5. Solution of the Doubts

a. Solution of the First Doubt

53. Response to these doubts:

To the first [nn.46-49]: in no way must it be conceded that inherence is of the essence of whiteness; and the question moved by others about this seems fictitious and deceptive and without understanding. For even if asking whether the relation [sc. of inherence] is the same as whiteness would have some evidence to it, yet not on this ground is there reason to ask whether it is of the essence of whiteness, because nothing is of the essence of something save what intrinsically belongs to its quiddity; but a respect, though it be the same as the foundation, as was said of the respect of the creature to God [n.50], is yet not of its quiddity, because then no essence of a creature would be absolute. I assert the negative, therefore, that the inherence whereby whiteness inheres in its subject, is not of the essence of whiteness.

54. When argument is then drawn from Aristotle [nn.47-48], I say that he never thought this, that a form which is per se in an absolute genus includes any respect essentially; but the idea of inherence cannot be understood without the idea of respect, unless you do not understand what is meant by the name.

55. The first authority, then [from Aristotle, n.47], is brought from equivocation over the phrase ‘by the fact that’. For ‘by the fact that’ is not always a mark of the formal cause of what precedes it; for when Metaphysics 5.18.1022a14-20 says that ‘to the extent that’ or ‘by the fact that’ is said as often as ‘cause’ is said, the phrase can be a mark of any cause of what precedes it; and so, since substance is a cause of accident but is not of the essence of it, an accident is a being ‘by the fact that it is, in such manner, of being’, designating the causality in the substance. But not for this reason will the formal ‘to be’ in the entity of whiteness be the ‘to be’ of another entity.

56. Thus universally, a thing caused by any cause, in any genus of cause, is what it is because it is, in such manner, of being, that is, belongs to such cause in such genius and order of causing; nor yet is this relation to any cause something formal or essential in the thing caused, because then no caused thing would formally be absolute.

57. However some pervert this text, saying that Aristotle’s text is that “accidents are not beings [sc. as opposed to “are not called beings,” n.47]The authentic text does seem to be the reading Scotus rejects. ³⁸ save because they are, in such manner, of being” - this proposition the Philosopher neither asserts nor is it there [sc. in the text] nor does it follow from the Philosopher’s proposition; for just as the phrase ‘by the fact that’ can denote in the antecedent any cause of what precedes, so it can denote such a cause but not do so precisely, and consequently it does not denote such precision. But let it be that in the antecedent the precise cause were denoted just as it is in the consequent, yet neither proposition makes for the intended conclusion, that the relation imported by the term ‘of being’ is formal in the essence of whiteness. Now the phrase ‘in such manner, of being’ is taken for the substance that the preceding discussion was about - or for ‘totally of being’, according to another text, such that ‘totally’ does not thus state the totality of universality, because then an accident would be ‘of being’ taken in the most universal way, and thus it would not be a being, but it would be totally being, with the totality of perfection; and thus is substance totally being.

58. As to the other authority [n.47, “neither naturally fit nor able [to be separated from substance]” and the other things said there, it is plain how the Philosopher understands it, that it is because of the necessary order of caused thing to proximate cause; but there is not got from this that the relation to proximate cause is of the essence of the caused thing.

59. The authority from Metaphysics 4 and the like one from Metaphysics 7 about ‘knowable’ and ‘non-knowable’ [n.48] could, according to the appearance of the words, be adduced for the fact that an accident would have no formal entity, just as ‘health’ in the case of urine has nothing of the formal idea of health; and if it is adduced for this purpose, it is only ignorance of words. For it is plain that accidents are principles of acting and principles of knowing substance and per se objects of the senses (from On the Soul 1.1.402b16-3a2). But it is trifling to say that something is a principle of acting, either by real action on matter or by intentional action on the senses or intellect, and does not have any formal entity; for thus I could say that a chimaera acts or senses. It is also trifling that something is the per se property of being if it not have per se some entity, or that it is the term of some motion or change if it not have some entity. In the case of all substances, if they have properties, the properties are accidents. Also if there is any movement of growth, alteration, and ‘where’, it is to an accident as term.

60. The understanding of the philosopher therefore in the examples is not that they run all fours, for according to Damascene ch.70 “What is alike in everything will be altogether the same thing, not an example.” And so he says as preface, “it is not necessary for examples to be assigned that are complete and without defects; for it is necessary to consider in examples what is like and what is unlike.”

61. Thus I say that the examples of the Philosopher are to this effect, that just as the essential order is of medicine to animal in what it is ‘to be called healthy’, so the essential order is between substance and accident in having entitative being. But the examples are not to the effect that essential order to a subject is of the essence of the whiteness that has that order the way the idea of sign is essentially ‘healthy’ as said of urine. And the reason for the unlikeness is in this, that there is not in urine any absolute form by which it might be said to be healthy, although there is something absolute there on which the idea of sign is founded, namely the sort of color and digestion and other things that appear in it, but the very order to health is that by which urine is formally said to be healthy. And therefore is this altogether equivocal as far as concerns the name imposed on it from the concept by which an animal is said to be healthy; for although the health is the same that is in an animal formally and that is indicated by urine, yet ‘healthy’ is imposed to denote what has health formally, and what has health as a sign is purely equivocal. But on the other side ‘being’ is not purely equivocal, as was said elsewhere [Ord. I d.3 nn.26-41], and in each extreme there is an absolute thing because of which a thing is said to be a being, although on one of the absolutes an order to the other is founded.

62. To the argument [n.49] I say that inherence inheres in whiteness, otherwise whiteness would not be formally inherent by that inherence.

63. And when you ask about the inherence [n.49] by what inherence it inheres in whiteness, I say that it is the same as the inherence of whiteness, and so a stand is made there. The reason for this is plain in Ord. II d.1 q.5 n.205, because the relation is the same as the foundation, without which ‘being a foundation’ includes a contradiction. Of this sort is the inherence of the inherence, because it is a contradiction for the inherence of whiteness at a surface to be actual and not actually to inhere or not to have that inherence. It is similarly impossible and a contradiction for inherence to exist aptitudinally without inhering aptitudinally, and without being a foundation of the inherence, namely the whiteness itself; and it too is present in this foundation, for a respect cannot exist without being in a foundation because of the special repugnance a respect has to not being in a foundation. But, for the opposite reason, no inherence of an absolute form is the same as itself, for there is simply no repugnance in that form being and not being simply.

b. Solution of the Second Doubt

64. And from this [n.63] the answer is plain to the second doubt [n.50]; for I say that the inherence of whiteness too is not the same as whiteness.

65. And when proof is given through the relation of the creature to God [n.50], I say the case is not alike, because of the major previously set down for this third conclusion [n.39]; for no relation to an extrinsic cause is identical with the thing caused save the relation that is to the first cause, because of the fact that the first cause can create any creature at all without any other extrinsic cause at all.

66. And when the argument about the definition is given [n.50], it would prove rather that an accident should not be defined by the subject, because stone or horse are not defined by God, therefore neither is accident by subject. Nevertheless, although God is the sort of cause without which it is impossible and a contradiction for a stone or a horse to exist, yet it is not so in the case of a subject with respect to an accident.

67. But I reply: the identity, or non-identity, of a respect with the foundation is not a reason that the term of respect should fall into the definition of the foundation as something added.

68. What else then?

I reply that neither is dependence an essential and necessary cause that the term of the dependence be added in the definition of the depending foundation; for then God would more be posited in the definition of any caused thing than substance in the definition of accident. But the cause is that no form can have a satisfyingly complete concept unless that of which it is the form be understood along with it; but a definition expresses the perfect concept of the defined thing; and therefore, however much the essential features of a form be expressed without that of which it is the form, and although the quiddity of it be indicated, yet there would not be a perfect concept satisfying the intellect, and so not a definitive concept either. But if a caused thing that is in itself some subsistent composite is conceived in itself, the intellect rests there, not seeking anything else to understand along with it.

69. And if you object that there is therefore equal necessity for a substantial form to be defined by something added as for an accident as well, I reply that there is a necessity on both sides. The point is plain from the Philosopher in defining the soul, On the Soul 2.1.412a19-21, where he at once posits the body (which is what is perfectible by the soul), or the whole composite (of which the soul is part). Nor does he posit anything pertaining to the essence of the soul save only that it is act, which signifies the respect of the soul to that of which it is the form. But there is not a like addition here and there, because in the definition of a substantial form is added something that, with it, makes it per se one, or of which it is a per se part (I give the disjunction because of the diverse way of saying that a form is defined, through matter or through the whole); but in the definition of an accidental form is added something with which it does not make a per se one, nor of which it is per se part.

c. Solution of the Third Doubt

70. As to the third doubt [n.51] I say that this respect of inherence is posterior to the whiteness, just as universally a respect founded on something is posterior to the foundation.

71. And when you say [n.51] that therefore whiteness does not necessarily require a term for the respect, I deny the consequence; for something can well depend on the term of a respect and yet not depend on the respect if the respect is posterior to it (for thus does the substance of a stone not depend on the respect of the stone to God, but rather conversely, provided they were diverse things, and yet the stone would depend essentially on God, who is the term of the respect).

72. As to the proposition [n.51] “whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect,” I reply: ‘because of’ in the sense of necessarily following the nature of the foundation, but not ‘because of’ in the sense of being required for the nature of the foundation as something prior to it. And because it is a ‘because of’ in the former way, it is not necessary that it be required in the same order in which the term of the respect is required.

73. Hereby as to the following point in the same place [“it can be defined completely without a subject,” n.51], which is still touching on the definition of accident, I concede that whiteness can be understood as to anything included in the idea of whiteness in the first mode per se,The first mode of per se is when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject (as in ‘man is rational’), while the second mode is when the subject belongs to the essence of the predicate (as in ‘man is capable of laughter’). ³⁹ without understanding anything of the respect.

74. And when it is said that therefore it could be defined by its essential parts [n.51], the concession has been made that some idea of it could be assigned that indicates, through the essential parts, the whole essence of it; yet it would not be a definition because it would not be expressive of the perfect concept, for the understanding, when it has this concept, would always depend on something else that is the term of the dependence of the concept [n.42].

75. And when you argue that if the respect is not necessarily concomitant, then the term too of the respect is not required for the understanding of a white thing [n.51], I deny the consequence (speaking of complete concept and one satisfying in intelligibility), since for this is required that the term be understood, but it is not required that the respect to the term be understood as well.

76. And this last fact [sc. respect to the term] makes clear the whole of this conclusion [sc. the third, n. 30] and the response to the three preceding arguments [sc. the doubts, nn.46-51]; for inherence is a certain respect

d. Solution of the Fourth Doubt

77. To the fourth doubt [n.52] I say that this inherence is not a per se property of whiteness but is a per accidens accident of whiteness; for inherence is a certain extrinsically arising respect, and that at least for any absolute accident, because it states the actual union of the absolute to another absolute. Now every union of an absolute to an absolute is an externally arising respect, but every externally arising respect is (for that in which it is) a per accidens accident (as was shown above in a question about character [Ord. IV d.6 nn.295-296]); for it is not a necessary consequent, even when the term is posited (for then it would be an intrinsically arising respect). For a respect cannot arise more intrinsically than what necessarily follows the foundation once the term is posited; for if it followed the posited foundation without the term it would not be a respect.

78. But the proof of the proposition, namely that every union of absolutes is an extrinsically arising respect [n.77], is that neither of the absolutes nor both are, by their idea, a necessary cause of such union; for God can without contradiction separate each and conserve it separately without the other, because of the fact that each of them in respect of the other can only be an extrinsic cause, and not a first cause, such that the point about extrinsic respect makes clear how whiteness could be without inherence, namely as a foundation without the extrinsically arising respect, either because the term is not the respect, as in the proposition just stated, or because, if it is, it is separate.

79. But this point about extrinsic respect is at length reduced to the idea above introduced, the proof of the third conclusion [nn.39-42], namely the proposition that God can make any absolute without what is not of the essence of the absolute, because the absolute would only depend on that as on an extrinsic and not a first cause - and all such dependence is contingent.

80. To the proof, then, about an attribute that is immediately present [n.52], one could say that if whiteness has a proper attribute it would more immediately inhere in whiteness than the inherence does. For the inherence is not necessarily present in whiteness, and that whether the subject is conjoined or is separate. Now inherence is only contingently present, and not by the nature of whiteness but by an extrinsic cause; for whiteness does not make itself inhere, but the agent does. For universally the form is not effective in generating but the composite is, and as in a composite per se one so in a composite per accidens. But what makes whiteness inhere in a subject makes a composite per accidens, namely the white subject.

81. And if you argue that by parity of reasoning neither does the remaining part, namely the potential, neither does it make the whole, and so the subject will not be the effective principle of uniting any accident to itself - this is not to the purpose. There is a solution to it, however, because the subject can well include the form virtually, and so include the whole composed of itself and the form. But not so the accident, because the accident does not virtually include itself nor the subject, nor consequently the whole composed of them; also, it naturally follows the agent, since it is the formal term, but the subject is not so.

82. One could say in another way that although inherence is present most immediately in whiteness and in other absolutes, yet the consequence that it is more a per se attribute does not follow unless the foundation, adopted by some people [Giles of Rome], be proved that a variable accident cannot be present in anything save by the mediation of an invariable accident - on which they base a great harangue about the powers of the soul. But how they prove it let them find out. They adduce some examples, but it would be necessary to see some reason for the conjunction of the extreme terms. If something of the same idea could be an inseparable accident in one thing and a separable accident in another (and this is not denied of heat in fire and in wood), the foundation will be weak.