e. Conclusion

333. The third reason [n.323] therefore can be maintained, namely the second member of the distinction posited above [ibid.], that destruction is annihilation of the bread absolutely. The reasoning about ‘per accidens’ is proof, that because the ‘non-being simply’ of the bread must be said to succeed to the ‘being simply’ of the bread, and because this succeeding of opposite to opposite is per accidens conjoined simply to the succeeding of ‘the presence of Christ’s body here’ to its ‘non-presence here’, therefore the latter will have two per se terms different from the per se terms of the former. Therefore the per se term of the latter will not be the per se term, or not precisely, as it is conjoined per accidens to the per se term of the former change.

334. I also say that the bread is not annihilated in this conversion of the bread into the body. This is made clear as follows, that (as was said in the preceding question [n.166]) one kind of transubstantiation is that whereby the term receives ‘being simply’, and another kind is that whereby it receives ‘being here’. As to the former kind, whereby one term receives ‘being simply’ and the other term ‘non-being simply’, perhaps the fact that the destruction of the term ‘from which’ is not simply annihilation could be saved, because there the per se term ‘to which’ of its beginning would be opposite to the term ‘from which’ of its ceasing (as is the case with the term ‘from which’ and ‘to which’ of generation and corruption), and the negation there of the term ‘from which’ as it is in the term ‘to which’ could be the term of the ceasing. But in the issue at hand, where the conversion is only a transition that introduces the term ‘to which’ of the per se positive change, it is not opposed to the term ‘from which’ of the privative change; and so it cannot be a reason for including the negation of it.

335. One could say, therefore, that this conversion is as of substance to substance, not insofar as it is to the being simply of the substance but as it is to the ‘being here’ of it, so that, just as the body as here succeeds to the bread as here, so the bread as here is converted into the body as here. And these changes, though they are between substances, yet they are changes as between substances, not as between terms; for the terms are only present-ness and non-present-ness, which can be reduced to the genus ‘where’, as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.35, 55.

336. Therefore, just as the body in the positive change does not acquire ‘being simply’ but ‘being here’, so in the corresponding depriving change (which this conversion includes, insofar as this conversion is a transitioning but not a productive transubstantiation) - this change, I say, does not take away the ‘being simply’ of the bread but its ‘being here’. And the beauty of the correspondence is sufficiently plain, because just as the body has a new presence without losing its old presence and states an acquisitive change without a depriving change (as was said in d.10 q.1 nn.48-49), so conversely the bread has a depriving change without an acquisitive change, because it ceases to be here and does not acquire another presence elsewhere.

337. Because, therefore, nothing is acquired or lost through this conversion, as it is a transitioning conversion, save only ‘being here’ and ‘non-being here’, the result is that, by this conversion as it is here, substantial being is not lost and so not annihilated; indeed neither is the bread destroyed by this conversion. However, because the bread does not remain in its substantial being and is, by this conversion, not destroyed (as was said), it must be that it cease to be by the ceasing to be that is from the ‘being of it simply’ to the ‘non-being of it simply’. Now the ‘non-being of it’, although it is quasiconcomitant with the presence of the body of Christ as that body is here, yet not as it is a term of the same genus; and so, if this destruction, considered in itself, be annihilation, yet in no way is the conversion annihilation.

338. An example of this: if the bread were destroyed and an angel were newly created and became present to the species of the bread, the conversion of the bread into the angel would be ‘of the bread as it is here’ into ‘the angel as it is present here’, and by this conversion the angel would only acquire that presence. However the new ‘being’ that is the term of the angel’s own creation would be concomitant with this new presence.

339. This way of speaking makes apparent which transubstantiation can be into something preexistent and which cannot, and which can be when the term ‘from which’ remains and which cannot. For the transubstantiation that is from term to term as to the ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ simply of the terms cannot be of something that is converted and yet remains, nor can it be conversion into a preexisting term. However, the transubstantiation that is a transition of substance to substance as to ‘being here’ can also be of a term ‘from which’ that remains (so that if it cease to be here, yet not cease simply to be and something else as it is here succeed to it). This transition can also be into a preexisting term, if the term begin to be here without beginning to be. Possible too is that the term ‘from which’ is destroyed, but not destroyed by this conversion; and possible that the term ‘to which’ begin to be, and not begin to be by this conversion, as was illustrated by the example of the created angel [n.338].