2. About the Divine Will

59. As to the issue at hand [I say] that all objects whatever (with the exception of sins and things willed in generally disordered way) that can be willed by a created will for the same ‘now’ or for different ‘nows’ (and this either in one or in diverse acts) - all these the divine will can in a single act, with one volition really but in idea diverse, will for the same person for the same ‘nows’. For that a will is limited to certain secondary objects precisely (such that it have no power for other objects) is a mark of imperfection in the will. And consequently, the divine will can will, for diverse instants, affirmation and negation for this person, who is in no way varied in himself before an act of volition. And the divine will can do this more than the created will can, because something eternal depends less on something temporal than a temporal act depends on something temporal; rather, it does not depend.

60. If the affirmation and negation, wherewith that will [sc. divine will] wills for this person (who is unvaried in himself) one thing for time a and another thing for time b, are causable simply, it follows that they are causable by the divine will; because the divine will is simply omnipotent. But if they are not causable, or if that will either wills only one of them or wills both conditionally, it follows that that will wills for this person one opposite for a and another for b, and without any change of itself (whether in itself or in its act), and without any change of object, as the object is object; because both volition and object, as it is object for the will, have being in eternity, and an object, as it is an object for act, could not vary without variation of act.

61. And from this follows that the divine will can will affirmation (let it be called c) for this person for instant a, and negation (let it be called d) for the same person for instant b, without any change either in the divine will or in the object, as it is object, or in anything extrinsic, and this if between those opposites change by nature does not occur (because, clearly, either the affirmation is only one of reason, and so the negation is only negation of a being of reason, or the will does not will them, both or one, save conditionally).

62. But because there is no new being of reason save through a new act of intellect or will, that condition (namely about being of reason [n.61]) does not preserve a passage from contradictory to contradictory without change - although the change is not a change between things that are beings of reason but between act and non-act. So, because of the divine will’s omnipotence, in no way can it will c instead of a for this person, and d instead of b, without some change in this person, and this if it will them with efficacious and absolute will. But if it will both or one of them conditionally and the condition does not exist, then a change too is not required. But a created will, because it is not omnipotent, can will absolutely for the same non-varied person c instead of a and d instead of b, and without any change preceding or following.

63. To the form, then of the reasoning,Scotus seems to be referring back to the argument at B above, nn.53-55 (and not n.62 as suggested by the Vatican editors). The major: no passage from contradictory to contradictory is without some change. The minor: but when to this person fault is remitted, it is such a passage. Conclusion: therefore, when to this person fault is remitted, it is not without some change. The conclusion does not hold because the passage from contradictory to contradictory when fault is remitted is not a change properly speaking, or not a real change. It is only a difference in relations of reason, namely from obligation to non-obligation [n.50]. This difference in relations of reason is explained in terms of God’s eternal but conditioned willing: he wills obligation to penalty for this person on the condition of no repentance, and remission of obligation to penalty for this person on the condition of repentance. There is no change in God, then, but there is change in the person [as said here, nn.62-63]. ⁴² I concede the major, taking change properly. But the minor in this way I deny, because the divine will, for the instant at which this man sins and for the whole time gone through up to instant b, wills him to be punished, not insofar as ‘to be punished’ is a participle of future time but insofar as it is a name, that is, he wills this person to be deserving of punishment - which is nothing other save to will to punish this person for the time then, and this with conditioned will, namely if it go on to the end [sc. if the person persists in sin until death]. But if at instant b he repent, God wills him for that time then, and for the whole time gone through up to the instant of a new sin, not to be punished - which is to will him conditionally to be punished if it go on to the end.

64. There is here, then, no passage from one opposite to the other, but there is about the same object here a conditioned willing of the affirmation for one instant and a conditioned willing of the negation for the other instant; and these two ‘willings’ stand together in eternity, and about the same object willed in eternity, although not for eternity, but for different ‘nows’.

65. And hereby is plain the answer to the proof about the divine intellect [n.54], which knows this person to be deserving of penalty before remission and not to be deserving after remission; for this is not other than to know this person to have been ordained to a penalty through an act conditioned for this instant for which he is so ordained, and not to have been ordained for that instant for which he is not so ordained.