3. Three Reasons for the Second Conclusion

338. For the second conclusion [n.329] he argues himself as follows (as it can be elicited from this words):

“Just as an accident has, by divine virtue, being without a subject in its ‘having been made’ and its ‘being at rest’, so too can it have being without a subject in its ‘coming to be’ and its motion” [Godfrey, Quodlibet XI q.3].

339. Another reason: “Because just as it has, by divine virtue, being without a subject, so too does it have everything by the same virtue, so that everything that can belong to it in a subject belongs to it without a subject. Therefore, just as extension could vary in a substance as to greater and lesser, and just as the substance would accordingly be said by participation to be greater and lesser, so too will this sort of change be able, when the extension remains without a subject, to come to be in another quantity without a subject” [ibid.].

340. Third: “Although motion does not exist in its complete idea (according to the course of nature that fits it) unless there is some one thing that, as to some form, is disposed differently now than it was before, yet to the essence of motion principally belongs the flow itself of the form, or the form itself in its ‘being in a state of becoming’.” Now this form [in a state of becoming] can well be found [here] even though no subject is differently disposed according to it; therefore too can the essence of motion be found [here].