III. To the Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion

80. From the same point could response be made to the four reasons for the first conclusion in the solution of the question [nn.40-43] if, however, they are extended by anyone to proving there are two changes - which was also denied in the second conclusion [n.44].

81. For the major of the first reason [n.40], if it is taken like this ‘whatever is multiplied in its entity as such a quality is different really from that which is not multiplied in its entity’, is false unless it be a real being; and therefore if the remissions are multiplied in the sort of quality in which they are beings (because they are only remissions of reason), and if the infusion of grace is one, it does not follow that the former are different changes from it; but it does well follow that they are not the same as it, because, universally, what is multiplied in its entity as such a quality is not the same as what is not multiplied, taking the multiplication to be similar on this side and on that.

82. Likewise, the major of the second reason [n.41], ‘whatever is separated from another in its being is really different from it’, is false unless it is in its being a real being.

83. The third reason and the fourth [nn.42-43] do not prove these to be two changes, but only that the change that is to grace does not have guilt for its per se term ‘from which’, which I concede.