2. Opinion of Others

a. Statement of the Opinion

21. Therefore is it said [Aquinas Sent. IV d.13 nn.27-82] that conviction for a faultThe Latin word ‘culpa’ means both ‘fault’ and ‘guilt’, and is translated in both ways in what follows according to suitability to the context. ² remains in the soul, which is a kind of obligation to the penalty due for that fault; now this obligation is a certain real relation, not founded on the guilty act, but on the essence of the soul, though only with actual guilt preceding, as was often said above on how a relation is founded on action [Ord. IV d.13 nn.27-82].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

22. Against this there is a twofold argument: first that no real relation remains in the soul; second, that if it did remain, the soul would not be called a sinner because of it.

23. The proof of the first is that an intrinsically arising real relation necessarily follows the positing of the extremes; but the relation here does not follow. The fact is plain, because while the soul and God remain the same, or while penalty is disposed in the same way, the soul is not for this reason obligated to penalty in the same way, because it is not so obligated before sin.That is, even if we suppose the listed foundations of the real relation to remain the same (the penalty as always due for such sin, God as always decreeing such penalty for such sin, and the soul as always capable of such sin), yet no relation of obligation in the soul to the penalty follows therefrom, unless an actual sin is supposed as well. ³ But if the relation is an extrinsically arising relation, it is necessary to give it a cause whereby it may arise on the basis of the extremes already posited (as is true of ‘where’ and the other circumstances [cf. Nicomachean Ethics 3.2.1111a3-6]). For a real respect that does not follow the posited extremes cannot exist unless some real action answer to it as to the term. Of this obligation [n.21] neither a real action nor a really acting agent can be given. For not the soul, because in sinning it had only a single disordered action that was related to that act of willing, which was deprived of its due circumstances, and so not to this respect [sc. of obligation] as to its term. Nor can this obligation be said to be the immediate term of divine action, because no soul is said to be a sinner precisely by the fact that it is the immediate term of divine action.

24. The proof of the second [n.21] is through this last point [n.23], because if there were in the soul such an obligation, it could not be imagined to be there save immediately from God, and thus the soul would not formally be a sinner by it, since God is not cause of sin per se but only permissively.

25. This difficulty the Master touches on in d.18, last chapter [Sent. IV d.18 ch.8 n.3-4], and he seems to solve it through this: “Until it repent the soul is polluted, just as it was while a depraved will was in it.” And he gives an example about him who has touched an animal carcass; for after the act ceases he remains unclean just as before [Leviticus 11.31]. And he adds: “Thus does the soul remain polluted just as it was in the act of sin itself, because it is thus by unlikeness far from God; for this unlikeness, which is in the soul by sin and is a distancing of the soul from God, seems to be a stain.”

26. Against this stands the prior deduction [n.23], because this stain, or distancing or unlikeness (with whatever name it be named), cannot be only a lack of the habit of grace, because that lack is totally present in a first sin [sc. therefore further sins would not add a further stain]; nor is it the lack of rectitude in the act, because that is not of a nature to remain unless the stain in the act remains.

27. Again, the stain of supreme hatred for a and supreme love of that very a are repugnant to each other; therefore by one the other is taken away, and consequently the stain of hatred for a could be taken away by extreme love for that very a [sc. while not paying any penalty to remove that stain of the original hatred].