B. Proof of the Conclusions

1. Proof of the First Conclusion

12. The first conclusion is plain from Augustine, and it is in the text [Ps.-Augustine, On True..., n.4 supra]: “Since God is always powerful, he is able to help even in death those whom it pleases; since therefore fruitful penitence is the work not of man but of God, he can inspire it whenever his mercy wants.”

13. It is also plain by reason, that whether interior penitence alone through merit by congruity (if had in extremities) dispose to justification, or whether the sacrament of penitence operate by way of sacrament - if the latter or former is had by anyone in extremities, the same idea of receiving grace is had by him as is also had in another penitent; and consequently grace will be received and so salvation.

2. Proof of the Second Conclusion

14. Proof of the second conclusion:

First, because then the use of free choice, or the use of free reason and will, is impeded, by inherent pain or fear. Now I do not mean that he is in extremities who is burdened by a sickness that is of common rule curable (as by a tertian fever or the like), nor he who dies suddenly, the cause of whose death still not appear. But I mean him who is judged, from evident causes already in place, to be near death, according to the lower causes that operate for the most part (as in the case of an infirmity when he is already reaching a level despaired of in the judgment of doctors, or in the case of other dangers, as drowning, wounding, and the like, when death is at once imminent). In these cases, I say, there is either very great pain in the sense part of the soul or very great fear. And both vehement sufferings are of a nature to impede free use of reason and will, because according to Augustine 83 Questions q.36 n.1, passions caused by distressing things move more than passions caused by delightful things. But a vehement passion of delight sometimes wholly, or almost, impedes the use of reason, as is said in City of God XIV ch.16, and an act of displeasure about sin, in order for it to be sufficient for true penitence

(whether internal only or for worthy reception of the sacrament of penitence), requires free use of reason and will [Ord. III d.15 n.62, a fuller treatment].

15. If you say that the pain or fear that is present does not totally impede intellect or will, I concede it. But it does impede them a lot, and consequently it is possible to have a weak and imperfect use of intellect and will, which scarcely suffices for the displeasure sufficient and required for true penitence.

16. This argument [n.14] is touched on by Augustine [cited by Lombard; the words from Hugh of St. Victor, n.9 supra], “So great a torment sometimes binds the members and pain oppresses the sense, that scarcely is a man able to think of anything else.”

17. Second, in order for displeasure to be ordered, it must have its due circumstances, and especially the circumstance of the end and the principal active principle, namely so that it may be voluntary and for the sake of God. But it is difficult then to have an act thus circumstanced. First, because he who up to then was impenitent does not seem he is then wresting from himself a new displeasure save by fear of imminent penalty (for the presumption is that if he were removed, as before, from the penalty, he would not wrest from himself such displeasure, as he did not before). Second, because the cause of this displeasure seems to be something at least simply involuntary, namely the near expectation of death; but that is involuntary; and what does not happen save on the supposition of something involuntary is not simply voluntary (just as someone does not altogether voluntarily throw merchandise into the sea if he only throws it on the supposition of an endangerment he does not want) - at any rate, what is only voluntary in this way does not seem accepted much by someone else, nor does it seem done much for love of him.

18. This argument [n.17] is touched on by Augustine in the text [Ps.-Augustine, OnTrue..., Lombard, supra n.4], “It is necessary,” he says, “not to fear death much but to love; for God seeks liberty not necessity of choice, charity not fear, so as to be able to delete sins committed; let not him, then, who is penitent fear so much the penalty, but be anxious for the glory.”More accurately: “for God, so as to be able to delete sins committed, seeks liberty not necessity of choice... Not therefore in fear alone does man live. He then who repents late should not only fear God the Judge, but love also God the Just; let God not be feared for penalty, but loved for glory.” ⁶⁰

19. Third reason, because a bad habit continued up to that point [of death] draws one away from act of penitence.

20. And this argument is touched on by [Ps.-]Augustine in the text [ibid.], “One must be afraid for a late penitent, since the children whom he wrongly loved are present, and his wife and the world are calling to him; a late penitence is wont to deceive many;” meaning: these delightful things are present in themselves, or in strongly impressed imaginations. And whether this way or that, habits long continued draw to themselves, by their vehemence, things to be loved inordinately, and consequently they put much difficulty in the way of having much displeasure about them.

21. The fourth reason: the more that someone is less a lord of his own acts, the more is an intenser displeasure required for a disposition to be there that is sufficient for deletion of guilt; but this person [on the point of death] is less a lord, because in no way lord of the external act of committing sin. Therefore, according to strict justice, an intenser motion is required for his justification than for the justification of someone healthy, although scarcely, however, could he have one as intense.

22. And this reason is touched on by [Ps.-]Augustine in the text [ibid., nn.3, 5 supra], “Do penance while you are healthy. If you do so, you are secure, because you have done it at the time you could have sinned. If you wish to be penitent when you cannot sin, sins have dismissed you, but not you them.” At least you do not as freely dismiss them as the healthy man does. And therefore, the more of freedom there is lacking in you the more is an intenser motion, in strict rigor, required of you, which scarcely or never will you be able to have. Therefore does Augustine say, “a great thing is it for him (if there is anyone) in whom God then inspires true penitence,” because there is scarcely anyone, or there is no one, who may then have the disposition, by congruity, for inspiration to be given him.