a. Solution of Others and the Weighing of It

45. From this passage is argument made:

In one way as follows [Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, William of Auvergne]: there is given here to the Apostles, and in them to all priests, power to remit sins; not principally, because this is proper to God, therefore      ministerially and by arbitration; but they cannot arbitrate in a cause they do not know; therefore the cause they have to arbitrate must be made manifest to them. This making manifest is confession; therefore, by the conferring of the power of arbitration to priests in a cause of sin, sinners are obliged to accuse themselves before priests as before arbiters, which is to confess.

46. Suppose it said that reason does well conclude that the sacrament of penance was instituted by Christ as useful and efficacious, but it does not follow from this that it must necessarily be received as falling under a precept, because extreme unction was instituted by Christ, and the sacrament of confirmation as was said above [Ord. IV d.7 n.18], and yet neither is simply necessary, nor is there a precept about this one or that.

And then to the form of the argument [n.45]: ‘they are arbiters in a cause of sin, therefore others should accuse themselves to them’. Those others, it is true, who want to submit to their judgment, and, if they do submit, those arbiters do indeed have power of judging. But it does not follow that therefore others are bound by necessity of precept to submit to their judgment. An example: let there be four priests, each of whom has authority to absolve this sinner. Each is completely his arbiter as far as power is concerned. But it does not follow that this sinner is bound to submit himself to any of them but only to the one he wants.

This is confirmed by what Christ adds, John 20.23, “Whose sins you retain, they are retained.” But that statement is not precise. For not only are those sins retained by God for penalty that are retained by the priest (because the priest does not retain any sins unless they are in some way revealed to him, though by signs unfitted for penitence), but also those sins that are in no way shown to the priest does God retain for the vengeance of Gehenna.     Therefore , this statement too “whose sins you remit, they are remitted” was not precise. Hence to neither affirmative is the negative adjoined that denotes that the remission or retention done by the Apostles is precise with respect to the retention or remission done by God.The affirmatives are ‘whose sins you remit, are remitted’ and ‘whose sins you retain, are retained’, and the corresponding negatives are ‘whose sins you do not remit, are not remitted’ and ‘whose sins you do not retain, are not retained’. But neither of these negatives is simply true, because sins that the confessing penitent does not reveal to the priest are neither remitted nor retained by the priest, and from this follows nothing about their remission or retention before God. ⁵⁴

47. Although this sort of response [n.46] seem very probable, if from the statement of John “Whose sins you remit etc     .” one excludes the idea of precept. However, by excluding this response the point at issue is shown in two ways:

First as follows: judging or arbitrating power is not committed to anyone unless the necessity is imposed on someone of submitting himself to him; but judging or arbitrating is, for you, committed to the priest in a cause of sin; therefore, on someone, as on the guilty party, is imposed the necessity of submitting himself to the priest’s arbitration. -

And the same major [‘judging or arbitrating power is not committed to anyone unless...’] is proved through the following, that no one is judge of anyone in the will of whom (namely him who is to be judged) it lies whether to be judged by this judge or not to be judged by him. For then the judge would have no authority in himself for judging if the other could be judged if he wanted and not judged if he did not want. For to what purpose does the power of judging belong to anyone save to declare the right to him who is bound to obey the right? For only to declare the right by way of punishment, if you like, is not to judge.

But neither is this compelling: for I concede that the arbiter has power not only to determine right in this case but that, from the fact that another submits himself to him, his determination binds or releases him. Not so the determination of anyone who knows the right and does not have judiciary power.That is, from the mere fact that priests do in fact know or determine the right, and do also bind and loose penitents who submit to them, it does not follow that the faithful are obliged to confess to them. For unless priests have judiciary power in addition, no one is bound to submit to them or to follow their determinations. ⁵⁵