II. To the Initial Arguments

A. To the First

153. To the initial arguments.

As to the first [n.104], I concede that any accident there lacks a subject (taking ‘subject’ in the first way, namely as the ultimate term of the dependence of an accident [n.146])

154. Nor is more proved by the argument taken from Metaphysics 7 [n.105]; for substance is posited in the definition of every accident for this reason, that of none of them can a perfect concept, satisfying to the intellect, be attained without the addition of substance; but not on this account is substance an immediate addition in the definition of any accident whatever; rather it is an immediate addition in the case of some, as being the proximate receiver, while in the definition of another it is added as the mediated receiver, being the mediated term of that other’s dependence, and it is the immediate term of the dependence of some further accident on which that other depends.

B. To the Second

155. To the second [n.107] I say that an accident can be the subject of an accident, taking ‘subject’ in the second way, though not taking it in the first way [n.146].

156. And when the opposite is proved from the Philosopher Metaphysics 4 [n.108], a triple response can be made.

First, that the ‘because’ does not indicate cause but concomitance, so that the sense is: for an accident is not an accident of an accident save ‘because’ (that is ‘when’) both are accident to some other thing. For this was something necessary with the Philosopher, who did not reckon that an accident without a subject could support another accident, as was said in the preceding question [n.55].

157. Second, it can be said that the Philosopher is speaking of disparate accidents, as his example there shows; for he says, “I mean ‘white’ and ‘musical’.”

158. Third, it can be said that the remark ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident’ is not stated as true but is stated as something following from the hypothesis that he intends there to reject; for he argues as follows [Metaphysics 4.4.1007b18-20, 8.1012b13-22]: if contradictories are true together then every predication is per accidens, and consequently predication has to keep going infinitely; but in infinite things there is no order, Metaphysics 2.2.994b19-20, because where there is no first, there is no second;     therefore no accident has an order per se to another accident, and consequently this other accident is no more an accident of it than it is of that other.

159. And the text agrees with this way of expounding it, for it does not say ‘an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident of the same thing’ but ‘an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless because etc     .’ by which he indicates that he does not assert the proposition as true but that he is inferring it from prior premises. And if one expounds the text in this way, the opposite can more be deduced from the authority than the proposed conclusion; for, according to this exposition, it will be inferred as something unacceptable, not asserted as something true.

160. And when the proof is given about ‘being per se’ and ‘being in another’ [n.109], the response is plain from the preceding solution [nn.83-91]; for in the way these features are proper to substance and to accident, in that way can ‘to be per se’ and ‘to sub-stand’ not apply to accident, just as ‘to inhere’ cannot apply to substance; but this holds when ‘to sub-stand’ is taken as it applies to what is ultimately the term of the dependence of inherence.

161. And when, lastly, proof through the idea of dependence [n.109] is given, because an accident cannot be the term of a dependence of the same idea - ‘altogether of the same idea’ can be conceded, because a different independence is required in the ultimate term, and this independence prohibits a dependence altogether the same as that which is a dependence on it. But a dependence that is ‘in some way of the same idea’ is not repugnant to what is the term of the dependence - just as every creature depends on God (and that in idea of God as effective cause), and yet one creature depends on another as if on such a cause, but not as on the altogether first effective cause, of which sort is dependence on the First thing. Thus, in the issue at hand, all accidents depend on substance as the subject, when taking ‘subject’ in the first way [n.146]; and consequently, in the way that it is proper for substance to be the term, no accident can be the term of the dependence of accidents as the ultimate term of them.

C. To the Third

162. As to the third [nn.110-111] I concede the consequence about possibility when one is speaking of an absolute accident.

163. But if you are arguing about a relative accident [cf. n.26], using the fact that dependence on the First thing is more essential than dependence on anything posterior to the First - I reply that the dependence of a relation on a foundation is most essential, such that the idea of relation is impossible without it. If substance, therefore, cannot be the foundation of some relation but only an accident can, the relation must more essentially depend on the accident which can be its foundation than on the substance. But this is not because the relation is an accident, but because a relation is a relation, as was said in the preceding solution [n.53].

D. To the Fourth

164. To the fourth [n.112] I say that in no way can an accidental relation be without a subject (taking subject in the second way, the way in which the foundation of an accidental relation is the subject of it [n.146]).

165. As to the proof [n.113], when it argues by division ‘either as it is a relation or as it is an accident’ - I say the division is not sufficient, for it is possible to grant a middle in between them, namely ‘as it is an accidental relation’. For the relation that formally constitutes a supposit per se is not in any subject, because a per-se-being supposit does not have an inherent formal element, speaking properly of ‘inherent’; but no accidental relation is a constituent of a supposit, and consequently, since only that which constitutes a supposit is non-inherent, an accidental relation will be inherent.

166. The point is plain in other things: for there are many special things to which certain things are repugnant and yet not repugnant through the nature of one common thing found in them, nor through the nature of one or other of them, but through the proper nature that includes both the conjuncts. So that if you were to say ‘a is repugnant to man, therefore either insofar as man is intellectual or insofar as man is animal; and if insofar as man is intellectual, then it would be repugnant also to an angel; and if insofar as man is animal, then it would be repugnant to an ox’ - I say that neither in this way nor in that, but insofar as man is a rational animal.

167. So it is in the issue at hand: insofar as a relation is accidental is not being in a subject repugnant to it (taking subject in the second way [n.146]).

168. It could be said differently that it is repugnant to a relation, by its being a relation, not to be in some subject, extending the ‘in’ to the foundation and subject; for neither is a divine relation as per se as the divine essence is per se, namely ‘a being simply unto itself’, not needing anything else at all for its being; and neither is it as per se being as a supposit is per se being; but a divine relation according to its formal idea is necessarily in a foundation as in something presupposed, or as in something formally constituted by it.

169. Also, as for the proof there [n.113] that a [divine] relation is per se because infinite - although the consequence could be conceded, yet the antecedent seems it must be denied; for no perfection formally infinite is lacking to any divine person, because then the person would not be simply perfect; but each person lacks some relation of origin; therefore no relation is formally infinite. And this is plain from the idea of ‘perfection simply’ [or: ‘pure perfection’], because according to Anselm Monologion 15: a perfection simply is that which, in whatever it is, is “better it than not it”; now a relation cannot be simply nobler than its opposite, because ‘relatives are simultaneous in nature’ [Categories 7.7b15].

170. When the argument then is made: ‘the divine essence is infinite, paternity is the divine essence, therefore paternity is infinite’ [n.113], there is a fallacy of figure of speech, just as when arguing as follows: ‘deity understands, paternity is deity, therefore paternity understands’. And the reason for this was touched on frequently in Ord. I [d.33-34, nn.2-3], that in the case of abstract terms the predication can well be identical; but where the predicate is an adjective, predication cannot be true unless it is formal.

171. Whether, then, the major [sc. ‘the divine essence is infinite’] is true formally or identically I care not; and the minor [sc. ‘paternity is the divine essence’] is only true with identical predication. When inferring the conclusion, which can only be true with formal predication (namely because the predicate is an adjective), I am, in that inference, interpreting the identical predication of the minor to be formal predication, because the conclusion could not be inferred unless such was the predication in the minor. And this interpretation, which happens in the inferring of the conclusion, is an altering -just as in the case of him who infers from the premises ‘Socrates is man’ and ‘Plato is man’ that therefore ‘Socrates is Plato’ is interpreting ‘man’ to have been ‘this something’ in the premises, because otherwise he could not infer the conclusion from the premises; and so he is altering ‘this sort of thing’ [sc. human being] into ‘this something’ [sc. this particular man].

172. So it is in the issue at hand [n.170: ‘the essence is infinite’ is a formal predication; ‘paternity is the essence’ is identical predication; if ‘paternity is infinite’ be inferred the predication can only be formal, and it only follows if one interprets the predication that was before in the minor [‘paternity is the essence’], which was only identical predication, to be formal predication; and consequently the conclusion only follows by altering identical predication into formal predication.