a. First: About Christ’s Body Beginning to Exist on the Altar without Change of Place

α. Opinion of Others and its Rejection

29. About the first it is commonly said [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton, William of Auxerre] that this is because of the change of something else into the body of Christ (namely because of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ), and so it is not necessary for Christ’s body to change in itself. For it is enough that something change into it for this sort of body to begin to be present there. Because just as a thing is generated where first something was corrupted, and not through a change proper to the generated thing, so does it seem that that into which something is converted by conversion of something else into it occurs where the thing converted into it first was, and not by a change in place proper to the term ‘to which’ of the conversion, but proper to the term ‘from which’.

30. On the contrary: I suppose that, according to them, transubstantiation, in the way it is admitted to be a change, is a substantial change. From this it follows that the change has some substance as the per se term ‘to which’. But by no change is that per se obtained which is posterior to its per se term. But this sort of presence [sc. of Christ’s body in the Eucharist] is posterior simply to the substance of the body of Christ; and this substance, it is manifest, is the term of the change. For this sort of presence is not essentially prior to it (because the substance of the body can be without this sort of presence), nor is it simultaneous in nature with it (because then its presence could only be destroyed if the substance was destroyed, which is false).

31. This reasoning can be confirmed in another way, by putting otherness for posteriority as follows: By no change is that per se obtained which is per se other than its per se term; but the sort of presence in question here is simply other than the substance that is the per se term of transubstantiation;     therefore etc     .

32. The major is plain, because to one per se change there is one per se term, and so whatever is per se other than the term, although it is per accidens the same as it, is not per se obtained through that change.

33. The minor is plain, because the sort of presence in question here is not the substance of bread, because there is no bread then; nor is it the substance of the body of Christ, because that substance was when this presence was not.

34. A second argument [sc. to the contrary. n.30] is as follows: God can make his body present to any bread while the substance of the bread remains, and yet this will not be by a change that is change to substance as to the per se term, because no substance of the bread is new, and yet thereby is obtained a presence of the same idea as the presence which is obtained now; therefore it must be by a change of the same idea; therefore it would be by a change other than substantial change.

35. The proof of the major [n.34] is that newness of what is prior does not follow on newness of what is posterior. The fact is plain from Physics 8.8.264b9-265a12 where the Philosopher maintains that in a circle there can be motion as to ‘where’ although there cannot be any newness in it as to absolute form. Hence something can be moved as to place without change as to substance (the reason is that ‘where’ is a certain extrinsic relation coming to a thing and not an absolute form). But the presence [of Christ’s body] here is posterior to the substance of the bread, just as relation is posterior to what is absolute, and posterior above all to substance. Therefore there can, without any change in the substance of the bread, be a new presence of [Christ’s] body to the bread. So there must be some change toward this sort of presence, a change that is not a substantial one. And consequently, in the matter at hand, this presence is not obtained through transubstantiation in substance, because a term of the same idea (and presence is a term of this sort) is not properly and per se the term of two changes distinct in genus.

36. And if you say that it can become present to the substance of the bread without substantial change, but yet it does become present through a substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ, and not through another change - on the contrary, God could convert the bread into the body of Christ previously made present to the bread. For there is no greater contradiction in this than there is now when the bread is converted into Christ’s non-previously present body. Therefore, if the sort of conversion of the bread done now is done into the body of Christ already present to the species of bread, the body would not come to be present there again. Or one would have to say that it became present after it was present and that the same presence would be the term of both the stated changes [sc. the change of bread to Christ’s body already present to the bread, and the change of bread to Christ’s body not already present to the bread];     therefore etc     .

37. Third [to the contrary] as follows: what is converted into something preexistent acquires the properties of that something pre-existent rather than the reverse. The point is plain, for if nutriment is converted into flesh, it is animated rather by the soul of the flesh than the flesh informed by the form of the nutriment and, universally, the nutriment acquires the absolute conditions and the ‘where’ and the other respects of the flesh rather than the reverse. Therefore, by the mere conversion of bread into the preexisting body of Christ the converted bread would acquire presence in heaven rather the body of Christ acquire the presence of the species of bread on the altar.

38. Fourth as follows: God could convert the bread into the body of Christ as Christ’s body has being in heaven, because there is no greater contradiction in this case than in the conversion that is posited now. But by such conversion Christ’s body would not then be possessed under the species of bread on the altar; therefore not now either.

39. Fifth as follows: if the bread quantum is converted into Christ’s body quantum, so that quantity is converted into quantity and substance into substance, Christ’s body quantum would not be circumscribed by the ‘where’ that the bread was circumscribed by; therefore by the conversion of substance into substance, the substance of Christ’s body does not have the definite ‘where’ which was the definite ‘where’ of the substance of bread.

40. The antecedent is manifest, because that quantum, namely Christ’s body, could not be circumscribed by the place of the bread, since it is larger than the bread.

41. The proof of the consequence is that just as a substance and a substance (which exist under quantity) are related to definite place, so also is a substance quantum related to a substance quantum as to circumscribed place; therefore that which conversion into a substance makes to be in a definite place, this the conversion of a substance quantum into a substance quantum would make to be in a circumscribed place.

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

42. As to this article, then [n.28], it does not seem one must necessarily take flight to the conversion of the bread into the body, especially since from the beginning, from when there is a thing of this sacrament, it was always believed that the body of Christ does not move from its place in heaven in order to be here, and yet there was not from the beginning as clear a belief about the conversion, as will be said in d.11 nn.105-106.

43. [Certain preliminaries] - I speak to this point, then, by laying down certain preliminaries, namely that when a body moves from place to place and expels another body, there are commonly four motions or changes in it and eight terms: namely two changes in the expelling body and two in the expelled body.

44. For the expelling body is moved from its first ‘where’ to the privation of this ‘where’, and this change between the positive term ‘from which’ to the privative term ‘to which’ can be called a losing of the first ‘where’; the same body too, from its lack of the second ‘where’, is moved to the second ‘where’, and so the change from the privation, as from the term ‘from which’ to the ‘where’ as to the term ‘to which’, can be called the acquisition of a ‘where’.

45. Similarly there are two changes and four terms concerning the body that is expelled when the first body enters its place.

46. But if a body were moved and another body not expelled from its place, there would now only be two changes, and both in the moved body: one namely that is loss of its first ‘where’ and the other its acquisition of a new ‘where’.

But if the body, by not leaving its first ‘where’, were to be now in a new ‘where’, only one change would be in it, namely from its not having the new ‘where’ to its having that new ‘where’; and this would be a change in acquisition. And there would be no change of a losing (which would be from the first ‘where’ to the lack of it), because ex hypothesi the first ‘where’ is not lost, though the body be placed in a new ‘where’.

47. But if none of these changes is posited, it would be altogether unintelligible how the body would be where it was not before. For it is impossible for what was previously not really here to be in any way here without there being some real change in it, or in that to which it is really present; for in no way is there a passage, as to any real predicate, from contradictory to contradictory [sc. from not here to here] without there being some real change; nor is there a reason why this part of the contradiction [sc. here] is more real now than it was before, nor why another [sc. not here] is more true than this one, and so both now and before either both are simultaneously true or both are simultaneously false.

48. [Application of the preliminaries to the matter at issue] - To the matter at issue: that there is a losing in the body of Christ of its ‘where’ in heaven is posited by no one, according to Augustine above, “The Lord is above until the end of the age” [n.9] -and understanding by this, ‘unless it pleased him, by some special grace, to make a local descent’, which is not posited as happening because of the truth of the Eucharist.

49. However, in order to save the real presence of Christ’s body here on the altar, one must posit that there is some presence of it to the species of bread that there was not before, otherwise it would not be more present now than not present. For the change that concerns the species, namely that they were first in a subject and now without a subject, does nothing for the fact that Christ’s body becomes present to them from not being present to them (as was proved above [nn.30-41]); for that presence has per se terms other than this change to make its non-presence become presence. Therefore, one must posit some per se change in Christ’s body that makes for acquisition of this new presence.

50. But this change cannot properly be called change in place, for two reasons. First, because no loss of the prior ‘where’ accompanies this change, as it commonly does in change of place; for one can identify in it, namely in change of place, a positive term ‘from which’ and a positive term ‘to which’, and these accompany two privations, in the way the Philosopher says in Physics 5.1.225a7-10, that “movement is from non-subject to subject.” Second, nor is there properly here a ‘where’ term of the change, because Christ’s body at the term of this sort of change does not properly have here a ‘where’, nor a being circumscribed by something, but its term is a certain simple presence to the species, though a true and real presence.

51. And if you ask ‘to what category does this change and term of change belong?’ - I say that if an angel be placed newly present to a body, that angel is said indeed to be in a definite place, in the way in which it belongs to an angel to be in place [Ord. II d.2 nn.249-251; also below nn.117-118, 146]. And thus is the angel said to change, although the change is very far from a true change in ‘where’.

52. Further, as to the other conditions, this presence of the body of Christ departs more from the true idea of ‘where’ than the existence of an angel in place does, because in no way is Christ’s body by this presence so determined to a single ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it. But an angel is by its ‘where’ so determined to that ‘where’ that another ‘where’ is repugnant to it.

53. And if you hold it unacceptable to say that there is any change of any kind in the real being of Christ’s body, I say that it is necessary at least to posit some respect coming to that body from outside, which does not follow necessarily on the foundation and term when these are posited in act, because every respect that follows in this way comes to a thing from within (as was shown in the question about character [IV d.6 n.295]). Therefore the respect can come to it newly from outside without anything new either in the foundation or the term.

54. So, therefore, it is not unacceptable that the body of Christ is newly present to something that does not have a new absolute form nor a new respect in respect of that body; or if it does have such a new respect then, by parity of reasoning, the body of

Christ too will have a new respect to it, because if the species are newly present to the body, then the body is newly present to them; for although containment is not a mutual real relation, yet presence is a mutual relation. Nor will it in that case be unacceptable to posit in Christ’s body this sort of change to a respect coming to it from outside.

55. And if you object that ‘there is no change that is change to a respect’ - the solution is in the question about ‘character’ [n.53, ibid.].

And if your whole complaint is, ‘this respect that comes from without, which is called simple presence, what category does it belong to?’ - one can say that, among all the respects that come from without, it is more properly reduced to the category ‘where’, because it agrees with that respect in many ways. And if perhaps it is not properly in that category, it follows that the ten categories do not sufficiently exhaust the whole of being; which is not unacceptable in the way the philosophers speak about the ideas of them; because it is not repugnant to find some respect (as of an angel to a stone) which does not have any idea of respect in a category the way the philosophers say. Nor yet does it follow from this that there are more categories than ten, but that the ideas of them, or of one of them, is not assigned under an idea as common, or is not as general, as could be assigned.