D. To the Fourth

164. To the fourth [n.112] I say that in no way can an accidental relation be without a subject (taking subject in the second way, the way in which the foundation of an accidental relation is the subject of it [n.146]).

165. As to the proof [n.113], when it argues by division ‘either as it is a relation or as it is an accident’ - I say the division is not sufficient, for it is possible to grant a middle in between them, namely ‘as it is an accidental relation’. For the relation that formally constitutes a supposit per se is not in any subject, because a per-se-being supposit does not have an inherent formal element, speaking properly of ‘inherent’; but no accidental relation is a constituent of a supposit, and consequently, since only that which constitutes a supposit is non-inherent, an accidental relation will be inherent.

166. The point is plain in other things: for there are many special things to which certain things are repugnant and yet not repugnant through the nature of one common thing found in them, nor through the nature of one or other of them, but through the proper nature that includes both the conjuncts. So that if you were to say ‘a is repugnant to man, therefore either insofar as man is intellectual or insofar as man is animal; and if insofar as man is intellectual, then it would be repugnant also to an angel; and if insofar as man is animal, then it would be repugnant to an ox’ - I say that neither in this way nor in that, but insofar as man is a rational animal.

167. So it is in the issue at hand: insofar as a relation is accidental is not being in a subject repugnant to it (taking subject in the second way [n.146]).

168. It could be said differently that it is repugnant to a relation, by its being a relation, not to be in some subject, extending the ‘in’ to the foundation and subject; for neither is a divine relation as per se as the divine essence is per se, namely ‘a being simply unto itself’, not needing anything else at all for its being; and neither is it as per se being as a supposit is per se being; but a divine relation according to its formal idea is necessarily in a foundation as in something presupposed, or as in something formally constituted by it.

169. Also, as for the proof there [n.113] that a [divine] relation is per se because infinite - although the consequence could be conceded, yet the antecedent seems it must be denied; for no perfection formally infinite is lacking to any divine person, because then the person would not be simply perfect; but each person lacks some relation of origin; therefore no relation is formally infinite. And this is plain from the idea of ‘perfection simply’ [or: ‘pure perfection’], because according to Anselm Monologion 15: a perfection simply is that which, in whatever it is, is “better it than not it”; now a relation cannot be simply nobler than its opposite, because ‘relatives are simultaneous in nature’ [Categories 7.7b15].

170. When the argument then is made: ‘the divine essence is infinite, paternity is the divine essence, therefore paternity is infinite’ [n.113], there is a fallacy of figure of speech, just as when arguing as follows: ‘deity understands, paternity is deity, therefore paternity understands’. And the reason for this was touched on frequently in Ord. I [d.33-34, nn.2-3], that in the case of abstract terms the predication can well be identical; but where the predicate is an adjective, predication cannot be true unless it is formal.

171. Whether, then, the major [sc. ‘the divine essence is infinite’] is true formally or identically I care not; and the minor [sc. ‘paternity is the divine essence’] is only true with identical predication. When inferring the conclusion, which can only be true with formal predication (namely because the predicate is an adjective), I am, in that inference, interpreting the identical predication of the minor to be formal predication, because the conclusion could not be inferred unless such was the predication in the minor. And this interpretation, which happens in the inferring of the conclusion, is an altering -just as in the case of him who infers from the premises ‘Socrates is man’ and ‘Plato is man’ that therefore ‘Socrates is Plato’ is interpreting ‘man’ to have been ‘this something’ in the premises, because otherwise he could not infer the conclusion from the premises; and so he is altering ‘this sort of thing’ [sc. human being] into ‘this something’ [sc. this particular man].

172. So it is in the issue at hand [n.170: ‘the essence is infinite’ is a formal predication; ‘paternity is the essence’ is identical predication; if ‘paternity is infinite’ be inferred the predication can only be formal, and it only follows if one interprets the predication that was before in the minor [‘paternity is the essence’], which was only identical predication, to be formal predication; and consequently the conclusion only follows by altering identical predication into formal predication.