B. To the Initial Arguments of the First Part

118. As to the first main argument [n.4], I concede both members of the distinction.

119. And when it is said against the first member that then a priest could remit the whole of the penalty that was due, this does not follow, because there is there some mean determined by right reason, and while standing thereon the priest does the remitting.

120. And when it is said that at least he would remit [the whole penalty] by several remissions, this touches on a good difficulty, whether repeated confession of the same sins remits, by the power of the keys, more and more of the penalty. It seems probable that it does, because a second absolution is of the same idea as the first; therefore it can have the same virtue with respect to any part of the penalty that needs to be remitted; and consequently by the giving of several absolutions the whole penalty, since the fault is partible, could be remitted, if indeed ‘everything finite is totally consumed by the removal of finite parts taken several times’ [Authorities of Aristotle 2.25, Aristotle Physics 1.4.187b25-26]. What, then, is better than to be confessing always until, after the hundredth or the thousandth confession, the whole penalty, due to whatever sins had been done, would be remitted?

121. It seems more probable that by virtue of the keys the second absolution remits no part of the penalty, for to take flight here to parts of the same quantity or same proportion is nothing, because there is no reason why the second absolution could not take away a part of the same quantity, if it could take away any, nor is it a surprise if it can take away none, for the same judgment, passed once without error, is ratified by God in heaven, and it is irrevocable. Therefore, it is reasonable that it be so ratified that it is unrepeatable. I do not say that it be illicit or impossible for it to be repeated, but yet it is with the fruit it has now unrepeatable.

122. We see this in the case of definitive sentences in the legal forum, by which the accused are absolved when they are found innocent; nor is the examination continued so that there may be a procedure in the same case; nor, if it were repeated, would the accused be absolved by the second sentence as he was by the first; for he who is once released is not absolved further, for only he who is bound is released.

To the second part of the division [nn.4, 118] I concede that the penalty inflicted by the priest that does not exceed the total latitude of justice is the penalty the confessing penitent is bound to pay, and it is enough.

123. But you will say: how will the one confessing know if it exceed that latitude or not?

I say either from the Divine Law if he is an expert in it per se, or if he is not he can inquire of another confessor in whose prudence he has more confidence. Or if he not want to submit to another confessor and he is not by his own industry sufficient to judge if this penalty is merited by the fault or not, let him keep the penalty imposed on him, especially if it seem to him to exceed the merited penalty; but if it seem to him deficient, it is safer to go to another prudent confessor than to expose oneself to purgatory.

124. To the second argument [n.5], I concede that the use of the keys extends itself to remitting guilt and the debt of eternal penalty, but instrumentally.