I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Many People for the Negative Conclusion

80. Here the negative conclusion is maintained by many people, but different ones prove it in different ways.

1. The Reasons of Henry of Ghent

81. [First reason] - One doctor [Henry, Quodlibet XIII q.4] argues as follows: When, as far as depends on the power of the agent, something could be done indifferently in various ways to the same thing, if the same thing were susceptible according to one way among them, it would be possible for it to be acted on similarly in any of the other ways. Now, on the part of the agent, since it is of infinite power, there is an equal possibility that a single body may come to be at the same time in several places according to any manner of plurality. But it is impossible that, with God as agent, the same body should be everywhere; therefore, it is impossible simply that the same body come to be at the same time in diverse places. The proof of the minor is that ‘being able to be everywhere at the same time’ is proper to God.

82. [Second reason] - Again, many contradictories would follow, for when a body is put in one place, either it has the same form as in another place or it does not.

If it has the same form, let ice be put in one place and heat in another place; it follows that in one place the body will have cold and in another place heat. Likewise if it not find anything to eat in one place it would be hungry there, in another place finding food it would not be hungry; and in one place it would incur sickness from the inclemency of the air, and in another place health from the air’s clemency, and so it would at the same time be healthy and not healthy but ill; and fourth, in one place it would be killed and in another not, so it would at the same die and not die

But if the second alternative is chosen [the thing has different forms in different places], the same results follow, because the same body will have at least contrary properties, save that according to the second member it will have contraries in each place, and according to the first member it will have one contrary in one place and another in another.

83. [Third reason] - Again, as a thing in place is commensurate with the dimensions of the place, namely as quantum and as continuum, it is thus commensurate to the place as [the place] is one and many; therefore, if the same placed thing is in diverse places, it will be one and many at the same time.Scotus’ expression here is obscure [see also n.144 infra]. He is referring to an argument in Henry’s Quodlibet IX q.32, where Henry argues that if the same body is present by its dimensions in several places, it is one because it is commensurate with the dimensions of one place (one both numerically and as an extension) and many because commensurate in the same way with the dimensions of many places. So the dimensions of the same body will have to be multiplied according as they are commensurate with the dimensions of several places, and hence the same body will be one (because it is the same body) and many (because it has as many sets of dimensions as the number of places it is in). ⁸

84. And if you object against the second reason [n.82], that its conclusion seems to apply in the same way to Christ’s body on the cross and in the pyx, because on the cross it was wounded but not in the pyx, Henry responds that when something belongs to something according to what naturally belongs to it, it belongs to it simply (as that if a man is curly as to his head he is curly simply, though he is not curly as to another part); but to be wounded, which includes division of what is continuous, belongs to something as it has being in place only; and therefore if it exists by location in one place and not by location in another place, if it is wounded where it is by location, it is simply wounded; and if it is not wounded in another place where it is not by location, not for this reason is it not wounded, but there is a fallacy according to simply and in a certain respect. But if the same body is by location in two places, and consequently in its dimensions in diverse places, one must say that whatever it naturally does or suffers in one place it does or suffers in the other; therefore in that case it follows that it will have opposites at the same time.

2. Other Doctors’ Reasons

85. Another doctor [Godfrey of Fontaines] argues as follows: the limits of place and of the placed thing are simultaneous; therefore if the placed thing is outside the limits of its proper place it is outside its own limits.

He also brings in about an angel that it cannot be in diverse places at the same time; therefore much less can a body be placed in diverse places.

86. Another doctor [Giles of Rome] argues as follows: as a thing is by its proper nature in only one species, so it is by one dimension in only one place at the same time.

87. Another [William of Ware] argues thus: if the same thing were at the same time in diverse places then either through one change or two. Not through one because one change is only to one term. Nor through two, because these two are either of the same kind or of a different kind. Not of the same kind, because the same thing cannot be moved at the same time by two motions of the same species, from Physics 3.3.202a34-36 [cf. Ord. II d.2 nn.259, 270-272] and Metaphysics 5.9.1018a5-9. Nor by two of different species, because the terms would be contraries and so the motions would be incompossible.

88. Again the terms of any motion are incompossible, from Physics 5.3.227a7-10 [sc. the beginning and end points of a motion are not simultaneous]; but any two ‘wheres’ can be the terms of any motion, because a body can move from one ‘where’ to the other; therefore any two ‘wheres’ are incompossible as to the same subject.

3. Further Reasons that can be Brought Forward

89. Now I put forward some other reasons.

The first is that a natural agent does not per se intend the corruption of the term ‘from which’ but only per accidens, because the term ‘from which’ is incompossible with the term ‘to which’ that it intends to introduce. Therefore if one ‘where’ be compossible with another ‘where’, a natural agent would not corrupt the first ‘where’ in order to introduce the second ‘where’; therefore it would be possible to put a body in the new ‘where’ without that body being moved from the ‘where’ it previously had.

90. Second thus: it is impossible for the same matter to be under two substantial forms at the same time; but if it be possible for the same body to be in diverse places at the same time, the opposite of this would follow.

Proof of the minor:

The first proof is: let the same nutriment be put in two or three places, and let it be eaten by different animals existing in those places; the nutritive power of each animal would convert that nutriment into its own substance and consequently the same matter of the nutriment will be informed by the form of each animal, and so the matter of the nutriment will be under diverse substantial forms at the same time, and will be animated by the sensitive souls in diverse brutes and by the intellective souls in diverse men.

The second proof of the same minor is: suppose that the same wood is in diverse places, and that in those places are two fires and that they act on the wood and destroy it (because the wood cannot resist the power of the agent) and introduce the form of fire into it - but not the same form, for the agents are diverse, therefore different forms of fire in the same matter, because the matter of the destroyed wood was the same just as the wood was the same.

91. Again third, it would follow that the fire, however small it be, could burn everything combustible. For let the fire have this combustible thing here proportioned to it, and that one there, and a third one in a third place - it could act on this one here and that one there and so on simultaneously in an infinite number of places. And thus any number of combustible things could be burned at the same time by however small a fire. But any power that can act on many small objects at the same time, can act on one great object put together from the small ones; therefore the smallest fire could at the same time burn what is to be put together from all those, and that burning from all the burnings.

92. Fourth as follows: it follows that some nourishable thing could be sustained in some place without receiving nutriment; for if it had suitable nutriment in one place it would be nourished there and consequently here too; or it would follow that it would be nourished and not nourished at the same time, and thus that it would be nourished here and would not take in nutriment here.a

a.a [Interpolation] an animal possessing suitable nutriment here would be nourished, but elsewhere, not having nutriment, it would not be nourished, and so it would be nourished and not nourished at the same time.

93. Fourth as follows, that if it had suitable nutriment in two places and were to ingest it in suitable amount in both places, the consequence would be that it would be nourished to double amount, or the nutriment ingested would be lost and not converted into nourishment.

B. The Possibility of an Affirmative Conclusion

1. Argument in General

94. Sufficient in general against the above is that anything is to be considered possible for God that is not manifestly impossible by virtue of its terms, or from which no impossibility or contradiction is evidently deduced. Such is the case here, as will be plain from solving the arguments [nn.128-169].

2. Particular Reasons, drawn from the Statements of Henry of Ghent

95. But there is argument in particular from certain reasons that the doctor, whose reasonings were repeated first [Henry, nn.81-84], sets down and strives to solve.

a. First Reason

96. The first reason is as follows: “It is no less unacceptable for two bodies to be together at the same time than for the same body to be in diverse places; but the first is possible for God, so the second is as well.”

97. The major is plain: philosophers, according to their principles, would posit a repugnance altogether between two quanta with respect to the same ‘where’, just as between white and black with respect to the same subject, as is plain from Physics 4.8.216a26-b15. Because a quantum, by the fact it is a quantum, expels another of the same quantity, and not because it is of this or that sort (he gives an example about a cube). The minor is plain from what happened (by the gift of subtleness) in the nativity of Christ, and his entrance through closed doors to his disciples, and from the closed sepulcher.

98. Henry replies that two dimensions are repugnant because of situation in place, and that the gift of subtleness takes this away. But that which is the reason for limitation to one ‘where’, namely a location that is determinate, cannot be taken away by any gift or endowment, because the glorious body too has a determinate location whereby it must be so here that it is not elsewhere, though it not have a location in place by which to give resistance to another body.

99. But against this is the argument from his third reason [n.83], which is about commensuration according to one and many; because, according to that reason, it is impossible for two bodies to be together more than for one body to be in two places, because the placed thing is co-multiplied with the multitude of the places either for the reason that it is commensurate with the place, or for some other special reason.

If on account of the first reason, then, since it is equally necessary for places to be commensurate with the things placed in them (because such commensuration is a common relation), a multiplication of places follows on the multiplication of placed things; and so follows the intended conclusion, that it is as equally impossible for two bodies to be together as for the same body to be in diverse places.

But if on account of something else, this can only be natural posteriority or simultaneity of place with respect to the placed dimension, for the naturally prior should not be multiplied with the posterior, but the posterior with the prior, and what is simultaneous to it with what it is simultaneous to.

100. But according to this second reason [previous paragraph], it is manifest that the dimensions of place are posterior to the dimensions of the placed thing; the dimensions of the place should rather be multiplied with the multiplication of the dimensions of the placed thing than the reverse.

101. The assumption is plain, because the dimensions of the placed thing are cause of the dimensions of the place; first because the placed thing makes the sides of the containing thing to be apart and for its surface to be actual; and second because the first is what can be without the other and not the reverse, because the surfaces of the locating thing cannot be apart without the distance of the parts of the placed thing.

102. The assumption is also plain for another reason, that in any motion in place the same surface of the placed thing remains, but the same surface of the place does not commonly remain when the placed thing is changed; also if a body of like shape succeeds to an equal body and similarly shaped, still the same surface as for the prior body does not remain circumscribing the second body.

103. This reason [n.99] can thus briefly be formed not only against Henry but also to prove the consequence that ‘two bodies can be together, therefore the same body can be in two places together’. The antecedent is conceded by everyone.

Proof of the consequence: because it is more possible that with the unity of the naturally prior stands a multitude in the naturally posterior than the reverse; but the dimension of the placed thing is naturally prior to the dimension of the place, as has just been proved [nn.100-102]; therefore it is simply more possible for several dimensions of places to correspond to one placed body than the reverse.

104. And thus is this first reason [n.99], in the first consequence [n.103], proved in this way.

b. Second Reason

105. The second reason is as follows: it is possible for God to convert the quantity of the bread into the quantity of his body, just as he converts substance into substance. On this basis, since, according to him [Henry], that into which something is converted [sc. Christ’s body, into which the bread is converted] exists where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was before, the result is that the body into which there is a conversion will be where that which is converted into it was before. And it cannot be in another place as to its quantity (such that the quantity would be its reason for being there, as would be the case if the quantity were the per se term of the conversion) without the quantity, according to them [followers of Henry], being placed there; therefore the same body will be placed where the converted thing [sc. the bread] was placed before and, along with this, it will remain in its own proper place [sc. heaven], because the conversion does not take away from its own place the term into which [sc. Christ’s body] the conversion is; therefore it [sc. Christ’s body] can be placed at the same time in two places.

106. He replies that the substance of the bread either (a) remains in such conversion, and then: (i) either it is affected by the dimensions of Christ’s body and the proposed thesis does not follow that Christ’s body is, by its dimensions, in two places, but only in one; (ii) or it is not affected by these other dimensions and then Christ remains where the substance of the bread is only by reason of the substance of the bread, and consequently he does not remain in his dimensions (because, according to the Philosopher Physics 1.2.185b3-5, substance has no magnitude), and so he will not be located in two places. Or (b) the whole is altogether converted into the whole, and then nothing remains [sc. of the converted bread] by reason of which Christ’s body may be said to be there, namely in the place of the converted [bread].

107. And further, he says [Quodlibet IX q.32 ad 2] that this is not to be posited, for it [Christ’s body] would not be anywhere sacramentally, because not under any perceptible species and it is, other than sacramentally, not anywhere save in heaven.

108. And further [ibid.] “since Christ’s body would not be there in its dimensions, it would not fill the place that the dimensions of the bread filled before, and thus the capacity of the place would not remain but, in the instant of the conversion, parts of air would rush in and the place that was there before would cease to be, and so thereby no body of anything would remain there save the body of Christ, just as no body remains when the species of bread are corrupted. If, therefore, a body still remained, this would only be because of the substance of the parts of air, which were before immediately touching the dimensions of the bread. And so the body of Christ would always remain there, because the parts of air could always remain in substance.”

109. Against this: the second reason [n.105] does not seem to be solved, because let an amount of substance [sc. of bread] equal to the substance of Christ’s body be converted into an amount of Christ’s body, and the argument will still stand, because that into which the conversion is made [sc. Christ’s body] will be quantitatively in the place of the converted term [sc. the bread] and in its proper place [sc. heaven] where it was before;     therefore etc     .

When therefore he replies by making a division [n.106], the second member of it could be granted that (b) ‘the whole is altogether converted into the whole’; nor does it follow that the term of the conversion [sc. Christ’s body] is not there if nothing [sc. of the bread] remains, unless this proposition is denied ‘the term of the conversion is where the thing converted was before’; and perhaps he would deny it, unless it has this addition ‘if that remains which was the reason for the converted thing’s having a location’.

110. And then this argument [n.106] does not work against him [n.105]. Nor either the argument about an equal amount of air converted into the body of Christ [n.108].

111. And I do not care to insist that I believe the proposition is false on which this reason rests, that ‘the term of the conversion must be where the thing converted was before’ [n.105], whether or not that remains which in the thing converted was the reason for its having a location.

112. However the other member of the division could be granted [n.106], namely that a quantity of air be converted into a quantity of Christ’s body while the substance of the air remains; and then one could infer that Christ’s body would exist under quantity and dimensions (as is plain), and that its quantity would be where the quantity of the converted air was before;     therefore the body of Christ will be there in its dimensions and, along with this, in heaven; therefore etc     . [it will be in two places].

c. Third Reason

113. I argue with another reason, that can be the second, I say, for this conclusion, though perhaps the third against the man [Henry], and I argue as follows. Wherever God can make some natural substance not under its natural mode, or under an opposite mode, he can make it in the same place under its own natural mode, or a mode agreeable to its nature. The proof is that his not making it under its natural mode is a twofold miracle, which is not the case with his making it under its natural mode.The twofold miracle is [in the case of the Eucharist] God making Christ’s body to be present here and God making it to be under the species of bread, or not in its natural mode. But if God can do two miracles together he can do one of them alone, namely make Christ’s body to be present here and not in the mode of bread but in its own or natural mode. ⁹ But God can make Christ’s body to be present here without converting another thing into Christ’s body; therefore he can make it to be present here under its natural mode, and present here by location in place.

114. Proof of the minor, because conversion of something else into Christ’s body is not formally the reason for its being here. The point is clear because, when the conversion is over, the term of the conversion here remains. Therefore, without contradiction, a thing’s being here can be conferred on it without any conversion of something else into it.a

And if you perhaps say that this conversion, as past, is the cause of this presence -on the contrary: God cannot by his absolute power make a past conversion of this sort not to be past; therefore he could not by his absolute power make ‘present in this way’ not to be present in this way, which is nothing.

a.a [Interpolation] Proof, because in the first way there are two miracles and in the second way one. But God, according to everyone, can make his body to be present sacramentally (that is, not under its natural mode) in diverse ‘wheres’, and make it so in fact. Therefore he can do the same in the same ‘wheres’ by way of position in place and by bodily dimensions.

     Not that it is said to be here by conversion of something else into it, because it can come to be without conversion just as with conversion, because when the conversion is over...

115. If you also say in a different way that the species of the converted thing [sc. the bread] left behind after the conversion is the reason for Christ’s body being here, and so the conversion is necessarily required for it to be here, and consequently if you posit that nothing [sc. of the bread] remains but the whole is converted into the whole, the result is that Christ’s body will not be in the place of the converted thing [sc. the bread] -on the contrary: the species is not formally in the body of Christ, therefore it is not formally the reason for the body of Christ having some quality or other, and meaning generally by ‘some quality or other’ whatever is formally existent in the body of Christ; but the body of Christ is admitted to be present here formally.

116. The above minor proposition [n.114] is proved also as follows: there can be newness in something posterior while there is no newness in something prior; therefore it is possible for such presence to be new without newness in the substantial form, which is prior to any such respect.

d. Fourth Reason

117. I argue fourth thus: an angel can be in several places together definitively; therefore so can a body be in several places together in its dimensions, or in place and by being circumscribed there.

The consequence is plain because the limitation is the same here as there, and consequently also determination as to place is similar, in the way suitable to each; hence, and generally, those who deny the consequent deny the antecedent.

118. Proof of the antecedent: God can convert bread into an angel (as will be shown in d.11 n.61); but, according to Henry [n.105], the place where something is converted [sc. the bread] is the place where what it is converted into is [sc. the angel] (after the conversion at any rate, if the reason for the converted thing’s having a location remains);     therefore an angel will be where the bread was. And the angel is not moved from heaven; therefore it is in two places. And it cannot be present there without being in the place there in the way suitable for it, namely definitively; therefore etc     .

3. What Must be Said about these Four Reasons

119. The fourth and second reasons are only against the man [Henry] who puts them forward, but the first and third seem to prove the intended conclusion simply.

Therefore I give consideration to the first and third of these four reasons. The second and fourth only proceed on the basis of a certain supposition, which I do not believe to be true. They would however be conclusive against many who concede this supposition [sc. ‘that into which something is converted is where the converted thing was before’ nn.105, 118].

120. Hugh of St. Victor’s intention is to this same effect [n.79], and although this doctor [Henry] strives to expound him, yet for anyone who reads Hugh it is sufficiently plain that the whole of what belongs to the thesis ‘being at the same time in two places’ is attributed by Hugh to the omnipotence of God, and not to any conversion of anything into the term of the conversion.

C. Scotus’ own Response

121. To the question, therefore, I respond that since I concede anything in accord with a maxim known to me (which is a maxim most certain for me), I concede that ‘for God everything is possible that does not evidently include a contradiction, and on which too no necessary contradiction follows’; and this maxim is of that sort, because the reasons that lead to proving a contradiction do not seem probative, as will appear in solving the reasons [nn.138-145] - I say, therefore, that it is simply possible for God to make the same body to be located at the same time in diverse places.

122. This is plain from understanding the terms: for when I say ‘a body is placed at the same time in diverse places’ I do not say anything over and above ‘body’ save a certain externally arising respect founded on a quantum to another quantum that circumscribes it.

123. But ‘that such a respect is, on the same foundation, multiplied to diverse terms’ does not appear to be against anything known to reason, because respects that come to a thing from within, about which the point is less evident, can be multiplied on a foundation that remains the same (as on the same whiteness two likenesses can be founded to two terms, as was proved in Lectura III d.8 n.49).

124. The assumption [n.122], namely that ‘where’ only states a respect coming from outside, is sufficiently clear from what was said in the previous question [nn.35, 5455].

125. And it is a wonder that those who so much follow reason follow imagination, that because imagination does not separate place from body or conversely, nor perceives that one is multiplied without the other, therefore let it be said to be simply impossible that one is multiplied without the other, since, in following imagination, nothing else appears. But according to reason no necessity from the ideas of the terms is or appears that when one is multiplied the other is too. For when a posterior is multiplied there is no necessity for the prior to be multiplied. But the ‘wheres’ are manifestly posterior to the located quantum, and they come to a thing accidentally and contingently. In many other cases too, where there is a greater connection, we concede according to reason that one is multiplied without the other. For scarcely is any other relation more accidental to its foundation than ‘where’ is - no mode of ‘existing in’ is, nor any mode of ‘being from’, and so on about many other relations. And yet in the case of other relations there is no such impudent assertion of the impossibility of multiplying relations on the same foundation.

126. And if you object that it is true that many respects can be founded on the same foundation when one of them is not adequate to the whole foundation, but here one thing is adequate to the whole idea of a quantum insofar as a quantum is locatable in place - this seems to be said without reason, because a respect that arises from the nature of a foundation seems to be more adequate to the foundation than that respect which comes to it from without, ceteris paribus. But two such respects to two terms, respects arising from the nature of the foundation, can exist in the same foundation, as two equalities to two equal quantities; therefore, without reason is it imagined that here there is one adequate respect.

127. And there is a confirmation, because a quantity’s presenceInstead of “quantity’s presence” and “substance’s presence” the Latin ‘sua’ could mean “his [Christ’s] presence” and “his [Christ’s] substance” ¹⁰ to place is not more adequate to the quantity than a substance’s presence, a presence fitting to it, is adequate to the substance, as on altars. But no presence on the altar is adequate to the substance, because the substance of Christ’s body is posited as able to have several presences, even primarily, since it is the first term of many conversions on altars, and yet along with this his body is present in heaven under its own quantitative mode.

D. To the Arguments Adduced for the Negative Opinion

128. As to the arguments [nn.81-93], some are universal and are solved in general in the way they proceed; many others are difficult as to imagination, and the way they proceed is in the examples above adduced about heat, hunger, saturation, health, sickness, life and death, and so on.

1. Three Preliminary Propositions

129. To solves these arguments I set down three propositions:

The first of them is: “Whatever things are essentially prior to the ‘where’ exist uniformly in the body even though the body has diverse ‘wheres’; but what things are posterior or simultaneous in nature with the ‘wheres’ will vary according to the variety of the ‘wheres’.” This is plain because something prior does not vary essentially because of variation in something posterior, but something posterior does indeed vary with variation in something prior. Also things that are simultaneous in nature with something, vary with that something. This is the first proposition.

130. The second proposition is: “As something passive which exists in one ‘where’ would receive a form from two agents next to it in the same place, so will it, if existing in two places or two ‘wheres’, be acted on by the same two agents next to it in the two ‘wheres’.” And I understand this about a being-acted-on that is toward absolute form. And this is plain, because in order for something passive to be acted on by an agent and to receive the form, there is only need that it be in a state of passive potency, and that the agent have an active form, and that they be duly near each other. But whether they are near each other in this ‘where’ or in that one makes no difference as far as action to absolute form is concerned. But when a passive thing is put in two ‘wheres’, it has the same passive potency for absolute form, and the active thing has the same active potency, and the passive thing can, as it is in this ‘where’ or in that one, be near the active thing in the same way. Therefore it will be acted on in the same way as to any absolute form by any active thing that is near it whether in this ‘where’ or in another one, just as if it were in one ‘where’ and the agent were near it. I have added the phrase ‘as to absolute form’ because it is not necessary that the passive thing receive the same effects when speaking of relative things that are simultaneous in nature with or posterior to the ‘where’; because these can vary as the ‘where’ does (from the first proposition [n.129]). However, this second proposition could also be conceded in their case, as will be plain in responding to the objections specifically [nn.177-179].

131. The third proposition is “Just as a body existing in one ‘where’ is disposed in idea of activity to the diverse things near it in that ‘where’, so is it, when existing in two ‘wheres’, disposed to the same things next to it in those ‘wheres’.” This is plain from the proof of the preceding relation [n.130].

2. To the Individual Reasons

132. Answer on the basis of these propositions to the reasons adduced for the negative opinion.

a. To the Reasons of Henry of Ghent

133. [To the first] - To the first [n.81] I say that the first proposition [the major] could be so understood that it would have to be denied absolutely. For God has power for all vision and for all modes of vision; but he cannot cause every vision in every eye, because not every eye is susceptive of every vision, as the eye of a bat is not capable of the vision of an eagle, because the vision of an eagle is repugnant to its receptive power. But let it be that Henry is speaking of any form to which the power of the agent is of itself equally disposed, and to which the receptive power is equally disposed, and let it be that anything through this power could be caused in the recipient - then the proposition is true, because both by reason of the active power and by reason of the passive power the possibility would be equal.

134. But the conclusion still does not follow if it is about any power individually and about all the many possible forms at once, because a surface has, on the part of God and of the active and passive recipient, an equal possibility for every color, but not for every color at once. And then Henry would need to show that a body is on its part equally receptive of all diverse ‘wheres’ and of two of them, which is denied by an adversary. However, I concede as to the thing that, on the part of God as active and on the part of body as receptive, there is an equal possibility in a body for two ‘wheres’ that are simply distinct, and to each or to any number, and then to all.

135. And when it is said that ‘by no virtue can one body have all ‘wheres’ or be everywhere’ - this is false. And my proof is that they concede that Christ’s body could be everywhere sacramentally; for God could convert any body universally, just like bread, into the body of Christ. And I say that, when making comparison with the power of God, there is no greater limitation to existing anywhere by location than to existing anywhere sacramentally.

136. Also, whatever can be done by an active second cause God can do immediately; but the sacrament, that veils the body of Christ, is only the reason for the body being here as second effective cause, because it is not the formal cause, as was proved before [d.8 nn.141-149].

137. And when it is said [n.81] that ‘being everywhere is proper to God’, I say that God is necessarily everywhere by his immensity, because there can be no ‘where’ in which God does not exist by his power, presence, and essence; and in this way is it impossible for anything other than God to be everywhere. But it is not unacceptable that something other than God be by God’s active power in any ‘where’ whatever, nor should it for this reason be said to be everywhere the way God is, for it is not immense.

138. [Second reason] - As to the argument [n.82] that includes many of those contradictories or repugnancies, the answer is plain from the three aforesaid propositions [nn.129-131]. Yet I apply them as follows: let it be that to this body in this place an agent, namely fire, comes next to it, and another agent, namely water, does so in another place - I say that either the agents are of equal power in action or one overcomes the other.

If they be of equal virtue and if they be then next to the body that has one ‘where’, either each would impede the other so that neither would act, or they would act for some intermediate effect in which the passive thing would be perfectly assimilated neither to one nor to the other. And I answer in the same way now when they are next to the same body that exists in diverse places or ‘wheres’.

But if the virtue of either one overcomes the other, it will either assimilate the passive thing to itself or will do so more than the other does.

139. And I reply in the same way if they are in diverse places, because there is no greater difficulty in this case than if fire and water were placed together (which it is not denied can be done by God), and if the same body were next to fire and water having the same ‘where’, because one should not there say, so as to prevent contraries in the passive thing, that ‘anything can more easily, or equally easily, avoid it here’.

140. About hunger and satiety [n.82] I say that hunger is appetite for the cold and dry. But this appetite is either natural or voluntary, namely the wish to eat, and whether it is one or the other it states something absolute. Therefore it does not vary with variation in ‘where’ (from the first proposition [n.129]), and consequently if it be here sated and its appetite cease in one ‘where’, it would cease elsewhere too, though not from food taken there, as will be immediately said about death [n.143].

141. But if you say satiety is ‘bodily fullness of stomach’ then, since it would not receive food as it does here, a doubt is possible whether it would for this reason be thus full here. And I say no (just as neither was the body of Christ wounded as it is in the pyx), because this fullness only states the presence of food contained by the container, namely the belly; and just as it is possible that the containing capacity of this body is different in this place and in that, so it is possible that the active containing capacity of this body here is different from the containing capacity of the same body in another ‘where’, for this containing capacity does not state something absolute but an extrinsic respect.

142. About the third [n.82], namely about health and illness, and temperateness and intemperateness, I say that intemperateness of the air expels temperateness as to the body of an animal on which the temperate or intemperate air acts. And then, in brief, the body would be such as the overcoming agent would be of a nature to cause it to be, although it would perhaps act less intensely because of the reaction of some contrary thing impeding or resisting it. But if they are equal in acting, the passive thing will then alter to the middle state, in the same way in short as you would say healthy and unhealthy things would be if they were together (which you concede God can do), and the same body would be next to this one and to that one together.

143. The fourth, which is about death and life [n.82], is easily solved, because each is something absolute (privative or positive), and consequently does not vary because of variation in ‘where’ (according to the first proposition [n.129]). If then it dies here, it dies there as well, but yet this inference does not follow ‘it is wounded here, therefore it is wounded there’, because wounding states a division of what is continuous as it is here by something dividing it here. But yet it is true that if it has a wound here it has it elsewhere as well, because such is what the discontinuity of the parts is like, and if it is in this body there it is also in the same body elsewhere.

144. [To the third] - To the next argument [n.83], the third main one by this doctor, I say that it is not necessary that something located in place be commensurate with the dimensions of place according as [the place] is one and many, so that according to the multitude of the dimensions of place there follows a multitude of the dimensions of the placed thing; just as neither does a multitude in what is prior follow on a multitude in what is posterior, especially as to an extrinsic respect and foundation, as was touched on in argument earlier [nn.123-126].

b. To the Reasons of the Other Doctors

145. To the first reason of another doctor [n.85] I say that the terms of one thing can be understood to be simultaneous with the terms of another either in simultaneity precise and adequate or in simultaneity neither precise nor adequate.

If simultaneity is understood in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false.

But if it is understood in the second way, namely simultaneity that is not adequate, then the major is false, because it is not necessary that what is outside the terms of one be outside the terms of the other. For, universally, if one thing exceeds another, it is not necessary that what is simultaneous with the exceeding thing be simultaneous with the exceeded thing. An example: if the soul according to its quidditative terms (for it does not have a quantitative term) is simultaneous with the terms of a finger, not for this reason does it follow that whatever is outside the terms of the finger is outside the terms of the soul.

146. To the other point about an angel [n.85], I say that it proves the opposite, as was shown in the fourth reason against the opinion [nn.117-118]; for an angel can in its own way, that is definitively, be in several places simultaneously, namely by divine power.

147. To the next argument from another doctor [n.86] I say that the likeness about the nature of a thing does not hold, because one nature is the formal reason for being in one species, but being circumscribed by something else is the formal reason for being in one place. And dimension is not the proximate formal reason for being in a place but it is only the fundamental reason. Now dimension can be one though the respects are diverse, just as whiteness can be one though the likenesses are diverse. But only through one likeness is a like thing constituted formally in a species. And if a like species is not able to be multiplied in the same thing, neither is the likeness able to be.The sense seems to be that a white thing can be like many other things in being white, but it has whiteness only by being white or being like whiteness. So as whiteness is not multiplied though the things are that are alike in whiteness, so dimension is not multiplied though the places are that the dimension is in. ¹¹

148. To the next from another doctor [n.87] I say that if the same thing remains in the same ‘where’ in which it was before, it can acquire a new ‘where’ by a single change, and two new ‘wheres’ by two changes.

149. And if you ask whether these changes are of the same species or not - let either one or the other be granted, I care not.

150. And when you argue that two changes of the same species are not simultaneous in the same thing [n.87], I say that incompossibility in two changes is only from the incompossibility of the terms or forms toward which the changes are. It would first, then, be necessary to prove the incompossibility of the two ‘wheres’, which I deny, because there is no incompossibility of two changes of this sort to those ‘where’ terms, as was shown above [n.148].

151. To the other argument of the same doctor [n.88], when he says that the terms of a change are incompossible, I say that this is true of first terms but not of concomitant terms. And I mean that the first terms of any change are privation and form, or conversely, but concomitant terms are those that are joined to those just mentioned.

152. I therefore concede universally that privation and form are incompossible, but concomitants can be compossible.

153. For example:

In the case of changes in individuals, if an animated thing is posited as having a single form, the organic body precedes the animation, animation being the term ‘to which’. But the organic body is not the per se term ‘from which’ but lack of animation is, because the change is between animation and lack of animation. Now while lack of animation and animation are incompossible together, yet organic body and animation are not.

154. In the same way in the case of corruption: if the same form of the body remains that was previously the per se term ‘from which’, namely the form which is succeeded by privation, the term does not remain, but the term concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’ does remain.

155. In the same way as to increase, if the whole preexisting quantity is posited as remaining, the positive whole term ‘from which’ remains, which is concomitant with the privation that is the per se term ‘from which’.

And conversely as to decrease, some positive quantity that was before remains but not the same per se term ‘from which’

156. Likewise as to alteration in intensity or remission.

157. And in the same way about motion, which is not a contradiction because a motion of acquiring does not involve loss. And then with the term ‘to which’ the per se term ‘from which’, which is privation, does not remain; but the term does remain that is as it were the per accidens and concomitant term, being concomitant with the per se term.

158. To the matter at hand: in this case only a motion is posited that acquires a new ‘where’ without a motion of loss, and this sort of per se term ‘from which’ is privation of the ‘where’ that is acquired. And it does not remain with the term ‘to which’. But there is no term here concomitant with the per se term ‘from which’, because such term is only where there are two concomitant changes and the per se term of one is the per accidens term of the other.

c. To the Other Reasons that were Adduced

159. To the arguments added on.

To the first argument [n.89] I say that one can prove through it that two bodies could not be together, because a natural agent does not intend to expel one body unless it introduces another body. If, then, there were no repugnance in two bodies being in this place here, a natural agent in moving this body to that ‘where’ would not expel the other body and so nature could make two bodies to be together. So, because the conclusion is manifestly unacceptable, I say that there are some repugnancies in respect of created and limited power that created virtue cannot deal with simultaneously, and yet they are not simply incompossible. An example: it is as impossible for nature to make a virgin conceive as to make two bodies to be in the same place and one body to be in diverse places; for created virtue has no power with respect to these at the same time, although their absolute simultaneity does not involve a contradiction simply, as was seen [nn.96-97], and therefore they are possible for God.

160. To the second [n.90] I say that one could concede that the matter of a body in two places might be changed by two agents into two forms, nor would a new miracle there be needed, but the matter would through the old miracle be fitted to receive the action of those agents.

161. However I say otherwise, that if the same thing is put in two places, it does not follow that the same matter would be informed by two forms at the same time, whether of the same or different species, and that one could argue in the same way about this one and about that, whether the agents were posited as of the same or different species.

162. As to the example about food [n.90] I say that the same thing would happen with food taken by diverse things in diverse ‘wheres’ as would happen if two stomachs were to come to be in the same place and the food was in each of them. For then either one power would totally overcome the other and all the food would be converted into its body; or the powers would be equal, and then they would convert the food equally, one into its body and the other into its; or the powers would be unequal yet not such that one would entirely overcome the other, and then the stronger would convert more of the food into its body and the weaker would convert less food into its. So as you would have to speak there about the stomachs of animals existing together and about the food received into each, so I speak in the same way here, following the second proposition set down above [n.130].

163. The same point serves for the other argument [n.90], about fires next to wood in diverse places; I say the same as you would have to say if two fires by the power of God were next to the wood.

164. And if you ask, “What should be said then? Surely the wood would be converted into fire, and into which fire and by which fire? For not more by one fire than the other because they are equal; nor into one fire only, because the agents are two and total agents, and there cannot be two total causes of the same effect.” - I say that either they would generate a more perfect fire, and so the effect would be divisible according to perfection if the substantial form could have part and part, just as one would say about heat. But if they were to generate an altogether indivisible effect, yet they would generate it in the same manner of efficient causality where neither of them could be the cause of the total effect, because the effect would happen after so brief an alteration that it would not suffice for ignition by either agent precisely. And then this proposition is true, that “two total causes totally causing cannot be causes of the same effect.”

165. To another argument [n.92] I say that an animal that exists in some ‘where’ without nutriment, would be nourished in that place if it took in appropriate food in another ‘where’. For although the local motion of the food to the stomach would not be the same here as there (and no wonder, because from the fact that the ‘where’ is different, so can the local mP3otion to the thing in that ‘where’ be different), yet the conversion of food into the substance of the thing to be fed is the same here as there, because the conversion is the generation of a part of the substance of the thing nourished, and the whole substance of the thing nourished and any part of it is prior to the ‘where’, and so will not vary with variation in the ‘where’.

166. And when the addition is made “if it had sufficient food in both places it would be nourished twice” [n.93], I say that either it would take in the food in both places and consequently it would receive food superfluously, because half of it would suffice for its nourishment; or it would take in one part in one place and the other in the other, and in each place (from what has been said [nn.140-141]) it would be sufficiently nourished.

167. To the argument about the small fire [n.91] I answer using the second proposition [n.130]. For let a fire be put in one place and much combustible material next to it as it is in that ‘where’ alone - what you would say then about the fire with respect to that material I say now, for either the fire would act precisely on some part of the material, or if it acted on any part, then, if we suppose that the whole matter is together, it would act on it yet with little intensity. I speak in the same way as to the matter at hand, that the action will not be intense on any part of the matter in comparison with the action it would have on one part if it acted on no other part. And no wonder, because natural virtue works less on more things than on fewer, and on many than on one.

168. To the argument about figure [n.84, Christ’s body on the cross and in the pyx], I say that although figure seems to be quality yet it follows the ‘where’.

169. To the other point about whole and part [n.84, about being curly because curly as to the hair], I say that a part outside the whole has nothing outside the whole that it does not have in the whole; for the actuality that is attributed to a part not in the whole outside the whole is only by way of making a precision.

170. But on the contrary: because continuity is an absolute form and consequently is prior to the ‘where’, then the same body cannot be continuous in one place and not continuous in another; and consequently neither is there a part here and a non-part there in the way that being continuous with another is called a part.

171. Look for the response.a

a.a [Interpolation ] - One can say that figure is double. One is an absolute form and it belongs to the category of the quality ‘form or an abiding form in something’, and so it does not follow ‘where’. Another is figure that is the siting of parts in place and in the container of them, and this is relative form that follows the ‘where’; and the argument proceeds in this latter way. But on this matter see d. 12 q.4 n.387, in the response to the question there ‘But about different shapes...’