B. The Possibility of an Affirmative Conclusion

1. Argument in General

94. Sufficient in general against the above is that anything is to be considered possible for God that is not manifestly impossible by virtue of its terms, or from which no impossibility or contradiction is evidently deduced. Such is the case here, as will be plain from solving the arguments [nn.128-169].

2. Particular Reasons, drawn from the Statements of Henry of Ghent

95. But there is argument in particular from certain reasons that the doctor, whose reasonings were repeated first [Henry, nn.81-84], sets down and strives to solve.

a. First Reason

96. The first reason is as follows: “It is no less unacceptable for two bodies to be together at the same time than for the same body to be in diverse places; but the first is possible for God, so the second is as well.”

97. The major is plain: philosophers, according to their principles, would posit a repugnance altogether between two quanta with respect to the same ‘where’, just as between white and black with respect to the same subject, as is plain from Physics 4.8.216a26-b15. Because a quantum, by the fact it is a quantum, expels another of the same quantity, and not because it is of this or that sort (he gives an example about a cube). The minor is plain from what happened (by the gift of subtleness) in the nativity of Christ, and his entrance through closed doors to his disciples, and from the closed sepulcher.

98. Henry replies that two dimensions are repugnant because of situation in place, and that the gift of subtleness takes this away. But that which is the reason for limitation to one ‘where’, namely a location that is determinate, cannot be taken away by any gift or endowment, because the glorious body too has a determinate location whereby it must be so here that it is not elsewhere, though it not have a location in place by which to give resistance to another body.

99. But against this is the argument from his third reason [n.83], which is about commensuration according to one and many; because, according to that reason, it is impossible for two bodies to be together more than for one body to be in two places, because the placed thing is co-multiplied with the multitude of the places either for the reason that it is commensurate with the place, or for some other special reason.

If on account of the first reason, then, since it is equally necessary for places to be commensurate with the things placed in them (because such commensuration is a common relation), a multiplication of places follows on the multiplication of placed things; and so follows the intended conclusion, that it is as equally impossible for two bodies to be together as for the same body to be in diverse places.

But if on account of something else, this can only be natural posteriority or simultaneity of place with respect to the placed dimension, for the naturally prior should not be multiplied with the posterior, but the posterior with the prior, and what is simultaneous to it with what it is simultaneous to.

100. But according to this second reason [previous paragraph], it is manifest that the dimensions of place are posterior to the dimensions of the placed thing; the dimensions of the place should rather be multiplied with the multiplication of the dimensions of the placed thing than the reverse.

101. The assumption is plain, because the dimensions of the placed thing are cause of the dimensions of the place; first because the placed thing makes the sides of the containing thing to be apart and for its surface to be actual; and second because the first is what can be without the other and not the reverse, because the surfaces of the locating thing cannot be apart without the distance of the parts of the placed thing.

102. The assumption is also plain for another reason, that in any motion in place the same surface of the placed thing remains, but the same surface of the place does not commonly remain when the placed thing is changed; also if a body of like shape succeeds to an equal body and similarly shaped, still the same surface as for the prior body does not remain circumscribing the second body.

103. This reason [n.99] can thus briefly be formed not only against Henry but also to prove the consequence that ‘two bodies can be together, therefore the same body can be in two places together’. The antecedent is conceded by everyone.

Proof of the consequence: because it is more possible that with the unity of the naturally prior stands a multitude in the naturally posterior than the reverse; but the dimension of the placed thing is naturally prior to the dimension of the place, as has just been proved [nn.100-102]; therefore it is simply more possible for several dimensions of places to correspond to one placed body than the reverse.

104. And thus is this first reason [n.99], in the first consequence [n.103], proved in this way.

b. Second Reason

105. The second reason is as follows: it is possible for God to convert the quantity of the bread into the quantity of his body, just as he converts substance into substance. On this basis, since, according to him [Henry], that into which something is converted [sc. Christ’s body, into which the bread is converted] exists where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was before, the result is that the body into which there is a conversion will be where that which is converted into it was before. And it cannot be in another place as to its quantity (such that the quantity would be its reason for being there, as would be the case if the quantity were the per se term of the conversion) without the quantity, according to them [followers of Henry], being placed there; therefore the same body will be placed where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was placed before and, along with this, it will remain in its own proper place [sc. heaven], because the conversion does not take away from its own place the term into which [sc. Christ’s body] the conversion is; therefore it [sc. Christ’s body] can be placed at the same time in two places.

106. He replies that the substance of the bread either (a) remains in such conversion, and then: (i) either it is affected by the dimensions of Christ’s body and the proposed thesis does not follow that Christ’s body is, by its dimensions, in two places, but only in one; (ii) or it is not affected by these other dimensions and then Christ remains where the substance of the bread is only by reason of the substance of the bread, and consequently he does not remain in his dimensions (because, according to the Philosopher Physics 1.2.185b3-5, substance has no magnitude), and so he will not be located in two places. Or (b) the whole is altogether converted into the whole, and then nothing remains [sc. of the converted bread] by reason of which Christ’s body may be said to be there, namely in the place of the converted [bread].

107. And further, he says [Quodlibet IX q.32 ad 2] that this is not to be posited, for it [Christ’s body] would not be anywhere sacramentally, because not under any perceptible species and it is, other than sacramentally, not anywhere save in heaven.

108. And further [ibid.] “since Christ’s body would not be there in its dimensions, it would not fill the place that the dimensions of the bread filled before, and thus the capacity of the place would not remain but, in the instant of the conversion, parts of air would rush in and the place that was there before would cease to be, and so thereby no body of anything would remain there save the body of Christ, just as no body remains when the species of bread are corrupted. If, therefore, a body still remained, this would only be because of the substance of the parts of air, which were before immediately touching the dimensions of the bread. And so the body of Christ would always remain there, because the parts of air could always remain in substance.”

109. Against this: the second reason [n.105] does not seem to be solved, because let an amount of substance [sc. of bread] equal to the substance of Christ’s body be converted into an amount of Christ’s body, and the argument will still stand, because that into which the conversion is made [sc. Christ’s body] will be quantitatively in the place of the converted term [sc. the bread] and in its proper place [sc. heaven] where it was before;     therefore etc     .

When therefore he replies by making a division [n.106], the second member of it could be granted that (b) ‘the whole is altogether converted into the whole’; nor does it follow that the term of the conversion [sc. Christ’s body] is not there if nothing [sc. of the bread] remains, unless this proposition is denied ‘the term of the conversion is where the thing converted was before’; and perhaps he would deny it, unless it has this addition ‘if that remains which was the reason for the converted thing’s having a location’.

110. And then this argument [n.106] does not work against him [n.105]. Nor either the argument about an equal amount of air converted into the body of Christ [n.108].

111. And I do not care to insist that I believe the proposition is false on which this reason rests, that ‘the term of the conversion must be where the thing converted was before’ [n.105], whether or not that remains which in the thing converted was the reason for its having a location.

112. However the other member of the division could be granted [n.106], namely that a quantity of air be converted into a quantity of Christ’s body while the substance of the air remains; and then one could infer that Christ’s body would exist under quantity and dimensions (as is plain), and that its quantity would be where the quantity of the converted air was before;     therefore the body of Christ will be there in its dimensions and, along with this, in heaven; therefore etc     . [it will be in two places].

c. Third Reason

113. I argue with another reason, that can be the second, I say, for this conclusion, though perhaps the third against the man [Henry], and I argue as follows. Wherever God can make some natural substance not under its natural mode, or under an opposite mode, he can make it in the same place under its own natural mode, or a mode agreeable to its nature. The proof is that his not making it under its natural mode is a twofold miracle, which is not the case with his making it under its natural mode.The twofold miracle is [in the case of the Eucharist] God making Christ’s body to be present here and God making it to be under the species of bread, or not in its natural mode. But if God can do two miracles together he can do one of them alone, namely make Christ’s body to be present here and not in the mode of bread but in its own or natural mode. ⁹ But God can make Christ’s body to be present here without converting another thing into Christ’s body; therefore he can make it to be present here under its natural mode, and present here by location in place.

114. Proof of the minor, because conversion of something else into Christ’s body is not formally the reason for its being here. The point is clear because, when the conversion is over, the term of the conversion here remains. Therefore, without contradiction, a thing’s being here can be conferred on it without any conversion of something else into it.a

And if you perhaps say that this conversion, as past, is the cause of this presence -on the contrary: God cannot by his absolute power make a past conversion of this sort not to be past; therefore he could not by his absolute power make ‘present in this way’ not to be present in this way, which is nothing.

a.a [Interpolation] Proof, because in the first way there are two miracles and in the second way one. But God, according to everyone, can make his body to be present sacramentally (that is, not under its natural mode) in diverse ‘wheres’, and make it so in fact. Therefore he can do the same in the same ‘wheres’ by way of position in place and by bodily dimensions.

     Not that it is said to be here by conversion of something else into it, because it can come to be without conversion just as with conversion, because when the conversion is over...

115. If you also say in a different way that the species of the converted thing [sc. the bread] left behind after the conversion is the reason for Christ’s body being here, and so the conversion is necessarily required for it to be here, and consequently if you posit that nothing [sc. of the bread] remains but the whole is converted into the whole, the result is that Christ’s body will not be in the place of the converted thing [sc. the bread] -on the contrary: the species is not formally in the body of Christ, therefore it is not formally the reason for the body of Christ having some quality or other, and meaning generally by ‘some quality or other’ whatever is formally existent in the body of Christ; but the body of Christ is admitted to be present here formally.

116. The above minor proposition [n.114] is proved also as follows: there can be newness in something posterior while there is no newness in something prior; therefore it is possible for such presence to be new without newness in the substantial form, which is prior to any such respect.

d. Fourth Reason

117. I argue fourth thus: an angel can be in several places together definitively; therefore so can a body be in several places together in its dimensions, or in place and by being circumscribed there.

The consequence is plain because the limitation is the same here as there, and consequently also determination as to place is similar, in the way suitable to each; hence, and generally, those who deny the consequent deny the antecedent.

118. Proof of the antecedent: God can convert bread into an angel (as will be shown in d.11 n.61); but, according to Henry [n.105], the place where something is converted [sc. the bread] is the place where what it is converted into is [sc. the angel] (after the conversion at any rate, if the reason for the converted thing’s having a location remains);     therefore an angel will be where the bread was. And the angel is not moved from heaven; therefore it is in two places. And it cannot be present there without being in the place there in the way suitable for it, namely definitively; therefore etc     .

3. What Must be Said about these Four Reasons

119. The fourth and second reasons are only against the man [Henry] who puts them forward, but the first and third seem to prove the intended conclusion simply.

Therefore I give consideration to the first and third of these four reasons. The second and fourth only proceed on the basis of a certain supposition, which I do not believe to be true. They would however be conclusive against many who concede this supposition [sc. ‘that into which something is converted is where the converted thing was before’ nn.105, 118].

120. Hugh of St. Victor’s intention is to this same effect [n.79], and although this doctor [Henry] strives to expound him, yet for anyone who reads Hugh it is sufficiently plain that the whole of what belongs to the thesis ‘being at the same time in two places’ is attributed by Hugh to the omnipotence of God, and not to any conversion of anything into the term of the conversion.