C. Opinion of Aquinas

22. [Statement of the opinion] - Another statement is that there is something that must dispose the will to be movable by right reason, and such is what virtue is; and something that must dispose the will to be movable by the Holy Spirit, and such is what a gift is. And these two things are posited as movers of the will.

23. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion. First, what it supposes is false, namely that reason moves the will such that the virtue is only a disposition of movability in the will. Second, the beatitudes are not in this way posited as distinct from the gifts and the virtues. Third, from the fact that God has given a habit to the will, he is always assisting the will and the habit to do the acts that befit them (as that after he miraculously gave sight to the blind man [John 9.1-38], he was always assisting the now sighted man to be able to be moved by the power of sight). Therefore, a thing is proportioned to the second and the first mover by something that is the same. Therefore, if a power is proportioned to itself by a habit, it is sufficiently proportioned to the Holy Spirit by the same habit and to any other mover. Therefore, it is not for this reason that other habits must necessarily be posited in the will.