b. Against the Second Conclusion

103. Against what is said secondly [nn.92, 94], it can be argued as follows: the power of judging in a case is not committed to anyone whose judgment will never, for any diligence whatever he is able to use, be ratified but only by chance or by special divine miracle; but whatever diligence a priest is able to use, he can never reach that indivisible point of the penalty that God judges this sinner to deserve. If he do, then, reach it, this will be by chance or special miracle, and it will not, for you [n.94], be ratified unless he do reach it; therefore he does not have the power of judging.

104. There is a confirmation, because it is not likely that God has given the Church a power of thus judging what he wants the judgment of the Church to ratify, and yet that it be impossible for the Church to judge correctly such that it not be ratified save by chance or special miracle.

105. Again, no one is constituted an arbiter between parties under the condition that he judge precisely according to the will of one of the parties, and this especially when he cannot determinately know the will of that party. But in a judgment of penitence the parties are God and the sinner, between whom the priest is arbiter. Therefore, the priest is not bound to judge precisely the penalty that God would inflict on the sinner, especially since he could not be clear about the will of God as to what it precisely is as the sinner is a member of the Church.

106. Again, if the priest impose a little bit more than correspond to the penitent’s sins, it is not probable but that the penitent would be bound to fulfill it. Therefore, although he impose a little bit less than the deserved penalty, it seems to be enough; for if something less than the point that divine justice dictates were not enough, then he ought not to fulfil any penalty beyond that point of divine justice.