b. On the Manner of this Possibility

α. Opinion of Giles of Rome and its Rejection

148. [Exposition of the opinion] - But about the manner of the possibility of this conversion, the following is set down [by Giles of Rome]: matter as it is a ‘what’ is wholly indistinct, On Generation 1.1.315a1-2; therefore an agent, by presupposing it as a ‘what’, regards it as altogether indistinct; but God is of the sort that he does not act through motion, and this for the reason that he is not instrument but first cause; therefore he acts on matter as it is altogether indistinct. Therefore, just as he can bring back the numerically same destroyed form to its proper matter (and this because he does not act by a motion that prevents the return of the numerically same thing), so he can bring back the same form into any other matter. But on the numerically same form the numerically same matter follows; therefore God can bring it about that any matter whatever become any matter whatever, and thus he can bring it about that the form of the body of Christ is put into the matter of the bread; and thereby this matter becomes that matter, and form becomes form, and thereby the whole becomes the whole (as is made diffusively clear in [Giles’] first and second trifling proofs).

149. [Rejection of the opinion] - But against the first proposition that he accepts, namely ‘matter as it is a ‘what’ is wholly indistinct’ [n.148]: For either matter is understood as indistinct in number (namely because whatever matter is, as such, a ‘what’ is altogether the same as anything), or it is understood as indistinct in idea (that is, that as it is a ‘what’ it is of a single idea).

150. If in the first way, this understanding is altogether impossible, because it is against the Philosopher and against natural reason and against what Giles intends to make clear:

151. It is against the Philosopher because, when speaking intentionally in Metaphysics 12.5.1071a17-27 about per se principles, the Philosopher says that as things coming from principles are different so their per se principles are different, and different in genus, species, and number. And to the issue at hand he says, “Of things that are in the same species the principles are different, not in species, but because in the case of singulars your and my matter and moving cause and species are different, though in the same universal idea.” Therefore he means intentionally that my and your matter, as my and your per se principle, are different in number. But our matter is a per se principle as it is a ‘what’, because a part of a substance cannot be anything other than substance as substance is a ‘what’.

152. This is also plain from the way the Philosopher proceeds. For when investigating matter, in Physics 1.9.92a31-32 and On Generation and Corruption 1.4.320a2-3, 2.1.329a29-31, 330b12-13, 9.335b5-6, he says that it is the same subject for the whole of the change and for each term of the change. So it is, then, the same in the generated and corrupted thing in the way it is not the same in two simultaneously generated things, for then generation and corruption would not more include the matter than they would include the simultaneous existence of diverse things. Therefore, if matter as it is a ‘what’ is the same in the corrupted air and in the fire generated from it, then matter as it is a ‘what’ is not thus the same in simultaneously existing air and fire. And this reason can be confirmed because, if the matter could be simultaneously the same under the form of air and fire, then there would be no need for a change corrupting what precedes so that the matter would come to exist under a different form.

153. Also against this view of Giles is manifest reason, because matter is prior, in the order of nature, to the form received, for it is the foundation of the form and of everything else, according to Metaphysics 1.8.989b6-7 (in the old Arabic-Latin translation), “In the foundation of nature there is nothing distinct.” Now what is prior, as it is prior, does not essentially vary because of a variation in what is posterior. So if matter, as it is a ‘what’, is altogether the same in itself, in no way can it be different because it receives a different form; therefore it will, as altogether the same, receive contrary substantial forms (or at least incompossible ones), such as the forms of air and fire. And then the result would be that the generator could generate something without corrupting anything; and matter could also be simultaneously the same under the form of man and of ass, and thus no two substantial forms would be repugnant to each other in simultaneously perfecting the matter.

154. This understanding is also false to Giles’ proposed intention [n.149], because he concludes that God can put the form of Christ’s body into the matter of the bread. But if this matter is the same as the matter of the body of Christ, the form of the body cannot be put into it because the matter already has it. For what is numerically the same as it, namely as the matter of the body, already has that form; therefore this matter has it - and if it has it, the form cannot be impressed upon it, because then it would simultaneously have it and not have it.

155. But if Giles means that the matter is indistinct in that it is of the same idea [n.149], and if he thus concludes that God can impress numerically the same form on the matter that is in this [other] thing, the consequence does not hold unless he prove that numerically the same form can simultaneously inform two matters each of which is a sufficient and total receptive subject of it; for this unity of idea stands along with a numerical distinction of this matter from that. Also let it be that this consequent be granted, yet the result would not be that this matter would become that matter, because what is prior does not vary because of a newness of what is posterior. Therefore, the matter does not become different from what it was before by the fact that it receives a form different from what it had before.

156. This point is proved also in that, if the matter did become different, this form could not be impressed on it, for this form cannot be impressed on the matter because it already has it. The upshot is that one may argue thus: ‘if in the same instant the matter of the bread receives the form of Christ’s body and becomes now in that instant the matter of the body, then in that instant it cannot receive the form of the body’, for the matter of the body cannot then receive the form of the body, because it has it before.

157. Again, this impressing of the form of the body on the matter of the bread will not be transubstantiation but generation. For the matter was before in a state of privation of the form of the body, and now it has the form. Nor does one through this obtain how the form of the bread passes over into the form of the body.

158. And then too this proposition that ‘only God has regard to matter as it is a ‘what’’ [n.148] seems to be false. For an agent has regard to the passive subject under the idea under which it induces in it the term of the action; but a created agent can induce a substantial form into matter by generation, and that form is induced in the matter as the matter is a ‘what’, because thus is it per se receptive of the substantial form. Therefore, the natural agent reaches the matter of the passive subject as it is a ‘what’. From this it follows that if the other proposition were true, that ‘what has regard to matter as it is a ‘what’ can impress the same form on any matter whatever’ [n.148], then if a supernatural agent can transubstantiate, it also follows that a created agent could do this, which is manifestly false.

159. Again, the proposition whereby Giles proves that ‘God does not act through motion’ [n.148], because everything else is an instrument of God and God is the first cause, does not hold. Indeed, it can be drawn rather to the opposite, because an instrument, as it is an instrument, should act through motion only because it is a moved mover; therefore that with respect to which it is an instrument must move it, and consequently ‘that of which it is the instrument’ will be able to act on that instrument through motion.

160. However this doctor’s statement could be expounded [differently so as to be acceptable].

β. Scotus’ own Opinion

161. As concerns this point, then [nn.143-144], I say that the absolute possibility of the conversion of the bread into Christ’s body derives from the full obedience of each term with respect to the divine power.