c. To the Third Argument

91. As to the third argument [n.23], if the proposition ‘generation is relation’ is true (as was shown in Ord. 1 d.27), and if the inference from abstracts to concretes universally holds of necessity, though sometimes not conversely, there will be nothing unacceptable, rather it will be necessary, that ‘to generate’ is ‘to be related’. But if the force of the words is stressed and it is held to be unacceptable that ‘to generate’ or ‘to speak’ be precisely ‘to be referred’, I say that a subordinate term is not precisely the superordinate one, for the subordinate is the superordinate with some difference added -as ‘man’ is not just ‘animal’ but ‘rational animal’.

92. So I say that ‘to generate’ states a relation, but a relation of a certain sort, namely a relation productive by way of nature, and ‘to speak’ is a relation productive by way of intellect; and therefore ‘to generate’ is not just ‘to be referred’ but ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile nature’, and ‘to speak’ is ‘to be referred by a relation of origin founded on fertile intellect’.