f. What sort of Action is to be posited in God in the case of Transubstantiation

78. But as to conversion in the case of the Eucharist, is any divine action to be posited here?

I say that there is, when one takes action as a relation of reason.

79. But as to action corresponding to action in the category of action there is more doubt. If substance is converted only into substance, so that nothing is transmuted, then passion properly speaking cannot be saved in this case, and consequently not action either.

80. But if, according to the second way, what I posited above is set down [d.11 nn.166-167], that this conversion is of the substance of bread as here into the body of Christ as here, and if the body of Christ as here be passive receptive of a new presence -then one can say that there is passion properly here in the body, and thus action here corresponding proportionally to action in the category of action.81. Nor is this repugnant to God; for God can transmute any passive thing just as nature can, and the passive transmuting is properly passion, and the active transmuting is action corresponding to the category of action, and is not just relation. And then one should say that the category of action can, according to proportional predication, in some way be transferred to God, but not intrinsic action.

82. Of these two opinions the first seems more difficult; indeed it seems barely intelligible how a new action without a term, a real action, may exist without there at least being some new relation without an absolute form in a term; but here, apart from destruction of the bread (whose term ‘to which’ is the nonbeing of bread), the action does not have, insofar as it is some positive change, an absolute form in the body of Christ as term, as all agree; so one must at least posit a new real relation there, and a relation to the agent; nor does it appear that the action could be new unless there is something in the body really new whereby a real action of God may be said to have a term more now than before.