B. Solution Consisting of Six Conclusions

1. Statement of the Conclusions

307. Accordingly the solution of the question will consist of six conclusions.

The first is this: the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist cannot be moved first, with motion or change properly speaking, by created power.

308. The second is this, that it can be moved, with motion properly speaking, immediately by God.

309. The third is this, that it can be moved, and moved first, with motion taken in extended sense.

310. The fourth is that it can only be moved in this way and with this motion immediately by God.

311. The fifth is this, that it can be moved concomitantly and moved to absolute form with any motion that it is moved by first as it is in heaven, and by the same agent as it is moved by there.

312. The sixth conclusion is that it is not moved concomitantly with the local motion it is moved first by as it is in heaven, nor by any motion similar to local motion.

2. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

313. The proof of the first conclusion is as follows, that no created virtue acts on a body unless it is proportionally close to it in place; the body of Christ is not in a place here and so is close to nothing as to place; rather only the species, under which is the body, is close to any agent with the closeness that can be possessed as to the ‘where’. But I said ‘no created virtue’, because although it is more manifest about a body than about an angel, yet an angel, if it acts on a body by really changing it, requires that body really to be close to it in place, or at least to have existence in place, because an angel’s virtue is not able to cause any motion in a body without that body’s ‘where’ being presupposed.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

314. The second conclusion is proved by the fourth reason given for the first part [n.301], because every disposition necessary for receiving heat that Christ’s body has as it exists in heaven it also has as it exists here; therefore its receiving heat is not repugnant to it as it is here, even though it be, per possibile or per impossibile, nowhere else. And consequently, since divine virtue can impress on any passive subject any form that that subject is able to receive, it follows that God could change his body, as it is first here, toward heat.

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

315. The third conclusion is plain from the fact we maintain that, after the consecration, the body of Christ is truly everywhere that the host is; therefore, because of the uniform presence of the body with the host, and because this host has a primary presence in different places according to the different containing things it is in, the result is that the body of Christ has different presences with the different containers. But these different presences are not without change broadly understood, and the change is in the body first as it is here, because in no way does Christ’s body as it is in heaven have one or other presence, indeed it has neither.

316. And if you ask “Could it [Christ’s body] not be present in different ways, and not just in respect of that which, as containing the species [of bread], contains it (so that it would be present by being concomitant with what contains the species), but would it not also be present because of the species and would it not begin to have a new presence because of the other species [of wine]?” - I say that the presence of Christ’s body with the species is necessary, not simply, but only by divine ordination, which the Church has certified. So God could, of his absolute power, make his body not present with the species in this way while the species remains; and make it present with the air containing the host in this way, and also successively present now with one part of the air and now with another. He could in this way even transfer the body from the place of the host to any part of the universe, and always under the same mode of existing, that is, non-locally and while another body is filling the place.

d. Proof of the Foruth Conclusion

317. The proof of the fourth conclusion is that what in no way has a moving power over anything when that thing exists per se, does not move it per accidens when that thing is with another thing with which it does not make a unity, the way act and potency make a unity. But created virtue has altogether no power over the body of Christ in itself as it exists in this way, so as to move it. Therefore when that body is under something else to which it is not disposed as potency nor as act, the result is that the created power will not be able to move that body, not even per accidens. But Christ’s body is under the host in this way, as is plain, because the species is not the form of the body nor the body the form of the species.

318. If the major here [n.317] is denied [Richard of Middleton], because a heavy object in a ship is moved by the mover of the ship, although the heavy object is not the form of the ship nor conversely - the objection is not to the purpose, because the moving power of the ship could act on a heavy object per se if it were heavy per se; and therefore I added in the major ‘neither of which is the act of the other’, because although a thing that is the act of something could not per se be moved by anything, yet it could per accidens be moved by the same thing that can move the whole of which it is the act.

319. But in order to remove all objection against the major, let this major be taken: “When certain things are conjoined by an act precisely of will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, then if one of these things is something in itself movable that is altogether disproportionate to some mover and the other is proportionate to it, the mover cannot move both of the conjoined things with the same motion.” The point is plain, because if the mover moves the one proportionate to it, not for this reason does it per accidens move the other, because the other is not present to the thing moved, neither as act of its potency, nor conversely, nor is it present simply from any necessity natural to it (as the heavy object is present to that on which it rests and is, for this reason, moved along with it). Rather it is only present to it by a will that is contingently disposed to the conjunction, and this will is consequently able not to will the conjunction while nevertheless the motion of the other of them continues.

320. An example of this: if an angel were voluntarily to make himself present to a stone, then if I move the stone, not for this reason do I move the angel, because the angel is not movable per se by my power, nor per accidens in this case, because he is not the form nor a part of anything movable by me. If therefore an angel were, at the end of the motion, present to the stone that was moved by me, this would not be by my act but by the angel’s own proper action, whereby he would make himself present there.

321. In the same way in the matter at issue; since Christ’s body is present to the species only by act of divine will, then if I make the species to have a new ‘where’, the body will not be there by that motion, because the presence, new or old, of the body is not subject to my will, not even per accidens, because it is neither form nor part of what is subject to my motion.

322. On the contrary [Richard of Middleton]: whatever moves something per se, moves per accidens whatever is in it; therefore the created virtue that per se moves the host moves per accidens the body that is per se in the host.

323. Secondly: because otherwise a new miracle would be performed every time a priest moves the host, because this moving could not be done, nor the truth of the Eucharist preserved, without special divine dispensation.

324. To the first [n.322] I say that the first proposition is false, unless it be understood of that which is in the moved thing either as act in a potency or as part in a whole or as something conjoined by natural necessity (as a heavy thing is conjoined with what it rests on). For if this thing is contingently conjoined with that thing by act of will, when the one moves it will not for this reason move the other. Rather there is need that the will, which is cause of the conjoining, be also cause of the motion of that which is not conjoined by any natural necessity to the moved thing. So it is in the matter at issue. And the thing is plain from the example about the angel; for what moves the stone per se does not for this reason move the angel per accidens.

325. To the second [n.323] I say that there is no new miracle, because God, by the same miracle by which he instituted the Eucharist in the Church, has determined to make the body of Christ always present to the species after consecration. And therefore, as long as the species, however it is moved, remains, God’s making Christ’s body to be present with the presence of something else (speaking of presence with respect to what contains a thing, the way the species, as primarily contained in place, has different presences) is not a new miracle but the previous determination of the divine will. Just as if an angel had determined that he would always be with this stone, his being moved with the movement of the stone would not be said to be a miraculous operation by the angel. Nor yet would he who moves the stone move the angel by his action, but the angel would move by his own will.

e. Proof of the Fifth Conclusion

326. The fifth conclusion is proved by the proof that was set down about absolute form, in both the first question and the second question of this part [nn.247, 279]: because an absolute is not varied by variation in an extrinsic respect, nor does it cease to be because of a new respect coming from outside. And there is the same reasoning about an absolute in being as about an absolute in coming to be.

327. This conclusion can be proved in particular by running through the changes that are changes to absolute form.

First then about alteration, because if the body is primarily hot in its natural existence it is concomitantly hot in the sacrament, according to what everyone concedes.

328. Likewise about increase and decrease, because if a part of quantity were to come to the body or depart from the body in its natural existence, it would similarly come to it and depart from it in the Eucharist, because the body has the same parts in one mode of existing as it has in another, from the first question of this part [nn.246-247].

329. Likewise about nutrition, because nutrition is the addition of a part to the whole thing to be nourished, but no part can be added here that is not added there.

330. In the same way about the diminution and corruption opposite to nutrition; if a part is lost from the body in its natural existence, it does not remain a part of the body in the sacrament, nor conversely. And yet I do not say that, if the body were corrupted in its natural existence, it would for this reason be corrupted in the Eucharist. Here one must note that corruption is properly speaking separation of the form from the matter, which matter remains afterwards in a state of privation of form.

331. But if the body were corrupted in its natural existence it would not remain as matter without form in the Eucharist.

332. I explain this as follows, that the soul first perfects what is first perfectible by it, namely the whole organic body; but the soul only perfects the parts of the body because they are some part of what is first perfectible; therefore, when the form of the whole organic body ceases, nothing is formed by the soul.

333. In the same way universally, when something belongs first to a whole and to a part only because it belongs to the whole, then with the destruction of the whole in its ordering to this something, the part does not have the same ordering to it. But now the first thing signified by the Eucharist is the body composed of matter and form (whether body includes the blood or not, I do not care; this was touched on in question one of this part [nn.215-217]). Therefore, when any whole under the idea of what is first signified no longer remains, nothing of what it is as per se signified remains.

334. But when the form is separated from the matter in its natural existence, that which is first signified does not remain in the Eucharist, because then the matter would have and not have the form at the same time. Therefore, at that moment nothing at all of the thing signified remains. For the matter does not remain under the form, because this would be a contradiction. Nor does the matter remain without any form, because it is not contained here save because it is part of a whole. Nor does matter under any other form remain, because it would have and not have that other form at the same time.

335. On the contrary: it was conceded before, in question one of this part [nn.223-235], that the thing of the Eucharist could remain although the body would nowhere have its natural existence; indeed when it is posited that it would be corrupted in its natural existence. Therefore, although the body would be corrupted in that natural existence, it does not follow that it could not remain truly the same as it is the thing of the Eucharist.

336. I reply that the ceasing to be of the body in its natural existence can be whole and total, as if there were annihilation; and there would truly be annihilation if the body were not anywhere; however, the same whole would remain here in another mode of existence. But if there is corruption there, it is partial destruction, namely separation of part from remaining part, and the separation cannot be there without the existence of a like separation everywhere; nor can the separation stand here with the fact that something of the body is in the sacrament, because nothing of the body is in the sacrament save as it is part of the whole. But a material part, separated from a formal part or from a natural form, is not part of the whole; therefore this inference does not hold, ‘if it can cease to be there without ceasing to be here, then it can be corrupted there and not be corrupted here’, because the first includes no contradiction; for it only posits that one respect remains in something absolute while the other respect does not; but the second does posit a contradiction, namely that the same absolute form is informing and not informing the same thing, when only a variation in relation has been posited.

337. But if you say that in both places the form does not inform the matter, on the contrary: because it is against the truth of this sacrament that a part of the body is contained in it unless the whole body be first contained in it; and so the matter without form will in no way be contained here, nor consequently will it be able to be corrupted as it is here, although the whole could be corrupted as it is here, because the matter cannot be changed as it is here from form to privation, which change is what is meant by corruption; rather ‘matter ceasing to have form’ is its ceasing to be part of the whole, and consequently ceasing to be as it is here.A proof of the sixth conclusion is not offered because the conclusion is already plain from what was said in proof of the first and second conclusions [nn.313-314], and will be plain from the response to the fourth initial argument [n.345]. ¹⁵

3. Synthesis of the Statements Made

338. From the first two conclusions is clear how the body of Christ, as it is here, could be moved first (with motion properly speaking) and by what.

339. From the third and fourth conclusions is plain how the body of Christ as it is here could be moved first, with motion taken in extended sense, and by what.

340. From the fifth and sixth is plain how it could be moved concomitantly and with what motion and by what mover.