accepted is a sufficient penalty as to the penalty of any venial sin, and perhaps as to a great part of the penalty due for mortal sins that have been dismissed. Nor is it a problem that it is a necessary penalty, because someone can voluntarily accept what is necessary. And so by this is what is said in the second opinion (that venial sin is deleted at the moment of death) consonant with what is said in the first opinion, that if it be remitted by the payment alone of the penalty, the penalty is paid in death; and in this way is venial sin remitted.