c. About the Two Reasons Adduced for the First Conclusion

α. About the First Reason

358. The reasons for this conclusion do not prove it.

The first, about the incompossibility of the terms of motion or change [n.332], is solved by the fact that the major proposition is true of first terms, which are always privation and form; but the said proposition is not universally true of terms concomitant with the primary terms, as was said above in the opinion about forms, in distinction 10 question 2 the last article [d.10 nn.121-123].

359. And if you argue that here more and less are incompossible, I reply they are so as ultimately and completely informing the subject, but not as ‘less’ is something of ‘more’; otherwise it would be necessary to say, on the basis of this argument, that the whole quantity of the increased thing would be new, which is not probable but rather the parts of flesh in their species, which parts remain the same, are quanta with the same quantity as before; however, some quantity is new of the parts of substance that have come to it.

360. And when Godfrey himself afterwards deduces [n.333] that quantity is not moved from the greater to the lesser, I go along with him (and about quality likewise), because quantity and the greater and lesser in quantity (not speaking of the respect that ‘greater’ involves, but of the absolute that the respect presupposes as proximate foundation) are not essentially distinct, not even in the way the subject of motion must be distinct from the term of motion.

361. And therefore I simply concede the argument that some form of some genus does not change to greater and lesser within the genus; but the whole form, which is greater either in quantity or quality, does so - where I do not say that a per accidens being is the term ‘from which’ and that the whole form (which is lesser) is the term ‘to which’, or conversely; and yet the thing that is lesser could exist in the whole form, which is greater, as some element of it.

β. About the Second Reason

362. As to the second reason [n.335], look for the answer.a Unless perhaps the first proposition, “any part of the rarer is rarer,” is false save when speaking of parts according to species and not according to matter, in the way the proposition from On Generation 1.5.321a2-3 is true, that “any part of what is increased is increased.” And then one should say that rarefaction is not towards any uniform quality in the whole altered thing or any part of it. But in this way: the rarefying agent generates from some parts of the rarefi-able body some bodies finer than is the rarefi-able body; and because those bodies cannot be simultaneous with the other parts that still remain in their species (for ‘two bodies cannot be together’), therefore the parts expel the other parts from their place, and consequently the whole body occupies a greater place. And thus ‘to be rarer’ is nothing other than to have a greater number of finer bodies mixed, by juxtaposition, with the thing’s own parts- such that, in brief, ‘the rarer’ is what thus has finer corpuscles together with its own parts still remaining in their proper form. Nor is it surprising that some parts are able to be converted into a finer body before others are, because some parts are closer to the agent, and more quickly receive its action than others do.

a.a [Interpolation] A first response to the reason could be denial of the supposition tat, namely, rarity is the reason for the greater quantity, or the new superadded quantity; for rarity is a stretching out of extension, which extension is a mode of quality. Or in another way, by holding that rarity implies greater quantity, I concede the point when it is said that ‘any part of the rarer is rarer’ [n.336]; I distinguish ‘therefore any part is greater’; I deny ‘or according to the same quantity’; I thus concede ‘or according to different quantities’. When he says ‘therefore any part is a quantum with a double quantity, namely a new and a pre-existing quantity’ - this is denied. And when the proof is given ‘because, when the greater arrives, the lesser does not give way, therefore it gets greater and is the first part; therefore, they are two’ [n.337], I say the thing presupposed is false, because quantity is homogeneous, therefore it becomes one (as that, when two waters joined together, there are not two waters but one). However, the first response is truer [sc. first lines in this interpolation], as is plain at the end of the question in response to the third argument [n.420]

363. On the contrary: some parts are corrupted at once at the beginning of alteration, and so new substances will be generated; and likewise, everywhere is the body altered uniformly - the senses say this.

364. To the first [n.363] I say that the body is not more rare at once, because greater rarity is only established from occupation of greater place; but there is no greater occupation before there is heating in some noticeably greater degree.

365. To the second [n.363] I say that neither do the senses discriminate spirits or vapors in the air from the air, and yet spirits or vapors in the air are not of the same species as the air.

366. As to the second conclusion of this opinion [n.329], where the fundamental weight of this question lies (because, as was said before [nn.349-350], there is a difficulty in it against both opinions - namely both against the opinion that posits a new total quantity and against the opinion that posits its newness in part) - I argue against the aforesaid second conclusion, which allows motion from an agent and without a moveable subject, by bringing back the reasons that Godfrey himself brings forward against himself and which he tries to solve [nn.341-348].